Organizing for national security. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate.

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The Council and the Court: Shared Objectives or Opposing Views on the Crime of Aggression

This paper argues that an important part of ensuring the jurisdictional basis of the crime of aggression is to secure a partnership between the UN Security Council and the ICC. Such a partnership should be conducive towards the reality of holding to account individuals that undertake an illegal use of force. This Paper puts forward guiding principles for a model that would benefit a constructive institutional relationship between the Council and the Court. It is through the application of these five guiding principles that the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute can translate into a constructive relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council for the betterment of international peace and security as well as international justice. I maintain that it would be damaging to both the legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the Security Council and the ICC and detrimental to the overall institutional relationship if the final outcome proves unfavourable to international action against the crime of aggression and nothing more than dead letter law. Essentially the key to a viable cooperation regime between the Court and the Council will hinge on shared objectives regarding the crime of aggression rather than opposing views, namely combating impunity by holding individuals accountable for the illegal use of force.

"Get new lawyers!"

In James Rubin's account of the Kosovo war, he describes an exchange between Secretary Albright and Robin Cook (the British Foreign Secretary). Cook was explaining that it is difficult for Britain to commit to the war without UN Security Council approval because the legal advice he had received was that such action would be illegal under international law. Albright's response was, simply, "get new lawyers". Rubin "credits" Blair with a "push" that swung the British to "finally agree" that a UN Security Council resolution was "not legally required". Robin Cook later stated in Parliament and that the war was legal. Interestingly, Blair did not. This article does not look at whether or not such an exchange took place; rather look at the ethical issues that such a situation would generate. The article suggests what the ethical obligations of the key legal players in such institutional dramas should be—including governments seeking advice, the lawyers giving it, the ministers reporting it and the opposition in Parliament. The article sets out the particular responsibilities of the lawyers and officials of a Westminster system. It also sets out some of the institutional mechanisms for making it more likely that those obligations are fulfilled—as always through the interaction of obligations by different players that make it more risky for any player to breach his or her ethical obligations. Analogous duties would be faced by the relevant actors in other systems.

Libya and the international community’s 'responsibility to protect'

The Libyan regime’s attacks on its own civilian population are a test case for the international community’s commitment to the notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The UN Security Council’s statement on 22 February 2011 explicitly invoked this concept by calling on “the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population”. Yet, with Muammar Gaddafi encouraging further violence against protesters and threatening to fight “until the last drop of blood” it seems unlikely that the Security Council’s warning will be heeded. Greater pressure from the international community will be needed to bring an end to the atrocities in Libya. The international response to the Libyan crisis represents an opportunity to translate the theory of R2P into practice.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.

Points of convergence and divergence : normative, institutional and operational relationships between R2P and POC

As an international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has gained substantial influence and institutional presence—and created no small controversy—in the ten years since its first conceptualisation. Conversely, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC) has a longer pedigree and enjoys a less contested reputation. Yet UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 has thrown into sharp relief the relationship between the two. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 follow exactly the process envisaged by R2P in response to imminent atrocity crimes, yet the operative paragraphs of the resolutions themselves invoke only PoC. This article argues that, while the agendas of PoC and R2P converge with respect to Security Council action in cases like Libya, outside this narrow context it is important to keep the two norms distinct. Peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, international lawyers, individual states and regional organisations are required to act differently with respect to the separate agendas and contexts covered by R2P and PoC. While overlap between the two does occur in highly visible cases like Libya, neither R2P nor PoC collapses normatively, institutionally or operationally into the other.

Capacity-building workshops on the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict - Summary Report

In June 2011, a research project team from the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (IEGL), Queensland University of Technology, the United Nations University, and the Australian Government’s Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (APCMCOE) held three Capacity-Building Workshops (the Workshops) on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. The research project is funded by the Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund, with support from APCMCOE. Developments in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire and the actions of the United Nations Security Council have given new significance to the relationship between R2P and POC, providing impetus to the relevance and application of the POC principle recognised in numerous Security Council resolutions, and the R2P principle, which was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 and, now, by the Security Council. The Workshops considered the relationship between R2P and POC. The project team presented the preliminary findings of their study and sought contributions and feedback from Workshop participants. Prior to the Workshops, members of the project team undertook interviews with UN offices and agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) in Geneva and New York as part of the process of mapping the relationship between R2P and POC. Initial findings were considered at an Academic-Practitioner Workshop held at the University of Sydney in November 2010. In addition to an extensive literature review and a series of academic publications, the project team is preparing a practical guidance text (the Guide) on the relationship between R2P and POC to assist the United Nations, governments, regional bodies, IOs and NGOs in considering and applying appropriate protection strategies. It is intended that the Guide be presented to the United Nations Secretariat in New York in early 2012. The primary aim of the Workshops was to test the project’s initial findings among an audience of diplomats, military, police, civilian policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and experts from within the region. Through dialogue and discussion, the project team gathered feedback – comments, questions, critique and suggestions – to help shape the development of practical guidance about when, how and by whom R2P and POC might be implemented.

