A Matrix PRNG with S-Box Output Filtering

We describe a modification to a previously published pseudorandom number generator improving security while maintaining high performance. The proposed generator is based on the powers of a word-packed block upper triangular matrix and it is designed to be fast and easy to implement in software since it mainly involves bitwise operations between machine registers and, in our tests, it presents excellent security and statistical characteristics. The modifications include a new, key-derived s-box based nonlinear output filter and improved seeding and extraction mechanisms. This output filter can also be applied to other generators.

Genetic Algorithm for Finding the Key’s Length and Cryptanalysis of the Permutation Cipher

In this article we discuss a possibility to use genetic algorithms in cryptanalysis. We developed and described the genetic algorithm for finding the secret key of a block permutation cipher. In this case key is a permutation of some first natural numbers. Our algorithm finds the exact key’s length and the key with controlled accuracy. Evaluation of conducted experiment’s results shows that the almost automatic cryptanalysis is possible.

Analysis of authenticated encryption stream ciphers

Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. AE is potentially more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message and in a separate pass, providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. This paper presents results on the analysis of three AE stream ciphers submitted to the recently completed eSTREAM competition. We classify the ciphers based on the methods the ciphers use to provide authenticated encryption and discuss possible methods for mounting attacks on these ciphers.

An analysis of the RC4 family of stream ciphers against algebraic attacks

To date, most applications of algebraic analysis and attacks on stream ciphers are on those based on lin- ear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). In this paper, we extend algebraic analysis to non-LFSR based stream ciphers. Specifically, we perform an algebraic analysis on the RC4 family of stream ciphers, an example of stream ciphers based on dynamic tables, and inves- tigate its implications to potential algebraic attacks on the cipher. This is, to our knowledge, the first pa- per that evaluates the security of RC4 against alge- braic attacks through providing a full set of equations that describe the complex word manipulations in the system. For an arbitrary word size, we derive alge- braic representations for the three main operations used in RC4, namely state extraction, word addition and state permutation. Equations relating the inter- nal states and keystream of RC4 are then obtained from each component of the cipher based on these al- gebraic representations, and analysed in terms of their contributions to the security of RC4 against algebraic attacks. Interestingly, it is shown that each of the three main operations contained in the components has its own unique algebraic properties, and when their respective equations are combined, the resulting system becomes infeasible to solve. This results in a high level of security being achieved by RC4 against algebraic attacks. On the other hand, the removal of an operation from the cipher could compromise this security. Experiments on reduced versions of RC4 have been performed, which confirms the validity of our algebraic analysis and the conclusion that the full RC4 stream cipher seems to be immune to algebraic attacks at present.

Analysis of indirect message injection for MAC generation using stream ciphers

This paper presents a model for generating a MAC tag with a stream cipher using the input message indirectly. Several recent proposals represent instances of this model with slightly different options. We investigate the security of this model for different options, and identify cases which permit forgery attacks. Based on this, we present a new forgery attack on version 1.4 of 128-EIA3. Design recommendations to enhance the security of proposals following this general model are given.

Extensions of the cube attack based on low degree annihilators

At Crypto 2008, Shamir introduced a new algebraic attack called the cube attack, which allows us to solve black-box polynomials if we are able to tweak the inputs by varying an initialization vector. In a stream cipher setting where the filter function is known, we can extend it to the cube attack with annihilators: By applying the cube attack to Boolean functions for which we can find low-degree multiples (equivalently annihilators), the attack complexity can be improved. When the size of the filter function is smaller than the LFSR, we can improve the attack complexity further by considering a sliding window version of the cube attack with annihilators. Finally, we extend the cube attack to vectorial Boolean functions by finding implicit relations with low-degree polynomials.

