Legal practitioners’ negligence liability for claim investigation and advice

Nigam v Harm (No 2) [2011] WASCA 221, Western Australia Court of Appeal, 18 October 2011

An analysis of Australia's legal regime for imposing liability on manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs

Following a trial in June 2009 where the Federal Court heard submissions regarding whether Merck Sharpe and Dohme Australia should be held liable for an increased risk of cardiovascular conditions noted in patients who had taken the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx, a judgment was handed down against MSDA in March 2010. MSDA appealed to the Full Federal Court, where they were successful. Special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was rejected in May 2012. This article will examine the themes raised in the trial judgment and the appropriateness of Australia’s statutory consumer protection regime through the lens of pharmaceutical drug injuries and side effects.

An examination of the liability of a construction contract certifier who gets it wrong

Construction contracts often provide that decisions under the contract will be made by a certifier. This paper reviews the liability issues when a certifier makes a mistake. We do that in light of recent pronouncements by the High Court of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal on negligence. We look at this question in the context of traditional construction contract arrangements and also consider the implications for Public Private Partnerships and the typical contract arrangements entered into to facilitate these transactions.

Liability in negligence and the failure to disclose multiple risks in surgery : I would have been willing to run the risk

It has been 21 years since the decision in Rogers v Whitaker and the legal principles concerning informed consent and liability for negligence are still strongly grounded in this landmark High Court decision. This paper considers more recent developments in the law concerning the failure to disclose inherent risks in medical procedures, focusing on the decision in Wallace v Kam [2013] HCA 19. In this case, the appellant underwent a surgical procedure that carried a number of risks. The surgery itself was not performed in a sub-standard way, but the surgeon failed to disclose two risks to the patient, a failure that constituted a breach of the surgeon’s duty of care in negligence. One of the undisclosed risks was considered to be less serious than the other, and this lesser risk eventuated causing injury to the appellant. The more serious risk did not eventuate, but the appellant argued that if the more serious risk had been disclosed, he would have avoided his injuries completely because he would have refused to undergo the procedure. Liability was disputed by the surgeon, with particular reference to causation principles. The High Court of Australia held that the appellant should not be compensated for harm that resulted from a risk he would have been willing to run. We examine the policy reasons underpinning the law of negligence in this specific context and consider some of the issues raised by this unusual case. We question whether some of the judicial reasoning adopted in this case, represents a significant shift in traditional causation principles.

Medical negligence, causation and liability for non-disclosure of risk : a post-wallace framework and critique

Through an examination of Wallace v Kam, this article considers and evaluates the law of causation in the specific context of a medical practitioner’s duty to provide information to patients concerning material risks of treatment. To supply a contextual background for the analysis which follows, Part II summarises the basic principles of causation law, while Part III provides an overview of the case and the reasoning adopted in the decisions at first instance and on appeal. With particular emphasis upon the reasoning in the courts of appeal, Part IV then examines the implications of the case in the context of other jurisprudence in this field and, in so doing, provides a framework for a structured consideration of causation issues in future non-disclosure cases under the Australian civil liability legislation. As will become clear, Wallace was fundamentally decided on the basis of policy reasoning centred upon the purpose behind the legal duty violated. Although the plurality in Rogers v Whitaker rejected the utility of expressions such as ‘the patient’s right of self-determination’ in this context, some Australian jurisprudence may be thought to frame the practitioner’s duty to warn in terms of promoting a patient’s autonomy, or right to decide whether to submit to treatment proposed. Accordingly, the impact of Wallace upon the protection of this right, and the interrelation between it and the duty to warn’s purpose, is investigated. The analysis in Part IV also evaluates the courts’ reasoning in Wallace by questioning the extent to which Wallace’s approach to liability and causal connection in non-disclosure of risk cases: depends upon the nature and classification of the risk(s) in question; and can be reconciled with the way in which patients make decisions. Finally, Part V adopts a comparative approach by considering whether the same decision might be reached if Wallace was determined according to English law.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Valuers, liability and insurance obligations revisited

- Overview of negligence from the valuer’s perspective - Consideration of defences - Impact of lender conduct - Insurance obligations and impact for the valuer

Don't argue with the ref! - Legal liability for incorrect decisions of sports' officials

This paper continues the conversation from recent articles examining potential remedies available for incorrect decisions by sports officials. In particular, this article focuses on bringing an action against an official in negligence for pure economic loss. Using precedent cases, it determines that such an action would have a low chance of success, as a duty of care would be difficult to establish. Even if that could be overcome, an aggrieved player or team would still face further hurdles at the stages of breach, causation and defences. The article concludes by proposing some options to further reduce the small risk of liability to officials.

