Brand equity, brand loyalty and consumer satisfaction

This study aims to investigate the mediating effects of consumer satisfaction on the relationship between consumer-based brand equity and brand loyalty in the hotel and restaurant industry. Based on a sample of 378 customers and using structural equation modelling approach, the five dimensions of brand equity—physical quality, staff behaviour, ideal self-congruence, brand identification and lifestyle-congruence—are found to have positive effects on consumer satisfaction. The findings of the study suggest that consumer satisfaction partially mediates the effects of staff behaviour, ideal self-congruence and brand identification on brand loyalty. The effects of physical quality and lifestyle-congruence on brand loyalty are fully mediated by consumer satisfaction.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Integrating attentional control theory and the strength model of self-control

In the present article, we argue that it may be fruitful to incorporate the ideas of the strength model of self-control into the core assumptions of the well-established attentional control theory (ACT). In ACT, it is assumed that anxiety automatically leads to attention disruption and increased distractibility, which may impair subsequent cognitive or perceptual-motor performance, but only if individuals do not have the ability to counteract this attention disruption. However, ACT does not clarify which process determines whether one can volitionally regulate attention despite experiencing high levels of anxiety. In terms of the strength model of self-control, attention regulation can be viewed as a self-control act depending on the momentary availability of self-control strength. We review literature that has revealed that self-control strength moderates the anxiety-performance relationship, discuss how to integrate these two theoretical models, and offer practical recommendations of how to counteract negative anxiety effects.

Formless as Water, Flaming as a Fire-Some observations on the Theory and Practice of Self-Determination

The concept of national self-determination is a highly contested concept from very outset. It is partly due to its dual parentage, namely nationalism and liberalism. Prior to 1945 it was only a political concept without legal binding. With the incorporation of the principle in the UN Charter it was universalized and legalized. However, there were two competing interpretations at the UN based on de-colonization and representative government. How to define self and what really determined remain highly controversial. How to reconcile the international norm of sovereignty of state and self determination of people became more complex problem with the tide of secessionist movements based on ethno-nationalism. The concept of internal self-determination came as a compromise; but it is also very vague and harbors a wide range of interpretations.

The education of the will, the theory and practice of self-culture,

Mode of access: Internet.

Charitable giving: A test of a revised Theory of Planned Behaviour model

Recent world events aside, downward trends in donating behaviour in Australia have increased the need for research into the factors that inhibit and encourage charitable giving. A revised Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) model was used to determine the influence of attitudes, norms (injunctive, descriptive, and moral norms), perceived behavioural control (PBC), and past behaviour (PB) on intentions to donate money to charities and community service organisations. Respondents (N=186) completed a questionnaire assessing the constructs of the revised TPB model. Four weeks later, self-reported donating behaviour was assessed (n=65). Results showed support for the revised TPB model. Attitudes, PBC, injunctive norms, moral norms, and PB all predicted donating intentions. Descriptive norms did not predict intentions. Intention was the only significant predictor of selfreported behaviour four weeks later, with neither PBC nor PB having a direct effect on behaviour. Theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.

Self-reported risk perception, mood and risk behaviour across the human menstrual cycle

Normally ovulating women exhibit a decline in risk behaviours that may lead to sexual assault during the fertile phase of the menstrual cycle, whereas women using the Pill do not. The current study tests two explanatory models: the mood and fertility models. Self-reported risk and non-risk behaviours, mood, and risk perception in sexual assault and physical risk domains were assessed by testing fiftyone women at menstruation and during their fertile period. Based on the decline in risk behaviours shown in past research, the fertility model predicts that normally ovulating women will display greater risk perception during the fertile phase of their cycle. The mood model predicts that at menstruation, when negative mood is highest, risk perception will be increased and risk behaviours correspondingly reduced. Risk behaviours did not vary over the cycle or between groups. Overall, results support the mood model. Negative mood was greater at menstruation and positive mood during the fertile period for both groups, rational risk perception was correspondingly greater at menstruation. The fertility model was not supported as risk perception ratings did not vary in the expected direction and ratings were not specific to the sexual assault domain.