What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Designing persuasive third party applications for social networking services based on the 3D-RAB model

The use of social networks services for promoting business, teaching, learning, persuasion and spread of information continues to attract attention as most social networking services (SNSs) now allow third party applications to operate on their sites. In the field of persuasive technology, the ability of SNSs to build relationships among their users and create momentum and enthusiasm through rapid cycles also give it a greater advantage over other persuasive technology approaches. In this paper we discuss the 3-dimensional relationship between attitude and behavior (3D-RAB) model, and demonstrate how it can be used in designing third-party persuasive applications in SNSs by considering external factors which affects persuasive strategies.

Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance

This paper studies the empirical effects of risk classification in the mandatory third-party motor insurance of Germany following the European Union’s directive to de-regulate insurance tariffs of 1994. We find evidence that inefficient risk categories had been selected while potentially efficient information was dismissed. Risk classification did generally not improve the efficiency of contracting or the composition of insureds in this market. These findings are partly explained by the continuing existence of institutional restraints in this market such as compulsory fixed coverage and unitary owner insurance.

Third party assessments in trust problems with conflict of interest: An experiment on the effects of promisesm

Is it possible to elicit reliable assessment from an assessor having a conflict of interest (e.g. a professor that writes a recommendation letter for a formal PhD student)? We propose an experimental test and show that compared to a not-incentivized assessment, a promise to give a truthful assessment reduces misreporting to the same extent as an incentivized assessment (i.e. when the assessor gains higher payoff if the assessment is correct).

Intergroup bias in third-party punishment stems from both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

Third-party complaints and firm performance: an application in Spanish banking

This article focuses on the impact of third-party complaints on firm performance. We propose two research hypotheses, which are developed from the literature of dissatisfaction, emotions, and economics. The methodology is based on an event study to estimate variation in firm share returns in the stock market due to the publication of the Annual Complaints Service Report by the Bank of Spain; as well as a regression analysis to examine the impact of the number of complaints per branch on the variation obtained. The empirical focus is on a sample of eleven banks to which complaints were made and which were quoted on the Spanish Stock Exchange between 1992 and 2001. The results show a negative impact of the publication of these annual complaint reports on the share returns of the banks concerned. Additionally, these returns have a negative relationship with the number of complaints per branch.