Medical negligence, causation and 'exceptional cases' under the civil liability legislation

Under the civil liability legislation enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, factual causation will be established if, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant can prove that the defendant's negligence was 'a necessary condition of the occurrence of the [claimant's] harm'. Causation will then be satisfied by showing that the harm would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's breach of their duty of care. However, in an exceptional or appropriate case, sub-section 2 of the legislation provides that if the 'but for' test is not met, factual causation may instead be determined in accordance with other 'established principles'. In such a case, 'the court is to consider (amongst other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed' on the negligent party.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Personal Injury Liability in Sport: Emerging Trends

Violent play during the course of a game or sport is not a new phenomenon; accompanying legal proceedings are. This article considers personal injury liability for injuries inflicted by a participant upon an opponent during a sporting pursuit. The jurisdictional focus is on England and Wales. The sporting emphasis of the article is on competitive, body contact games. The legal emphasis is on the tort of negligence. Analogous to the law of criminal assault, breach of "implied sporting consent" or the volenti of the claimant will be seen as central in application, as assessed through a number of objective criteria, including the skill level of the injuring party and whether that defendant was acting in "reckless disregard" of the claimant's safety. These criteria or evidential guidelines, which emerge from a careful doctrinal analysis of the relevant case law, are seen as crucial to the examination of the appropriate degree of care in negligence within the prevailing circumstances of sport. The article also searches for some theoretical coherency within the case law, premising it on Fletcher's idea of reciprocal risk-taking. In addition, the underlying policy-related issue of sport's social utility is discussed, as are practical matters relating to vicarious liability, insurance and the measure of damages for "lost sporting opportunity". Moreover, it will be shown that personal injury claims relating to sports participant liability now extend to a consideration of the duties of coaches, referees, sports governing bodies and schools. Finally, this article is set against the backdrop of an apparently spiralling "compensation culture" and the concomitant threat that that "blame culture" poses for the future promotion, operation and administration of sport.

Professional Services: Civil Liability for Deficiency

This study deals the professional Services civil Liability for deficiency with special reference to medical professionals.the study deals with the characteristics of profession,basis of liability , historical evolution of legal controls on professional services, liability of doctors for negligence under tort law. Expectations to liability for medical negligence are critically evaluated. consent of medical treatment etc are studied

The high court on vicarious liability

Vicarious liability (respondeat superior) is a venerable common law doctrine which holds an employer liable for the torts of employees, regardless of the fault of the employer. An employer's liability for the torts of its employees can represent a significant financial obligation and can affect both hiring and operational decisions of businesses. Vicarious liability is a prominent theme in the background of much litigation and is often the reason for litigating the issue of whether or not a worker is an employee. Vicarious liability may also arise through other relationships, such as partnership and agency. Two recent decisions by the High Court of Australia have drawn attention to the issue of vicarious liability. These decisions illuminate the High Court's view of vicarious liability's two main streams: negligence (Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd) n2 and intentional tort (NSW v Lepore). [*2] n3

An overview of liability and compensation for personal injury in China under the general principles of civil law

This article reviews the personal injury tort system in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese torts law has a number of unique features. To begin with, it is quite new — the legal framework of torts law was established only in 1986. The unique features of the Chinese torts law also stem from its long and difficult evolution over nearly 40 years. Equally important has been the remarkable blend of influences that have shaped its current law — a mixture of socialist objectives, capitalist pragmatism, and feudal doctrines combined with jurisprudential models taken from a range of western civil codes and, more recently, the common law.

Part one of the article briefly analyses the most important features of the existing Chinese legal system. Part two provides a background to the enactment of the General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL), which incorporates Chinese torts law. The review looks at the development and drafting of the GPCL legislation, and the influences that guided the formulation of legal principles. Part three of the article provides an overview of the torts law provisions in the GPCL. Part four examines the law of personal injury established by the GPCL. Part five uses some case studies to illustrate the principles highlighted in the previous two parts and part six contains a brief conclusion and some pointers to the directions that Chinese torts law may take in the future.