Turning Agents into Psychological Principals: Aligning Interests of Non-Owners Through Psychological Ownership

Principals who delegate tasks to agents face the perennial challenge of overcoming agency problems. We investigate whether feelings of ownership among senior managers in the absence of formal ownership can align agents' interests with those of principals, thus turning agents into psychological principals. Using a moderated mediation model, we find that psychological ownership is positively related to company performance through the mediating effect of individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour. We also find that the effect of psychological ownership on individual-level entrepreneurial behaviour and, ultimately, company performance is weaker for high levels of monitoring compared to low levels. These findings offer important contributions to agency, psychological ownership, and entrepreneurship literatures.

O Conflito de Agência Exposto ao Efeito de Mercado: Um Estudo Empírico de Precificação de Ações da Bombril S/A

Esta dissertação apresenta um estudo exploratório que tem como objetivo a avaliação da reação do mercado frente aos problemas de agência e assimetria informacional entre os acionistas majoritários-controladores e os acionistas minoritários de uma empresa brasileira de capital aberto, no tocante ao valor das suas ações negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo. O estudo se propõe a investigar o impacto de precificação dessas ações promovendo a análise do seu comportamento frente à divulgação de notícias de crise e fraude da empresa por meio da mídia especializada. A metodologia adotada consiste na aplicação de estudo de eventos para identificação de retornos anormais da empresa desde a divulgação da primeira notícia selecionada, datada de maio de 2001, até a última notícia em outubro de 2005, utilizando-se de procedimentos estatísticos como a regressão linear e aplicação do teste t de student para estimar e comparar os resultados. Os dados foram obtidos por meio do banco de dados da Economática Ltda, conforme acesso realizado na Universidade de São Paulo. Para objeto de pesquisa foi selecionada a empresa Bombril S/A, por estar em evidências quanto a problemas de agência no âmbito do mercado nacional. Os resultados obtidos apontaram que o mercado reagiu significantemente aos anúncios dos conflitos selecionados, apresentando um valor de p-value <0,05 para os blocos de eventos, o que significa a rejeição da hipótese nula, constatando que a evidencia estatística dos dados testados comprova retornos anormais acumulados diferentes de zero. Entretanto, sugere-se novas pesquisas com outros parâmetros de eventos na busca de mais evidências sobre o efeito das informações no preço das ações.

Transplanting Anglo-American accounting oversight boards to a diverse institutional context

The introduction of accounting and auditing oversight boards (OBs) has been promoted on a global scale as a key component of the international financial architecture that has emerged over the past two decades. Such institutions, modeled on the Anglo-American tradition, are domestically organized and embedded within distinctively diverse institutional contexts. Their role is to ease agency problems, improve the quality of financial reporting, and help provide stability in the global financial system. We employ an institutional approach, located within the broader political economy framework of global capitalism, to examine the establishment and operation of the new regulatory regime in Greece. Greece, a member of the European Union, exhibits characteristics of a "delegative" democracy, i.e. a traditionally weak institutionalization, reform (in)capacity problems and a clientelistic political system. Our case study shows that the formation and operation of the newly-established system of oversight is conditioned by local political and economic constraints and, thus, does not automatically translate into concrete benefits for the quality of financial reporting. We also draw attention to the structural mismatch between a progressing globalized financial integration and the fragmented nature of the system of oversight, and illustrate that OBs' independence from local governments is an important but neglected issue.

How important is ownership in a market with a level playing field? The Indian banking sector revisited

Private ownership of firms is often argued to lead to better firm performance than public ownership. However, the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence indicate that agency problems may affect the performance of privately owned firms. At the same time, competition and hard budget constraints can induce state-owned firms to operate efficiently. In India, banking sector reforms and deregulation were initiated in 1992, encouraging entry and establishing a level playing field for all banks. Data for the financial years 1995–1996 through 2000–2001 suggest that, by 1999–2000, ownership was no longer a significant determinant of performance. Rather, competition induced public-sector banks to eliminate the performance gap that existed between them and both domestic and foreign private-sector banks.

