Dispute Settlement Alternatives in Future EU BITS. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2012

Following the inclusion of the Common Commercial Policy in the exclusive competences of the European Union, a handful of policy adjustments have occurred. Among these adjustments, investment protection has been a remarkable one - given its new, exclusive framework and an already established, state-level practice. As the new policy stands, Bilateral Investment Treaties, which had been negotiated and executed by the EU Member States in the pre-Lisbon period, can now only be negotiated and executed by the EU. These prospective ‘EU BITs’, inter alia, aim for an even stronger mechanism for the protection of investors both in the EU and in third states. A strong protection mechanism inevitably calls for a strong Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the establishment of a DSM may prove to be challenging. The EU currently faces several questions on its path to a tangible and reliable ‘EU BIT’, and arguably the most outstanding one is the question of the DSMs to be incorporated in these new agreements. What are the alternatives of a DSM for these new BITs? Which alternatives are currently utilizable and which ones are not? What are the current problems that the EU face, and how can those problems be tackled? Is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes an alternative, and if not, why? Following a thorough overview, this paper aims to analyse the DSM alternatives for the EU to be used in the new EU BITs and ultimately provide a solid DSM proposal.

Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

Problems and policies of dispute settlement and wage stabilization during World War II.

Mode of access: Internet.

Variation in Mississippian settlement patterns : the Larson settlement system in the central Illinois River Valley /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-81).

Política e direito nas contramedidas no direito internacional geral e na Organização Mundial do Comércio

Esta dissertação concentra suas investigações nas contramedidas do direito internacional geral e da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). No âmbito do direito internacional, estudou-se a essência política da sociedade internacional descentralizada, bem como a tendência do processo de fragmentação do direito internacional em direção a regimes mais regulados pelo direito. Além disso, investigou-se a tentativa de ampliação da normatização das contramedidas por meio do Projeto de Artigos sobre Responsabilidade Internacional do Estado de 2001. No âmbito do regime especial da OMC, analisou-se o maior adensamento jurídico das contramedidas como ponto culminante na fase de implementação das decisões no sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Com base na avaliação sobre a necessidade de reforma do instituto das contramedidas da OMC, foram pesquisadas as principais propostas para sua modificação, buscando-se identificar a tentativa de redução do espaço político. A hipótese deste trabalho partiu da afirmação sobre a existência de uma tendência evolutiva no direito internacional geral e na OMC no que tange ao aumento da juridicidade do instituto das contramedidas. Entretanto, essa hipótese confirmou-se apenas parcialmente, pois a tentativa de aprimorar a regulamentação jurídica do instituto das contramedidas ocorre em meio à permanência de elementos políticos.

Os Estados Unidos e o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da OMC: Um estudo da participação dos EUA na criação e no uso do mecanismo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Low-Income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the Sleeping Dog?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most judicialized dispute settlement systems in international politics. While a general appreciation has developed that the system has worked quite well, research has not paid sufficient attention to the weakest actors in the system. This paper addresses the puzzle of missing cases of least-developed countries initiating WTO disputes settlement procedures. It challenges the existing literature on developing countries in WTO dispute settlement which predominantly focuses on legal capacity and economic interests. The paper provides an argument that the small universe of ‘actionable cases’, the option of free riding and the assessment of the perceived opportunity costs related to other foreign policy priorities better explain the absence of cases. In addition (and somewhat counterintuitively), we argue that the absence of cases is not necessarily bad news and shows how the weakest actors can use the dispute settlement system in a ‘lighter version’ or in indirect ways. The argument is empirically assessed by conducting a case study on four West African cotton-producing countries (C4) and their involvement in dispute settlement.

The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body

The authority of an international court (IC) is not necessarily evolutionary and its development unidirectional. This article addresses the authority of the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and shows how it rapidly and almost immediately became extensive, but has since exhibited signs of becoming more fragile. The article applies a typology of IC authority developed by Alter, Helfer and Madsen (2014) and explains the transformation from narrow authority (a dispute resolution venue under the GATT based on political negotiations) to extensive authority (a judicialized WTO dispute settlement system with a sophisticated case law) and presents empirical indicators of the rise of the AB’s authority. Such rapid development of extensive authority is arguably a unique case in international politics at the multilateral level. That authority nonetheless remains fragile, and shows signs that it could decline significantly for reasons we explain.

Will the TPP destroy our healthcare system?

Could the TPP force Australia to adopt an American-style model of private health? Dr Matthew Rimmer, Professor of intellectual property and innovation law at QUT, explains. There has been much concern that Australian citizens and residents are being ripped off on the price of medicines by multinational pharmaceutical drug companies. And the problem is only likely to be exacerbated by global trade deals — like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a regional agreement under negotiation at the moment, involving a dozen countries across the Pacific Rim, including Australia and the United States. The secret trade agreement covers a score of topics — including such matters as intellectual property, investment, transparency in health procedures, and trade in services. The Trans-Pacific Partnership will have a significant impact upon the health of everyone in the Pacific Rim — particularly their ability to buy affordable medicines.

Popular participation in labour law: The new labour dispute resolution tribunal

The Labour Tribunal Law (No. 45 of 2004) ushered in a new court-annexed dispute resolution system for industrial relations disputes in Japan (outlined generally in Sugeno, 2004). Similar to the lay judge system for criminal trials (Johnson and Shinomiya, Chapter 2), the new tribunal adopts an adjudicative model that blends professional and lay expertise with decisions heard by a tripartite panel comprising a professional judge and two lay judges recommended by management and labour unions respectively. The new tribunal system came into operation on 1 April 2006.

Labor Provisions from NAFTA to CAFTA: Standards That Work, or a Work in Progress?

The emerging U.S. approach linking free trade to domestic labor protections is a practical framework on which to base substantive and procedural rights. Nevertheless, much more can be done in future agreements to improve these safeguards for workers in a way that will maximize the gains from trade and reduce the most harmful effects of development. In order to improve future agreements, the U.S. should expand access to consultations within the dispute resolution mechanism, focus complaints on core rights such as organization and bargaining, encourage the development of small independent unions in corporatist cultures, and incorporate the ILO into the dispute settlement process. Finally, the civil law systems of Central America and the Anglo-American common law system may have fundamentally different understandings of the rule of law. This difference in understanding may pose a significant disadvantage for developing or civil law systems entering treaties with the U.S., and should be better understood by both sides in order to maintain the credibility of the law and the effectiveness of the treaty.