987 resultados para Strategic competition
Resumo:
Information processing in groups has long been seen as a cooperative process. In contrast with this assumption, group members were rarely found to behave cooperatively: They withhold unshared information and stick to initial incorrect decisions. In the present article, we examined how group members' cooperative and competitivemotives impact on group information processing and propose that information sharing and use in groups could be seen as strategic behavior. We reviewed the latest developments in the literature investigating different forms of strategic information processing and their underlying mechanisms. This review suggests that explicit cooperative goals are needed for effective group decision-making.
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In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices
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We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.
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This paper surveys the literature on fiscal competition. We consider tax and expenditure competition in a more general set up where different jurisdictions within a federation may compete in the provision of public goods in order to attract some residents (Tiebout, 1956) and expel others (Brueckner, 1999); and/or for business. We address the vast literature on welfare gains or losses of these types of competition. Then, we discuss the empirical evidence, focusing on estimates of the sensitiveness of production factors to tax differentials and on the importance of the strategic interdependence among jurisdictions. We combine econometric studies with some case studies. Last we discuss the design of mechanisms to cope with fiscal competition, especially under a more global environment where factors become more mobile.
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Universities have entered a period of rapid change and upheaval due to an external environment beyond their control which includes shifting demographic patterns, accelerating technology, funding shortages, and keener competition for students. Strategic planning, a comprehensive vision which challenges universities to take bold and creative measures to meet the threats and opportunities of the future, is an institutional imperative in the 1980's. This paper examines freshman student feedback in an effort to incorporate this important element into a strategic plan for Brock University, a small, predominantly liberal arts university in St. Catharines, Ontario. The study was designed to provide information on the characteristics of the 1985-86 pool of freshman registrants: their attitudes towards Brock's recruitment measures, their general university priorities, and their influences in regard to university selection (along with other demographical and attitudinal data). A survey involving fixed-alternative questions of a subjective and objective nature was administered in two large freshman classes at Brock in which a broad cross-section of academic programs was anticipated. Computer analysis of the data for the 357 respondents included total raw frequencies and rounded percentages, as well as subgroup cross-tabulation by geographic home area of respondent, academic major, and high school graduating average. The four directional hypotheses put forward were all substantiatied by the survey data, indicating that 1) the university's current recruitment program had been a positive influence during their university search 2) parents were the most influential group in the students' decisions related to university 3) respondents viewed institutional reputation as less of a priority than an enjoyable university lifestyle in a personal learning atmosphere 4) students had a decided preference for co-operative study and internship programs. Strategic planning recommendations included a reduction in the faculty/student ratio through faculty hirings to restore the close rapport between professors and students, increased recruitment presentations in Ontario high schools to enlarge the applicant pool, creation of an Office of Co-operative Study and Internship Programs, institutional emphasis on a "customer orientation", and an extension of research into student demographics and attitudinal data.
Resumo:
In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices
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The paper examines how European retailers are using private standards for food safety and,quality as risk management and competitive tools and the strategic responses of leading Kenyan and other developing country supplier/exporters to such standards. Despite measures to harmonize a 'single market', the European fresh produce market is very diverse in terms of consumer preferences, structural dynamics and attention to and enforcement of food safety and other standards. Leading Kenyan fresh produce suppliers have re-positioned themselves at the high end, including 'high care', segments of the market - precisely those that are most demanding in terms of quality assurance and food safety systems. An array of factors have influenced this strategic positioning, including relatively high international freight costs, the emergence of more effective competition in mainstream product lines, relatively low labor costs for produce preparation, and strong market relationships with selected retail chains. To succeed in this demanding market segment, the industry has had to invest substantially in improved production and procurement systems, upgraded pack house facilities, and quality assurance/food safety management systems. (C) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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As integrated software solutions reshape project delivery, they alter the bases for collaboration and competition across firms in complex industries. This paper synthesises and extends literatures on strategy in project-based industries and digitally-integrated work to understand how project-based firms interact with digital infrastructures for project delivery. Four identified strategies are to: 1) develop and use capabilities to shape the integrated software solutions that are used in projects; 2) co-specialize, developing complementary assets to work repeatedly with a particular integrator firm; 3) retain flexibility by developing and maintaining capabilities in multiple digital technologies and processes; and 4) manage interfaces, translating work into project formats for coordination while hiding proprietary data and capabilities in internal systems. The paper articulates the strategic importance of digital infrastructures for delivery as well as product architectures. It concludes by discussing managerial implications of the identified strategies and areas for further research.
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In order for town centres to manage increased competition in retailing, co-operation between stakeholders in a strategic alliance has become more important. A typical set of stakeholders in a strategic alliance for strengthening retailingare retailers, local authorities and property owners. The roles of retailer’sand local authorities’ are well researched. However, the role of property owners is not. The aim of this paper seeks to unfold the role of property owners in a strategic alliance. This is a case study of a medium-sized town in which semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders were conducted. In the chosen town there is a TCM alliance co-operation at work. The above mentioned stakeholders are possible members in an alliance. The case studied shows a fragmented property owner market with no dominant property owner, as it is in many medium-sized towns. Our study shows that many stakeholders look at the role of property owners as crucial for town centre development. However, property owners do not see that they can significantly contribute to or benefit from the development.The main reasons for this opinion are that they consider themselves as not having enough resources or the capability to influence the town development.
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We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.
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This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.
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This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.
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O fim do ano de 2014 marcou o segundo aniversário da Resolução 13/2012 (R13) do Senado brasileiro. Grosso modo, R13 constituiu-se de um normativo do Senado cujo objetivo era o de por um fim na Guerra Fiscal dos Portos (FWP), uma competição fiscal entre os estados que se dá através da concessão de benefícios fiscais sobre operações interestaduais com mercadorias importadas de modo a atrair empresas importadoras para o território do estado concedente. R13 diminuiu o nível da tributação sobre tais operações, esperando com isso diminuir os lucros auferidos e a propensão das firmas de aceitarem tais regimes especiais de incentivação fiscal. Nada obstante, R13 gerou uma grande discussão sobre se os benefícios da atração de investimentos para um estado em particular superariam ou não os custos que esse estado incorreria em renunciar receitas tributárias em razão concessão desses benefícios fiscais. O objetivo do presente trabalho é o de dar uma contribuição a essa discussão, testando se um comportamento de interação estratégica entre estados, tal como aquele que supostamente ocorre no contexto da FWP, de fato emerge dos dados de importação coletados de janeiro de 2010 a maio de 2015, e, também, testando se a R13 de fato afetou tal comportamento de interação estratégica. Utiliza-se aqui um modelo de econometria espacial, no qual se especifica uma matriz de pesos que agrega o nível de importação das jurisdições concorrentes, organizando os dados em um painel de efeitos fixos. Os resultados sugerem que existe um comportamento de interação estratégica entre os estados e que a R13 de fato impactou tal comportamento.
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This work aims to understand the interaction between competition and network formation in the banking market. Combining Matutes and Padilla (1994) and Matutes and Vives (2000), we build a model of imperfect bank competition for deposits in which an interbank relationship network is a key strategic decision: it affects banks’ profit and risk position. The competition level exerts influence in the banking network structure since it affects the network outcomes. As result, we have that different competition levels imply different network topologies. Specifically, greater competition imply denser networks. Finally, when we allow for the possibility of collusion, the denser network can come out in the least competitive environment.
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Based on a structured literature review, the ceramic tiles sector of Italy (benchmark) and Brazil (2nd world producer and consumer) are compared, under four strategic factors: normative, market, technology and strategic management, in order to identify critical risks for a national strategic sector. The document aims to propose guidelines for a strategic re-planning of the Brazilian ceramic tiles sector, making the Brazilian producers aware of the national market fragility (in spite of its recent remarkable evolution) and helping the policy makers to reflect on the need of reviewing the strategic planning methods and practice, of designing new targeted programs (based on coherence between operation and business strategies), of providing improved management to strengthen the sector against unfair competition by low-cost producers, enhancing the necessary infrastructure in technology, work, marketing and quality management. The analysis is limited to the single-firing production technology. The wide-coverage strategic analysis of the Brazilian ceramic tiles sector, very little studied until now in a scientific way, emphasizes the importance of applying research methodology and may be valuable to both scholars and practitioners. Additionally, it highlights the need of investments in innovation (product design and production technology) and the fundamental role of the sector organization, identifying different dimensions. It is possible to conclude that the recent Brazilian production growth is not due to a natural strengthening because of the hit of the sector and of correct enterprises strategy, but it seems the result of a temporary and favorable economic contingency.