Three essays on dual-class stock structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common "one share-one vote" configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

Net-surplus as a useful tool to analyse financial information in co-op societies

This paper aims to analyse a sample of Galician co-ops to verify whether or not it is possible to deduce different financial behaviours among co-op partners from the amount of net-surplus. To this end, our study adds net-surplus to the variation registered in some account entries so that other residual incomes yielded by the co-op may be considered. The distribution of these revenues shows that partners do not usually choose to fully anticipate residual incomes. This reveals that some firms follow a positive net-surplus strategy, which is actually different from the null net-surplus strategy asserted by the classical financial theory. Furthermore, results show that differences between both strategies are statistically significant. This opens a path to future research on determinants explaining why co-op partners voluntarily renounce to anticipating these residual incomes. Such behaviour only arises when yearly accounts render a positive result, thereby making the accounting net-surplus a useful tool to analyse financial information in co-op societies.

Three Essays on Dual-Class Stock Structure

Dual-class stock structure is characterized by the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights. The departure from a common “one share-one vote” configuration creates ideal conditions for conflicts of interest and agency problems between controlling insiders (the holders of voting rights) and remaining shareholders. The owners of voting rights have the opportunity to extract private benefits and act in their personal interest; as a result, dual-class firms are often perceived to have low transparency and high information asymmetry. This dissertation investigates the quality of information and the information environment of firms with two classes of stock. The first essay examines the quality of information by studying accruals in dual-class firms in comparison to firms with only one class of stock. The results suggest that the quality of accruals is better in dual-class firms than in single-class firms. In addition, the difference in the quality of accruals between firms that abolish their dual-class share structure by unification and singe-class firms disappears in the post-unification period. The second essay investigates the earnings informativeness of dual-class firms by examining the explanatory power of earnings for returns. The results indicate that the earnings informativeness is lower for dual-class firms as compared to single-class firms. Earnings informativeness improves in firms that unify their shares. The third essay compares the level of information asymmetry between dual-class firms and single-class firms. It is documented that the information environment for dual-class firms is worse than for single-class firms. Also, the finding suggests that the difference in information environment between dual-class firms and single-class firms disappears after dual-class stock unification.

The impact of culture and corporate governance in dividend policy: evidence from emerging and developed countries

The present research aims to analyse the impact of corporate governance and cultural dimensions in dividend policy. The corporate governance and dividend policy have a close relationship, in that both are evidenced in literature to mitigate agency problems. Cultural factors are also related to agency problems. The existence of agency problems and their solutions differs across countries and it is related to the implementation of the mechanisms of governance. So, cultural factors may have influence on corporate governance and dividend policy. Our sample consists in 1 232 companies belonging to the main indices of 38 countries classified as emerging or developed. To measure the quality of firm level corporate governance, we use the ASSET4 Corporate Governance Performance Index, developed by Thomson Reuters, and as proxy of culture we use three cultural dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede, namely uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and indulgence. We obtained significant empirical evidence that firms with high quality of corporate governance pay higher dividends. With regard to cultural factors, we confirm that in countries with high levels of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, the dividend payout ratio is lower. On the other hand, countries with high level of indulgence have higher dividend payout ratio. However, we verify that the impact of cultural effects is minimized when the firms have a high quality level of corporate governance. Additionally, we found that the impact of corporate governance and cultural factors in dividend policy differs when dealing with emerging or developed countries.

Problems in coordinating multilateral assistance to Thailand, Departments of State and the Treasury, Agency for International Development : report to the Congress /

Publication date stamped on cover.

Temporary disability insurance; problems in formulating a program administered by a state employment security agency. Rev. ed. 1949. [Prepared by the Division of Research and Statistics and the Bureau of Employment Security of the Social Security Administration].

"Appendix C. Selected references on temporary disability insurance program": pages 63-67.

Coordinating U.S. development assistance : problems facing the International Development Cooperation Agency : report to the Congress /

"B-197029."

The role of a state vocational rehabilitation agency in solving problems in a depressed area; project 790.

Cover title: Depressed areas study.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control

Two basic representations of principal-agent relationships, the 'state-space' and 'parameterized distribution' formulations, have emerged. Although the state-space formulation appears more natural, analytical studies using this formulation have had limited success. This paper develops a state-space formulation of the moral-hazard problem using a general representation of production under uncertainty. A closed-form solution for the agency-cost problem is derived. Comparative-static results are deduced. Next we solve the principal's problem of selecting the optimal output given the agency-cost function. The analysis is applied to the problem of point-source pollution control. (C) 1998 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.