When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

Agricultural Policymaking: Interest Groups and Access to Governmental Officials

Conservation agriculture that focuses on soil recovery is both economically and environmentally sustainable. This lies in contrast with many of the current agricultural practices, which push for high production, which, in turn lead to over-depletion of the soil. Agricultural interest groups play a role in crafting farming policies with governmental officials. Therefore, my study examined three interest group types agribusinesses, farmer organizations, and environmental NGOs that seek to influence agricultural policy, specifically focusing on the federal farm bill, due to its large impact throughout the nation. The research in which data wasgathered through subject interviews, a literature review, and databases found that access to governmental officials affects the amount of influence a group can have. Access is contingent upon: 1) the number of networks (social, professional, and political), 2) amount of money spent through campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures, and 3) extent of business enterprises and subsidiaries. The evidence shows that there is a correlation between these variables and the extent of access. My research concludes that agribusiness interest groups have the most access to government officials, and thus have the greatest influence on agricultural policies. Because agribusinesses support subsidies of commodity-crops this indirectly impacts conservation agriculture, as the two programs compete in a zero-sum game for funding in the farm bills.

Koproduktion von Wissen in der Entwicklung des Biolandbaus - Einflüsse von Marginalisierung, Anerkennung und Markt

The empirical analysis of the historical development of transdisciplinary co-production of knowledge (CPK) in organic agriculture (OA) in Switzerland has revealed three distinct phases. The initial phase shows various characteristics of transdisciplinary CPK and a high importance of experiential knowledge. The 2nd and 3rd phases involve an in-creasing segregation of farmers’, extension agents’, and scientists’ knowledge, caused by internal and external impacts, i.e. foundation of independent research institutions, changes in agriculture policy, and new market strategies. These developments strikingly represent an ambiguous trend: the growing societal and political recognition of OA and the increasing market, which are positive achievements, are associated by a gradual loss of very precious forms of CPK. A successful re-establishment of CPK processes and re-integration of experiential knowledge would help to resolve this dilemma and thus improve future research in OA and sustainability research in general.

The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some examples regarding the Council most recent practice. Research Papers in Law 03/2012

[Introduction.] It is generally believed that while the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order, in the sense of constitutional and institutional autonomy that is to say what concerns the autonomous decision-making of the EU, has been clearly strengthened by the most recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (eg. Moxplant3, Intertanko or the Kadi/Al Baraakat judgements or the Opinion 1/2009 of the CJEU etc.) as well as, in my opinion, in many aspects by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is still valid to add that the principle of a favourable approach, stemming from the Court jurisprudence, for the enhanced openness of the EU legal order to international law has remained equally important for the EU4. On the other hand, it should be also seen that in a globalized world, and following the increased role of the EU as an international actor, its indispensable and crucial role concerning the creation of world (legal) order in many policy fields ( for example let's think about the G20 issues, the global economic and financial crisis, the role of the EU in promoting and protecting human rights worldwide, the implementation of the multilateral or regional conventional law, developed in the framework the UN (e.g. in the field of agriculture or environment etc) or what concerns the Kyoto process on climate change or the conservation of marine biological resources at international level etc), it seems reasonable and justified to submit that the influence, for example, of the law-making activities of the main stakeholder international organizations in the mentioned policy-areas on the EU (especially on the development of its constantly evolving legal order) or vice-versa the influence of the EU law-making practice on these international organizations is significant, in many aspects mutually interdependent and more and more remarkable. This tendency of the 21st century doesn't mean, however, in my view, that the notion of the autonomy of the EU legal order would have been weakened by this increasing interaction between international law and EU law over the passed years. This contribution is going to demonstrate and prove these departuring points by giving some concrete examples from the most recent practice of the Council (all occuring either in the second half of 2009 or after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty), and which relate to two very important policy areas in the EU, namely the protection of human rights and the Common Fishery Policy.

Introducing more equity in the CAP: a difficult challenge. Egmont Paper #55, June 2012

[From the Introduction]. The main question addressed by this paper is how to reach a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments pragmatically, politically and economically? Pragmatically, the CAP is a multi-functional policy, which has to combine different goals, i.e. to be more equitable, green and market-oriented. However, these objectives are not always compatible and require trade-offs. Politically, regarding the CAP’s significant share (40%) of the EU budget and the current public debt crisis, Member States are most likely to keep their attention on the juste retour calculations rather than the promotion of the European public interest in the EU negotiations. Economically, reaching a more equitable distribution of payments should be achieved without significant disruptive changes that could have serious consequences on the costs and benefits of the agricultural sector in the EU. Considering these elements, it is already clear that reaching a more equitable distribution of CAP’s payments represents a difficult challenge.

The European Economic Community's Third Enlargement. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12 No. 6, June 2012

The European Economic Community's third enlargement round brought up a series of tensions between member states, which would require a great amount of time and effort to be solved. Bigger issues, such as the British contribution, the community budget and the Common Agriculture Policy reforms, are going to be at the centre of EEC's agenda in the 1970-80's, and ultimately, British and French national interests on these matters will prevail. The basic argument of this article is that member states used the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, such as improvements in decisionmaking procedures and budget reform, and only after those accomplishments, member states agreed on concluding the third enlargement.

The Penetration of Financial Instability in Agricultural Credit and Leveraging. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 2, September 2011

This paper describes the aggregate rural capital markets of the EU and the main differences between the markets of its member countries. The results of our study suggest that the agricultural credit markets are still quite segmented and the segments are country- rather than currency- or region specific. Financial instability in Europe is also penetrating the agricultural sector and the variation of interest rates for agricultural credit is increasing across countries. Perhaps the most dramatic signal of growing financial instability is that the financial leverage (gearing rate) of European farms rose in 2008 by almost 4 percentage points, from 14 to 18%. The 4 percentage-point annual rise was twice the 2 percentage-point rise observed during the economic recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across countries does not, however, reflect the distribution of country-specific risk premiums in the manner that they are observed in government bond yields. Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial situation in the public sector and in which the bond markets are encumbered with high country-specific risk premiums, the agricultural sector is not directly exposed to a very large risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not so highly leveraged. For example in Greek and Spanish agriculture, the financial leverage (gearing) rate is only 0.6% and 2.2% respectively, while the highest gearing rates are found elsewhere (in Denmark), reaching 50%.

Land Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 1, September 2011

The paper provides an overview and a comparison of land markets covering the three candidate countries for European Union membership: Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia and Turkey. It analyses and compares agricultural land structures and factors driving land markets, based on the available cross-section and time-series evidence on agricultural land structures and land productivity (yields). The land productivity measured by production per hectare of agricultural land varies between the three countries. Agricultural land structures are the result of historical evolution in land markets and land-leasing developments with additional different institutional environments and agrarian and land reforms.

Productivity and Credit Constraints: Firm-Level Evidence from Propensity Score Matching. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 3, September 2011

Drawing on a unique, farm-level panel dataset with 37,409 observations and employing a matching estimator, this paper analyses how farm access to credit affects farm input allocation and farm efficiency in the Central and Eastern European transition countries. We find that farms are asymmetrically credit constrained with respect to inputs. Farm use of variable inputs and capital investment increases up to 2.3% and 29%, respectively, per €1,000 of additional credit. Our estimates also suggest that farm access to credit increases total factor productivity up to 1.9% per €1,000 of additional credit, indicating that an improvement in access to credit results in an adjustment in the relative input intensities on farms. This finding is further supported by a negative effect of better access to credit on labour, suggesting that these two are substitutes. Interestingly, farms are found not to be credit constrained with respect to land.

Rural Labour Market Developments in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 5, September 2011

The significant changes in the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of human resources in rural Macedonia can be explained by the continued trend of emigration from villages to urban areas and abroad. The intensity of emigration has altered the demographic structure and reproductive base of the rural population, along with the income of rural households. The rural and agricultural labour market faces a mismatch with respect to the unfavourable age, education and spatial distribution of the total labour force. A reduction in the participation of women in the agricultural labour force is a new feature. The overall transformation is apparent in the income structure of rural households. An increase in the share of households with mixed income sources notably stems from households that receive remittances and foreign currency funds from family members abroad. The demographic revitalisation of rural areas depends on economic revitalisation, with a more rational use of the labour force and human resources, as well as a restructuring of agricultural production and agricultural holdings. In addition, improvements are necessary in the functioning of market institutions to better meet the needs of smaller farmers and the rural economy.

Do agricultural subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit institutions? The Case of CAP Payments. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 4, September 2011

In this paper we estimate the impact of subsidies from the EU’s common agricultural policy on farm bank loans. According to the theoretical results, if subsidies are paid at the beginning of the growing season they may reduce bank loans, whereas if they are paid at the end of the season they increase bank loans, but these results are conditional on whether farms are credit constrained and on the relative cost of internal and external financing. In the empirical analysis, we use farm-level panel data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network to test the theoretical predictions for the period 1995–2007. We employ fixed-effects and generalised method of moment models to estimate the impact of subsidies on farm loans. The results suggest that subsidies influence farm loans and the effects tend to be non-linear and indirect. The results also indicate that both coupled and decoupled subsidies stimulate long-term loans, but the long-term loans of large farms increase more than those of small farms, owing to decoupled subsidies. Furthermore, the results imply that short-term loans are affected only by decoupled subsidies, and they are altered by decoupled subsidies more for small farms than for large farms; however, when controlling for endogeneity, only the decoupled payments affect loans and the relationship is non-linear.