Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

Labor's shares - aggregate and industry: accounting for both in a model of unbalanced growth with induced innovation

The relative stability of aggregate labor's share constitutes one of the great macroeconomic ratios. However, relative stability at the aggregate level masks the unbalanced nature of industry labor's shares – the Kuznets stylized facts underlie those of Kaldor. We present a two-sector – one labor-only and the other using both capital and labor – model of unbalanced economic development with induced innovation that can rationalize these phenomena as well as several other empirical regularities of actual economies. Specifically, the model features (i) one sector ("goods" production) becoming increasingly capital-intensive over time; (ii) an increasing relative price and share in total output of the labor-only sector ("services"); and (iii) diverging sectoral labor's shares despite (iii) an aggregate labor's share that converges from above to a value between 0 and unity. Furthermore, the model (iv) supports either a neoclassical steadystate or long-run endogenous growth, giving it the potential to account for a wide range of real world development experiences.

Evaluating the performance of external fault ridethrough solutions used in wind farms with fixed speed induction generators when facing unbalanced faults

Na sequência da integração da energia eólica em larga escala foram estabelecidos códigos de rede pelos vários operadores de sistema, exigindo que os parques eólicos permaneçam em serviço durante e após a ocorrência de defeitos na rede a montante. Nos parques eólicos equipados com sistemas de velocidade constante este requisito pode ser assegurado pela instalação, no ponto de interligação à rede, de equipamento de compensação dinâmica de potência reactiva, controlado como fonte de tensão, sendo as funções de controlo baseadas em medidas efectuadas no ponto de interligação relativamente às componentes directas da tensão e da corrente. Como a adopção deste tipo de soluções externas é adequada ao funcionamento do sistema em regime equilibrado, este artigo foca a avaliação do desempenho da solução no caso da ocorrência de defeitos assimétricos. Os resultados obtidos através das simulações dinâmicas evidenciam o aparecimento de sobre tensões nas fases não afectadas pelo defeito que poderão colocar o parque eólico fora de serviço.

On the generation mechanisms of short-scale unbalanced modes in rotating two-layer flows with vertical shear

We report on the results of a laboratory investigation using a rotating two-layer annulus experiment, which exhibits both large-scale vortical modes and short-scale divergent modes. A sophisticated visualization method allows us to observe the flow at very high spatial and temporal resolution. The balanced long-wavelength modes appear only when the Froude number is supercritical (i.e. $F\,{>}\,F_\mathrm{critical}\,{\equiv}\, \upi^2/2$), and are therefore consistent with generation by a baroclinic instability. The unbalanced short-wavelength modes appear locally in every single baroclinically unstable flow, providing perhaps the first direct experimental evidence that all evolving vortical flows will tend to emit freely propagating inertia–gravity waves. The short-wavelength modes also appear in certain baroclinically stable flows. We infer the generation mechanisms of the short-scale waves, both for the baro-clinically unstable case in which they co-exist with a large-scale wave, and for the baroclinically stable case in which they exist alone. The two possible mechanisms considered are spontaneous adjustment of the large-scale flow, and Kelvin–Helmholtz shear instability. Short modes in the baroclinically stable regime are generated only when the Richardson number is subcritical (i.e. $\hbox{\it Ri}\,{<}\,\hbox{\it Ri}_\mathrm{critical}\,{\equiv}\, 1$), and are therefore consistent with generation by a Kelvin–Helmholtz instability. We calculate five indicators of short-wave generation in the baroclinically unstable regime, using data from a quasi-geostrophic numerical model of the annulus. There is excellent agreement between the spatial locations of short-wave emission observed in the laboratory, and regions in which the model Lighthill/Ford inertia–gravity wave source term is large. We infer that the short waves in the baroclinically unstable fluid are freely propagating inertia–gravity waves generated by spontaneous adjustment of the large-scale flow.

A critical assessment of unbalanced surface stresses: Some complementary considerations

The wide-ranging survey of twisted growth in polymers by Lotz and Cheng cites extensive evidence consistent with the relief of surface stress being the underlying cause. This complementary note contributes to the discussion by making three main points. First, it is necessary to go further and explain the key issue of how a consistent twist is maintained when, as commonly, this habit has a lower symmetry than the crystallographic lattice. Detailed study has shown that, in polyethylene, this occurs by reorganization of the initial fold surfaces. Second, the suggested explanation by Keith and Padden that. in polyethylene, the asymmetric habit derives from molecules adding to lamellae with inclined fold surfaces is invalid being doubly inconsistent with observation. Third, twisting has now been linked to faster growth by study of row structures in polyethylene. This produces inherently rough fold surfaces in Regime II whose internal stresses drive reorganization and twisting. For slower (Regime I) growth, fold surfaces form with and maintain ordered packing so providing no basis for twisting. These new insights radically alter the context of twisted growth and provide a firm factual basis for further work. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.

The iso-Score Curve Graph. A new tool for competitive bidding

The present work describes a new tool that helps bidders improve their competitive bidding strategies. This new tool consists of an easy-to-use graphical tool that allows the use of more complex decision analysis tools in the field of Competitive Bidding. The graphic tool described here tries to move away from previous bidding models which attempt to describe the result of an auction or a tender process by means of studying each possible bidder with probability density functions. As an illustration, the tool is applied to three practical cases. Theoretical and practical conclusions on the great potential breadth of application of the tool are also presented.

On competitive bidding: scoring and position probability graphs

Iso-score curves graph (iSCG) and mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters (SP) and Forecasting Parameters (FP) can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) used in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. The various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe the main SPs and FPs, and the representation of tendering data by means of iSCGs, enable the generation of two new types of graphs that can be very useful for bidders who want to be more competitive: the scoring and position probability graphs.

Estimating future bidding performance of competitor bidders in capped tenders

Research in Bid Tender Forecasting Models (BTFM) has been in progress since the 1950s. None of the developed models were easy-to-use tools for effective use by bidding practitioners because the advanced mathematical apparatus and massive data inputs required. This scenario began to change in 2012 with the development of the Smartbid BTFM, a quite simple model that presents a series of graphs that enables any project manager to study competitors using a relatively short historical tender dataset. However, despite the advantages of this new model, so far, it is still necessary to study all the auction participants as an indivisible group; that is, the original BTFM was not devised for analyzing the behavior of a single bidding competitor or a subgroup of them. The present paper tries to solve that flaw and presents a stand-alone methodology useful for estimating future competitors’ bidding behaviors separately.

Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one’s own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors.

Share bidding auctions, sliding scale royalty rates and the new brazilian regulatory framework for the pre-salt areas

O governo brasileiro recentemente aprovou uma legislação instituindo um novo marco regulatório para as reservas petrolíferas do pré-sal. Segundo as novas regras, estas áreas deverão ser licitadas mediante um leilão de partilha de lucro. Motivado por esta mudança, apresentamos um modelo de leilão de partilha sob afiliação, demonstrando a existência de um equilíbrio monótono em estratégias puras e caracterizando a solução. Alem disso, provamos que este mecanismo gera receita esperada maior ou igual a um leilão de primeiro preço usual. Em seguida, introduzimos no modelo uma função representando taxas de royalties que dependem do valor do objeto. Este instrumento permite uma elevação na receita esperada de ambos os modelos, fazendo com que a diferença entre eles encolha. Finalmente, analisando o novo marco regulatório sob o ponto de vista dos resultados obtidos, concluímos que o antigo modelo de concessão utilizado pelo governo brasileiro é mais adequado e lucrativo.