How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

O progama empregador de última instância: Sua relevância em tempos de crises financeiras e sua aplicabilidade ao Brasil.

This dissertation aims to continue the work developed previously concerning the properties of the employer of last resort program (ELR) that would be able to promote a complete elimination of the involuntary unemployment from the economy, so much of the unemployment generated by structural problems as for problems of the conjuncture, as the present world financial crisis. Besides, it intends to deepen the study concerning the applicability of that program to the Brazilian economy, estimating their potential target population in the country and the cost with the workers' remuneration. It was presented the ELR theoretical-conceptual structure and a debate concerning their economic viability; the program properties that turn it more efficient than the onetary and fiscal policies (PMFs) in the fight against involuntary unemployment in times of financial crises; a study on its applicability to the Brazilian socioeconomic specificities and an estimate of their potential target population and of the annual wage cost in the country, as a whole, and in the specific case of the Northeast region and of the state of Rio Grande do Norte.

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2010-2011: The region in the decade of the emerging economies

Incluye Bibliografía

The globalization of financial volatility: challenges for emerging economies

Includes bibliography

Korea and Taiwan in the financial crisis

Includes bibliography

From the capital surge to the financial crisis and beyond: the Mexican economy in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

An international financial architecture for crisis prevention

Includes bibliography

Globalization of financial markets: implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Strengthening regional financial cooperation

Includes bibliography

Investment and financial volatility in Latin America

Includes bibliography

The current financial and economic crisis: empirical and methodological issues

In this paper we describe the main causes of the recent financial crisis as a result of many theoretical, methodological, and practical shortcomings mostly according to heterodox, but also including some important orthodox economists. At theoretical level, there are problems concerning teaching and using economic models with overly unrealistic assumptions. In the methodological front, we find the unsuspected shadow of Milton Friedman’s ‘unrealisticism of assumptions’ thesis lurking behind the construction of this kind of models and the widespread neglect of methodological issues. Of course, the most evident shortcomings are at the practical level: (i) huge interests of the participants in the financial markets (banks, central bankers, regulators, rating agencies mortgage brokers, politicians, governments, executives, economists, etc. mainly in the US, Canada and Europe, but also in Japan and the rest of the world), (ii) in an almost completely free financial and economic market, that is, one (almost) without any regulation or supervision, (iii) decision-taking upon some not well regarded qualities, like irresponsibility, ignorance, and inertia; and (iv) difficulties to understand the current crisis as well as some biases directing economic rescues by governments. Following many others, we propose that we take this episode as an opportunity to reflect on, and hopefully redirect, economic theory and practice.

Gold and the Stock Market: 3 Essays on Gold Investments

This thesis gives an overview of the history of gold per se, of gold as an investment good and offers some institutional details about gold and other precious metal markets. The goal of this study is to investigate the role of gold as a store of value and hedge against negative market movements in turbulent times. I investigate gold’s ability to act as a safe haven during periods of financial stress by employing instrumental variable techniques that allow for time varying conditional covariance. I find broad evidence supporting the view that gold acts as an anchor of stability during market downturns. During periods of high uncertainty and low stock market returns, gold tends to have higher than average excess returns. The effectiveness of gold as a safe haven is enhanced during periods of extreme crises: the largest peaks are observed during the global financial crises of 2007-2009 and, in particular, during the Lehman default (October 2008). A further goal of this thesis is to investigate whether gold provides protection from tail risk. I address the issue of asymmetric precious metal behavior conditioned to stock market performance and provide empirical evidence about the contribution of gold to a portfolio’s systematic skewness and kurtosis. I find that gold has positive coskewness with the market portfolio when the market is skewed to the left. Moreover, gold shows low cokurtosis with the market returns during volatile periods. I therefore show that gold is a desirable investment good to risk averse investors, since it tends to decrease the probability of experiencing extreme bad outcomes, and the magnitude of losses in case such events occur. Gold thus bears very important and under-researched characteristics as an asset class per se, which this thesis contributed to address and unveil.

Negative Bubbles and Unpredictability of Financial Markets: The Asian Currency Crisis in 1997

We obtain the three following conclusions. First, business cycles depend on prices of stocks and primary commodities such as crude oil. Second, stock prices and oil prices generate psychological cycles with different periods. Third, there exist cases of "negative bubble" under certain conditions. Integrating the above results, we can find a role of a government in financial market in developing countries.

Career Crisis? Impacts of Financial Shock on the Entry-Level Labor Market: Evidence from Thailand

We utilize Thailand's the financial crisis in 1997 as a natural experiment which exogenously shifts labor demand. Convincing evidence from the Thailand Labor Force Survey support the hypothesis that both employment opportunities and wages shrunk for new entrants after the crisis. We find that workers who entered before the crisis experienced job losses and wage losses. But these losses were smaller than those of new entrants after the crisis. We also find that new entrants after the crisis experienced a 10% reduction in the overtime wages compared to new entrants before the crisis.

Proposal for redesigning the financial system: lessons learned from the crisis

this paper analyzes the singularities inherent to the financial industry, in relation to other businesses, and its implications to financial crises throughout history. The efficient markets hypothesis is questioned, and its impact on the deregulation of the financial system is analyzed. Finally, the causes of the current crisis are investigated, and the general lines to be addressed for the redesign of a financial system to achieve an efficient and equitable capitalism are suggested.