Low probability differentials and the cryptanalysis of full-round CLEFIA-128

So far, low probability differentials for the key schedule of block ciphers have been used as a straightforward proof of security against related-key differential analysis. To achieve resistance, it is believed that for cipher with k-bit key it suffices the upper bound on the probability to be 2− k . Surprisingly, we show that this reasonable assumption is incorrect, and the probability should be (much) lower than 2− k . Our counter example is a related-key differential analysis of the well established block cipher CLEFIA-128. We show that although the key schedule of CLEFIA-128 prevents differentials with a probability higher than 2− 128, the linear part of the key schedule that produces the round keys, and the Feistel structure of the cipher, allow to exploit particularly chosen differentials with a probability as low as 2− 128. CLEFIA-128 has 214 such differentials, which translate to 214 pairs of weak keys. The probability of each differential is too low, but the weak keys have a special structure which allows with a divide-and-conquer approach to gain an advantage of 27 over generic analysis. We exploit the advantage and give a membership test for the weak-key class and provide analysis of the hashing modes. The proposed analysis has been tested with computer experiments on small-scale variants of CLEFIA-128. Our results do not threaten the practical use of CLEFIA.

Algebraic Analysis of LEX

LEX is a stream cipher that progressed to Phase 3 of the eSTREAM stream cipher project. In this paper, we show that the security of LEX against algebraic attacks relies on a small equation system not being solvable faster than exhaustive search. We use the byte leakage in LEX to construct a system of 21 equa- tions in 17 variables. This is very close to the require- ment for an efficient attack, i.e. a system containing 16 variables. The system requires only 36 bytes of keystream, which is very low.

Algebraic analysis of small scale LEX-BES

This paper examines the algebraic cryptanalysis of small scale variants of the LEX-BES. LEX-BES is a stream cipher based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a block cipher, initially introduced by Biryukov at eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher project in 2005. The Big Encryption System (BES) is a block cipher introduced at CRYPTO 2002 which facilitates the algebraic analysis of the AES block cipher. In this paper, experiments were conducted to find solution of the equation system describing small scale LEX-BES using Gröbner Basis computations. This follows a similar approach to the work by Cid, Murphy and Robshaw at FSE 2005 that investigated algebraic cryptanalysis on small scale variants of the BES. The difference between LEX-BES and BES is that due to the way the keystream is extracted, the number of unknowns in LEX-BES equations is fewer than the number in BES. As far as the author knows, this attempt is the first at creating solvable equation systems for stream ciphers based on the LEX method using Gröbner Basis computations.

Bias in the nonlinear filter generator output sequence

Nonlinear filter generators are common components used in the keystream generators for stream ciphers and more recently for authentication mechanisms. They consist of a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and a nonlinear Boolean function to mask the linearity of the LFSR output. Properties of the output of a nonlinear filter are not well studied. Anderson noted that the m-tuple output of a nonlinear filter with consecutive taps to the filter function is unevenly distributed. Current designs use taps which are not consecutive. We examine m-tuple outputs from nonlinear filter generators constructed using various LFSRs and Boolean functions for both consecutive and uneven (full positive difference sets where possible) tap positions. The investigation reveals that in both cases, the m-tuple output is not uniform. However, consecutive tap positions result in a more biased distribution than uneven tap positions, with some m-tuples not occurring at all. These biased distributions indicate a potential flaw that could be exploited for cryptanalysis

Algebraic analysis of small Scale LEX-BES

This work examines the algebraic cryptanalysis of small scale variants of the LEX-BES. LEX-BES is a stream cipher based on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a block cipher, initially introduced by Biryukov at eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher project in 2005. The Big Encryption System (BES) is a block cipher introduced at CRYPTO 2002 which facilitates the algebraic analysis of the AES block cipher. In this article, experiments were conducted to find solutions of equation systems describing small scale LEX-BES using Gröbner Basis computations. This follows a similar approach to the work by Cid, Murphy and Robshaw at FSE 2005 that investigated algebraic cryptanalysis on small scale variants of the BES. The difference between LEX-BES and BES is that due to the way the keystream is extracted, the number of unknowns in LEX-BES equations is fewer than the number in BES. As far as the authors know, this attempt is the first at creating solvable equation systems for stream ciphers based on the LEX method using Gröbner Basis computations.