Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 11, 1985.

Shipping list no.: 85-1153-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 12, 1985.

Shipping list no.: 86-31-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 13, 1985.

Shipping list number: 86-42-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 18, 1985.

Shipping list number: 86-108-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 19, 1985.

Shipping list no.: 86-138-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 20, 1985.

Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 25, 1985.

Shipping list number: 86-152-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 26, 1985.

Shipping list no: 86-162-P.

Tax reform proposals. hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, June 27, 1985.

Shipping list no. 86-195-P.

Tax reform act of 1984 : law and controlling committee reports /

Includes index

The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Impact On Hospitality Industries

In her discussion - The Tax Reform Act Of 1986: Impact On Hospitality Industries - by Elisa S. Moncarz, Associate Professor, the School of Hospitality Management at Florida International University, Professor Moncarz initially states: “After nearly two years of considering the overhaul of the federal tax system, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The impact of this legislation is expected to affect virtually all individuals and businesses associated with the hospitality industry. This article discusses some of the major provisions of the tax bill, emphasizing those relating to the hospitality service industries and contrasting relevant provisions with prior law on their positive and negative effects to the industry. “On October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) with changes so pervasive that a recodification of the income tax laws became necessary…,” Professor Moncarz says in providing a basic history of the bill. Two, very important paragraphs underpin TRA 86, and this article. They should not be under-estimated. The author wants you to know: “With the passage of TRA 86, the Reagan administration achieved the most important single domestic initiative of Reagan's second term, a complete restructuring of the federal tax system in an attempt to re-establish fairness in the tax code…,” an informed view, indeed. “These changes will result in an estimated shift of over $100 billion of the tax burden from individuals to corporations over the next five years [as of this article],” Professor Moncarz enlightens. “…TRA 86 embraces a conversion to the view that lowering tax rates and eliminating or restricting tax preferences (i.e., loopholes) “would be more economically and socially productive.” Hence, economic decisions would be based on economic efficiency as opposed to tax effect,” the author asserts. “…both Congress and the administration recognized from its inception that the reform of the tax code must satisfy three basic goals,” and these goals are identified for you. Professor Moncarz outlines the positive impact TRA 86 will have on the U.S. economy in general, but also makes distinctions the ‘Act will have on specific segments of the business community, with a particular eye toward the hospitality industry and food-service in particular. Professor Moncarz also provides graphs to illustrate the comparative tax indexes of select companies, encompassing the years 1883-through-1985. Deductibility and its importance are discussed as well. The author foresees Limited Partnerships, employment, and even new hotel construction and/or rehabilitation being affected by TRA 86. The article, as one would assume from this type of discussion, is liberally peppered with facts and figures.

Seriously, less taxes? Tax reform's effects over labor supply

Using a matching and a difference in differences approach we analyzed the impact of a payroll costs reduction implemented through a tax reform in Colombia on worked hours and hourly income -- Existing studies have found mixed results, while increases in wages are commonly found, the results for employment and worked hours effects are a source of debate with no consensus on sight -- However, in line with earlier revisions of literature, we concluded that the effect of payroll costs reductions is positive and significant on both, worked hours and income -- In this paper, using socioeconomic data from Colombia we found that those individuals a effected by a payroll cost reduction between 2012-2014 exhibited significant increases in both hours and income compared to similar individuals una effected by this framework

The distributional consequences of tax reforms under market distortions

In this paper we examine the importance of imperfect competition in product and labour markets in determining the long-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent heterogeneneity in capital hold- ings. Each of these market failures, independently, results in welfare losses for at least a segment of the population, after a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour tax increase. However, when combined in a realistic calibration to the UK economy, they imply that a capital tax cut will be Pareto improving in the long run. Consistent with the the- ory of second-best, the two distortions in this context work to correct the negative distributional e¤ects of a capital tax cut that each one, on its own, creates.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy