When do export subsidies have a redistributional role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplusfrom consumersand taxpayers to farmers.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.

Regional subsidies and industrial prospects of lagging regions

Large and sustained differences in economic performance across regions of developing countries have long provided motivation for fiscal incentives designed to encourage firm entry in lagging areas. Empirical evidence in support of these policies has, however, been weak at best. This paper undertakes a direct evaluation of the most prominent fiscal incentive policy in Brazil, the Fundos Constitucionais de Financiamento (Constitutional Funds). In doing so, we exploit valuable features of the Brazilian Ministry of Labor's RAIS data set to address two important elements of firm location decisions that have the potential to bias an assessment of the Funds: (i) firm “family structure” (in particular, proximity to headquarters for vertically integrated firms), and (ii) unobserved spatial heterogeneity (with the potential to confound the effects of the Funds). We find that the pull of firm headquarters is very strong relative to the Constitutional Funds for vertically integrated firms, but that, with non-parametric controls for time invariant spatial heterogeneity, the Funds provide statistically and economically significant incentives for firms in many of the targeted industries.

Energy subsidies and WTO dispute settlement: why only renewable energy subsidies are challenged?

Over the past few years, renewable energy subsidies have become one of the main sources of trade disputes in the WTO. A total of six cases have been initiated against renewable energy subsidy programs since the first of such disputes was brought by Japan against Canada’s Feed in Tariff (FIT) program in 2010. Yet not even a single case has so far been initiated against the much larger and environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies. The main objective of this paper is to examine what makes renewable energy subsidies vulnerable to WTO dispute, as compared fossil fuel subsidies.

Food-web composition affects cross-ecosystem interactions and subsidies

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Minimal cross-subsidies approach for loss allocation in distribution networks with open access

Open access philosophy applied by regulatory agencies may lead to a scenario where captive consumers will solely face the responsibility on distribution network's losses even with Independent Energy Producers (also known as Distributed Generation) and Independent Energy Consumers connected to the system. This work proposes the utilization of a loss allocation method in distribution systems where open access is allowed, in which cross-subsidies, that appear due to the influence the generators have over the system losses, are minimized. Thus, guaranteeing to some extent the efficiency and transparency of the economic signals of the market. Results obtained through the Zbus loss allocation method adapted for distribution networks are processed in such a way that the corresponding allocation to the generation buses is divided among the consumer buses, while still considering consumers spatial characteristics. © 2007 IEEE.

Access to housing and direct housing subsidies: some Latin American experiences

Includes bibliography

El efecto de los subsidios, la reglamentación y las diversas formas de propiedad en la calidad y eficacia operativa de los servicios del transporte urbano en América Latina = The impacts of subsidies, regulation, and different forms of ownership on the service quality and operational efficiency of urban bus systems in Latin America

Incluye Bibliografía

Ocean freight, shipbuilding costs and charter rates: recent trends

This issue of the Bulletin provides a brief overview of the maritime transport industry in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a focus on the behaviour of freight rates and the costs associated with chartering and shipbuilding, all of which increased sharply in 2003. Three separate markets will be analysed: 1) the containerized general cargo market; 2) the dry bulk cargo market and 3) the liquid bulk (crude oil and oil products) market. This study has incorporated contributions made by professional experts in the field and institutions associated with ports and maritime transport in the region, received subsequent to the study prepared and disseminated in January 2004.

Chile: subsidies, credit and housing deficit

Includes bibliography.

Footprint of recycled water subsidies downwind of Lake Michigan

Continental evaporation is a significant and dynamic flux within the atmospheric water budget, but few methods provide robust observational constraints on the large-scale hydroclimatological and hydroecological impacts of this ‘recycled-water' flux. We demonstrate a geospatial analysis that provides such information, using stable isotope data to map the distribution of recycled water in shallow aquifers downwind from Lake Michigan. The δ2H and δ18O values of groundwater in the study region decrease from south to north, as expected based on meridional gradients in climate and precipitation isotope ratios. In contrast, deuterium excess (d = δ2H − 8 × δ18O) values exhibit a significant zonal gradient and finer-scale spatially patterned variation. Local d maxima occur in the northwest and southwest corners of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan, where ‘lake-effect' precipitation events are abundant. We apply a published model that describes the effect of recycling from lakes on atmospheric vapor d values to estimate that up to 32% of recharge into individual aquifers may be derived from recycled Lake Michigan water. Applying the model to geostatistical surfaces representing mean d values, we estimate that between 10% and 18% of the vapor evaporated from Lake Michigan is re-precipitated within downwind areas of the Lake Michigan drainage basin. Our approach provides previously unavailable observational constraints on regional land-atmosphere water fluxes in the Great Lakes Basin and elucidates patterns in recycled-water fluxes that may influence the biogeography of the region. As new instruments and networks facilitate enhanced spatial monitoring of environmental water isotopes, similar analyses can be widely applied to calibrate and validate water cycle models and improve projections of regional hydroecological change involving the coupled lake-atmosphere-land system. Read More: http://www.esajournals.org/doi/abs/10.1890/ES12-00062.1

On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation

The Canadian unemployment insurance program is designed to reflect the varying risk of joblessness across regions. Regions that are considered low-risk areas subsidize higher risk ones. A region's risk is typically proxied by its relative unemployment rate. We use a dynamic, heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to Canada to analyze voters preferences between a uniformly generous unemployment insurance and the current system with asymmetric generosity. We find that Canada's unusual unemployment insurance system is surprisingly close to what voters would choose in spite of the possibilities of moral hazard and self-insurance through asset build-up.