One-sided tolerance interval in a two-way balanced nested model with mixed effects

In many research areas (such as public health, environmental contamination, and others) one deals with the necessity of using data to infer whether some proportion (%) of a population of interest is (or one wants it to be) below and/or over some threshold, through the computation of tolerance interval. The idea is, once a threshold is given, one computes the tolerance interval or limit (which might be one or two - sided bounded) and then to check if it satisfies the given threshold. Since in this work we deal with the computation of one - sided tolerance interval, for the two-sided case we recomend, for instance, Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [5]. Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4] performed the computation of upper tolerance limit in balanced and unbalanced one-way random effects models, whereas Fonseca et al [3] performed it based in a similar ideas but in a tow-way nested mixed or random effects model. In case of random effects model, Fonseca et al [3] performed the computation of such interval only for the balanced data, whereas in the mixed effects case they dit it only for the unbalanced data. For the computation of twosided tolerance interval in models with mixed and/or random effects we recomend, for instance, Sharma and Mathew [7]. The purpose of this paper is the computation of upper and lower tolerance interval in a two-way nested mixed effects models in balanced data. For the case of unbalanced data, as mentioned above, Fonseca et al [3] have already computed upper tolerance interval. Hence, using the notions persented in Fonseca et al [3] and Krishnamoorthy and Mathew [4], we present some results on the construction of one-sided tolerance interval for the balanced case. Thus, in order to do so at first instance we perform the construction for the upper case, and then the construction for the lower case.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities

In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities.

Transformation into Platform - How can an organisation move from a single-sided business to platforms? A case study at Lyyti

The research studies the transformation from a single-sided offering to a multi-sided platform. The study aims to define platforms and their benefits, creating a theoretical framework by applying change management models with the platform theory, and by finding critical change points of the transformation. The empirical research was done by utilizing action research. The researcher worked as project manager in the case company, and studied the transformation project by working actively and leading the project team. The result of the project was a study of how the company would be able to manage the transformation. The results clearly showed that the company didn’t have the capabilities to finish the transformation. As a conclusion, the study showed that the critical change points that led to the project failure were, that the project was managed with insufficient change managerial efforts, which later resulted as lack of commitment to re-allocating the resources to complete the transformation. Many of the critical change points were results of combined change managerial and platform-related issues.

Task assignment algorithms for two-type heterogeneous multiprocessors

Consider the problem of assigning real-time tasks on a heterogeneous multiprocessor platform comprising two different types of processors — such a platform is referred to as two-type platform. We present two linearithmic timecomplexity algorithms, SA and SA-P, each providing the follow- ing guarantee. For a given two-type platform and a given task set, if there exists a feasible task-to-processor-type assignment such that tasks can be scheduled to meet deadlines by allowing them to migrate only between processors of the same type, then (i) using SA, it is guaranteed to find such a feasible task-to- processor-type assignment where the same restriction on task migration applies but given a platform in which processors are 1+α/2 times faster and (ii) SA-P succeeds in finding 2 a feasible task-to-processor assignment where tasks are not allowed to migrate between processors but given a platform in which processors are 1+α/times faster, where 0<α≤1. The parameter α is a property of the task set — it is the maximum utilization of any task which is less than or equal to 1.

Task assignment algorithms for two-type heterogeneous multiprocessors

Consider the problem of assigning implicit-deadline sporadic tasks on a heterogeneous multiprocessor platform comprising two different types of processors—such a platform is referred to as two-type platform. We present two low degree polynomial time-complexity algorithms, SA and SA-P, each providing the following guarantee. For a given two-type platform and a task set, if there exists a task assignment such that tasks can be scheduled to meet deadlines by allowing them to migrate only between processors of the same type (intra-migrative), then (i) using SA, it is guaranteed to find such an assignment where the same restriction on task migration applies but given a platform in which processors are 1+α/2 times faster and (ii) SA-P succeeds in finding a task assignment where tasks are not allowed to migrate between processors (non-migrative) but given a platform in which processors are 1+α times faster. The parameter 0<α≤1 is a property of the task set; it is the maximum of all the task utilizations that are no greater than 1. We evaluate average-case performance of both the algorithms by generating task sets randomly and measuring how much faster processors the algorithms need (which is upper bounded by 1+α/2 for SA and 1+α for SA-P) in order to output a feasible task assignment (intra-migrative for SA and non-migrative for SA-P). In our evaluations, for the vast majority of task sets, these algorithms require significantly smaller processor speedup than indicated by their theoretical bounds. Finally, we consider a special case where no task utilization in the given task set can exceed one and for this case, we (re-)prove the performance guarantees of SA and SA-P. We show, for both of the algorithms, that changing the adversary from intra-migrative to a more powerful one, namely fully-migrative, in which tasks can migrate between processors of any type, does not deteriorate the performance guarantees. For this special case, we compare the average-case performance of SA-P and a state-of-the-art algorithm by generating task sets randomly. In our evaluations, SA-P outperforms the state-of-the-art by requiring much smaller processor speedup and by running orders of magnitude faster.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

The Pelosi-type versus the modified Misgav-Ladach: a randomized trial of two surgical techniques for cesarean section

Cesarean section (CS) is now the most common major surgical procedure performed on women worldwide. A quarter of deliveries in Spain are performed by cesarean section. With the increasing rates of the operation, there is the need to use evidence-based techniques to optimize outcomes and minimize complications. The goal of this study is to employ a well-designed randomized controlled trial to evaluate the intraoperative blood loss of two surgical techniques for cesarean section, the Pelosi-type and the modified Misgav-Ladach. The trial will take place in Hospital Universitari de Girona Dr. Josep Trueta From 2014 to 2015, 512 pregnant women undergoing delivery by their first lower segment cesarean section in this center will be selected through a consecutive nonprobability sampling. We will collect the main obstetrical characteristics, intraoperative outcomes, short-term outcomes for the baby and postoperative outcomes. We will evaluate the intraoperative blood loss by comparing the changes in hemoglobin levels, pre and postoperatively. Patients will be followed during the postoperative period and in a two-week postoperative appointment. We will analyze the continuous variables, such as the differences in hemoglobin levels, using an unpaired two-sided Student’s t-test, while for the categorical variables Fischer’s exact test will be used

Coopetition as a lead generating mechanism: design, modelling and simulation

The aim of this research is to develop a tool that could allow to organize coopetitional relationships between organizations on the basis of two-sided Internet platform. The main result of current master thesis is a detailed description of the concept of the lead generating internet platform-based coopetition. With the tools of agent-based modelling and simulation, there were obtained results that could be used as a base for suggestion that the developed concept is able to cause a positive effect on some particular industries (e.g. web-design studios market) and potentially can bring some benefits and extra profitability for most companies that operate on this particular industry. Also on the basis of the results it can be assumed that the developed instrument is also able to increase the degree of transparency of the market to which it is applied.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.