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China's traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China‟s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of pragmatic considerations, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P‟s legitimacy, which has contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria and Yemen. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council‟s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China’s traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China’s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China’s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO’s military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P’s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council’s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

Is there an international obligation to prosecute pirates

Combating piracy at sea and apprehending pirates have been a long-standing problem for the global community. Increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia have prompted the UN Security Council to intervene in the matter. The Council, through several resolutions, has authorised states to take action against Somali pirates in the territorial waters and land territory of Somalia and recently adopted a resolution urging all states to fully implement relevant international conventions in their domestic legal systems. However, despite the Security Council's intervention in the matter most states are still reluctant to prosecute Somali pirates in their domestic courts. Considering the most recent Security Council resolution and existing international law, this article examines whether there is an international obligation to criminalise piracy under domestic legal frameworks and to prosecute pirates in domestic courts. It submits that existing international law arguably imposes an obligation to prosecute pirates, at least in certain circumstances, and the recently adopted Security Council resolution reinforces this obligation.

The responsibility to protect and the Arab Spring : Libya as the exception, Syria as the norm?

On March 17 2011 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 authorising the use of force for civilian protection purposes in Libya.1 This resolution was hailed by many supporters of the responsibility to protect (R2P) as a crucial step towards the consolidation of the concept’s normative standing.2 Gareth Evans described the intervention as ‘a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to’.3 For Lloyd Axworthy the Libya episode signalled a move towards a ‘more humane world’.4 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared that it ‘affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated by their own government.’5 At first glance, the Security Council’s rapid, decisive response to escalating violence in Libya might well have suggested a new willingness on the part of the international community to take collective action to avert intra-state humanitarian crises. However, a closer examination of the text of resolution 1973 and statements by Security Council member states reveals a less than complete endorsement of R2P. Disagreements between states over the scope of the mandate for the use of force in Libya quickly emerged. Long-standing fears among Russia, China and other non-Western states that R2P could be used as a pretext for regime change returned to the fore as the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s military action were called into question. This post-Libya backlash against R2P has been a central factor in the international community’s subsequent inability to agree on effective civilian protection measures in Syria. Much of the optimism that surrounded R2P in the immediate aftermath of resolution 1973 has given way to a sober realization that achieving international consensus on civilian protection measures will rarely be straightforward.

Bridging the gap: Early warning, gender and the responsibility to protect

Women, Peace and Security (WPS) scholars and practitioners have expressed reservations about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle because of its popular use as a synonym for armed humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, R2P’s early failure to engage with and advance WPS efforts such as United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 (2000) has seen the perpetuation of limited roles ascribed to women in implementing the R2P principle. As a result, there has been a knowledge and practice gap between the R2P and WPS agendas, despite the fact that their advocates share common goals in relation to the prevention of atrocities and protection of populations. In this article we propose to examine just one of the potential avenues for aligning the WPS agenda and R2P principle in a way that is beneficial to both and strengthens the pursuit of a shared goal – prevention. We argue that the development and inclusion of gender-specific indicators – particularly economic, social and political discriminatory practices against women – has the potential to improve the capacity of early warning frameworks to forecast future mass atrocities.

R2P ten years after the World Summit: Explaining ongoing contestation over Pillar III

This article examines how and why contrasting interpretations of the international community’s role in preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes continue to exist a decade after the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was unanimously endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Building on recent critical constructivist insights into the fluid, dynamic nature of norms, it advances two main arguments. The first is that continuing contestation over R2P’s third pillar is a product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm dynamism. R2P’s inherently complex normative structure, coupled with several external factors, including the broader normative environment, norm implementation experiences and a shift in global power towards the BRICS, have contributed to a period of renewed contestation and triggered attempts to re-formulate R2P thorough Brazil’s ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) proposal and China’s semi-official ‘Responsible Protection’ concept. The second central argument is that such contestation is affecting R2P’s distinct normative prescriptions in different ways. While resistance to the implementation of coercive pillar III measures is currently impeding the normative progress of that component of the norm, this contestation has not prevented consensual pillar II assistance from becoming more deeply embedded in international practice and discourse.

The pandemic of conflict-related sexual violence and the political economy of gender inequality

Since the 1998 Rome Statute recognized widespread and systematic acts of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as an act of genocide, a war crime and crime against humanity, the last decade has seen historic recognition that egregious acts of sexual violence merit international political and legal attention (UN General Assembly, 1998). Notably there are now no fewer than seven United Nations Security Council resolutions on the cross-cutting theme of Women, Peace and Security.