La théorie des sources des obligations : éclatement d'une classification

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

Impact de l’évolution des formes de croissance urbaine sur l’identité de la ville et de ses citoyens

L’évolution de l’urbanisation dans le monde nous a motivés à développer nos recherches quant à cette croissance déchaînée des villes et ces multitudes de formes urbaines qui en résultent. L'objet de ce travail est d'analyser ces formes de croissance spatiales et d’analyse leur impact sur l’identité dans la ville. Il s'agit de montrer dans quelle mesure elles favorisent la prolifération de nouvelles identités dans les régions périphériques de la ville. Notre recherche porte alors sur une étude socio spatiale de la capitale de la Tunisie. Tunis, cette métropole en pleine expansion, occupe un emplacement stratégique dans la Méditerranée et joue un rôle important dans les échanges afro-européens. La pertinence de l’étude de l’évolution du domaine urbain de Tunis résulte du fait que cette ville a connu différents types de croissances. La variété des modes de développement de l’espace urbain fait de Tunis un exemple pertinent qui mérite d’être étudié, d’autant plus que l’espace englobe des banlieues planifiées, spontanées, historiques, et bien d’autres qui résultent du juste fait de l’informalité, allant du patrimoine à la construction d’une identité urbaine plurielle. Notre travail comportera donc une étude spatiale de l’évolution de l’espace urbain de Tunis, basée essentiellement sur des cartes et des photos satellites, doublées d’une analyse sociale, basée sur une enquête in situ, réalisée avec les habitants des banlieues, et ce, dans le but de recenser leurs degrés d’attachement à l’espace ainsi que les rapports qu’ils entament avec le centre-ville. Notre recherche nous a permis de conclure que les habitants des banlieues s’identifient aux nouvelles formes de croissance et développent au fil des années un sentiment d’appartenance et d’attachement identitaire à leurs quartiers. Cela contribue à la prolifération d’identités multiple dans la ville.

Nouvelle approche en théorie des jeux comportementale

Il a été démontré en laboratoire que l’équilibre de Nash n’était pas toujours un bon indicateur du comportement humain. Différentes théories alternatives (aversion à l’inégalité, réciprocité et norme sociale) ont vu le jour pour combler les lacunes de la théorie classique, mais aucune d’elles ne permet d’expliquer la totalité des phénomènes observés en laboratoire. Après avoir identifié les lacunes de ces modèles, ce mémoire développe un modèle qui synthétise dans un tout cohérent les avancées de ceux-ci à l’aide de préférences hétérogènes. Afin d’augmenter la portée du modèle, une nouvelle notion d’équilibre, dite comportementale, est ajoutée au modèle. En appliquant le nouveau modèle à des jeux simples, nous pouvons voir comment il élargit le nombre de comportements pouvant être modélisé par la théorie des jeux.

Formes quadratiques ternaires représantant tous les entiers impairs

Les calculs numériques ont été effectués à l'aide du logiciel SAGE.

Non-domination et collectivités : l'apport du républicanisme à une théorie des droits collectifs

L'objectif poursuivi dans ce mémoire est de montrer que le néo-républicanisme possède les outils les plus efficaces pour penser la réconciliation des droits individuels, fondement des États de droits occidentaux contemporains, et des droits collectifs que peuvent légitimement réclamer les collectivités nationales. Dans cette visée, et comme de nombreux auteurs libéraux se sont attaqués à cette question dans les dernières décennies, j'expose d'abord trois stratégies libérales pour traiter cette possible réconciliation tout en faisant ressortir leurs faiblesses respectives. J'avance qu'aucune de ces stratégies ne permet vraiment de comprendre comment un régime de droits collectifs et un régime de droits individuels peuvent être articulés de façon cohérente. J'argue ensuite que le néo-républicanisme, parce qu'il comprend la liberté non pas comme l'absence d'interférence, mais comme un statut de non-domination, permet de voir que les droits collectifs des groupes nationaux et les droits individuels sont nécessairement compatibles, parce qu'ils s'organisent en fonction du même idéal. Les droits d'un individu et ceux de sa collectivité nationale sont, d'une certaine manière, les deux faces d'une même médaille, la non-domination individuelle dépendant de la non-domination du groupe national auquel l'individu appartient. En dernier lieu, je soutiens que cette compréhension du rapport entre les deux régimes de droits devrait se traduire par un ensemble de mesures institutionnelles concrètes dont la plus importante est la reconnaissance d'un droit, pour les collectivités nationales, à l'autodétermination.

Ontologie et théorie des ensembles

L’ontologie de Leśniewski est un calcul général des noms. Elle fut créée par Leśniewski pour apporter une solution naturelle au paradoxe de Russell en théorie naïve des ensembles. L’ontologie a été perçue par ses défenseurs et par ses adversaires comme une théorie incompatible avec la théorie des ensembles. Dans le présent texte, nous montrons que l’ontologie de Leśniewski permet, au contraire, de définir une théorie des ensembles qui coïncide avec la théorie de Zermelo- Fraenkel.

O livro Théorie des approximations numériques et du calcul abrégé de Agliberto Xavier

Pós-graduação em Educação Matemática - IGCE

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Portrait des difficultés des élèves du secondaire relativement à l’orthographe des formes homophones

Cette recherche descriptive vise à établir un portrait des principales difficultés rencontrées par les élèves du secondaire relativement à l’orthographe des homophones et cela à travers différents angles d’analyse. Nous avons d’abord fait ressortir l’importance des difficultés orthographiques chez les élèves du secondaire québécois et mis en relief la proportion de ces erreurs attribuée à l’orthographe des homophones. À partir des données recueillies par le groupe de recherche Projet grammaire-écriture qui s’est donné comme objectif, dans un premier temps, de recueillir de nombreuses données à travers deux instruments de collecte (une dictée et une production écrite), nous avons tout d’abord relevé les erreurs d’homophonie commises le plus fréquemment par les élèves pour ensuite analyser chacune des formes homophones problématiques en fonction de critères variés tels que leur fréquence lexicale dans la langue française, leur appartenance à une catégorie grammaticale particulière ou encore la structure syntaxique qui les sous-tend. Les erreurs les plus importantes ont fait l’objet d’une observation plus poussée : nous avons établi le pourcentage de graphies correctes versus erronées dans tous les textes des élèves. Finalement, nous avons aussi comparé nos résultats à ceux obtenus par McNicoll et Roy (1984) auprès d’une population de niveau primaire. Les résultats révélés par notre analyse montrent que ce sont principalement les finales verbales en /E/ qui posent problème aux élèves du secondaire, suivies par les formes homophones s’est/c’est/ces/ses et se/ce.