Enhancing Agent Mediated Electronic Markets with Ontology Matching Services and Social Network Support

Os Mercados Eletrónicos atingiram uma complexidade e nível de sofisticação tão elevados, que tornaram inadequados os modelos de software convencionais. Estes mercados são caracterizados por serem abertos, dinâmicos e competitivos, e constituídos por várias entidades independentes e heterogéneas. Tais entidades desempenham os seus papéis de forma autónoma, seguindo os seus objetivos, reagindo às ocorrências do ambiente em que se inserem e interagindo umas com as outras. Esta realidade levou a que existisse por parte da comunidade científica um especial interesse no estudo da negociação automática executada por agentes de software [Zhang et al., 2011]. No entanto, a diversidade dos atores envolvidos pode levar à existência de diferentes conceptualizações das suas necessidades e capacidades dando origem a incompatibilidades semânticas, que podem prejudicar a negociação e impedir a ocorrência de transações que satisfaçam as partes envolvidas. Os novos mercados devem, assim, possuir mecanismos que lhes permitam exibir novas capacidades, nomeadamente a capacidade de auxiliar na comunicação entre os diferentes agentes. Pelo que, é defendido neste trabalho que os mercados devem oferecer serviços de ontologias que permitam facilitar a interoperabilidade entre os agentes. No entanto, os humanos tendem a ser relutantes em aceitar a conceptualização de outros, a não ser que sejam convencidos de que poderão conseguir um bom negócio. Neste contexto, a aplicação e exploração de relações capturadas em redes sociais pode resultar no estabelecimento de relações de confiança entre vendedores e consumidores, e ao mesmo tempo, conduzir a um aumento da eficiência da negociação e consequentemente na satisfação das partes envolvidas. O sistema AEMOS é uma plataforma de comércio eletrónico baseada em agentes que inclui serviços de ontologias, mais especificamente, serviços de alinhamento de ontologias, incluindo a recomendação de possíveis alinhamentos entre as ontologias dos parceiros de negociação. Este sistema inclui também uma componente baseada numa rede social, que é construída aplicando técnicas de análise de redes socias sobre informação recolhida pelo mercado, e que permite melhorar a recomendação de alinhamentos e auxiliar os agentes na sua escolha. Neste trabalho são apresentados o desenvolvimento e implementação do sistema AEMOS, mais concretamente: • É proposto um novo modelo para comércio eletrónico baseado em agentes que disponibiliza serviços de ontologias; • Adicionalmente propõem-se o uso de redes sociais emergentes para captar e explorar informação sobre relações entre os diferentes parceiros de negócio; • É definida e implementada uma componente de serviços de ontologias que é capaz de: • o Sugerir alinhamentos entre ontologias para pares de agentes; • o Traduzir mensagens escritas de acordo com uma ontologia em mensagens escritas de acordo com outra, utilizando alinhamentos previamente aprovados; • o Melhorar os seus próprios serviços recorrendo às funcionalidades disponibilizadas pela componente de redes sociais; • É definida e implementada uma componente de redes sociais que: • o É capaz de construir e gerir um grafo de relações de proximidade entre agentes, e de relações de adequação de alinhamentos a agentes, tendo em conta os perfis, comportamento e interação dos agentes, bem como a cobertura e utilização dos alinhamentos; • o Explora e adapta técnicas e algoritmos de análise de redes sociais às várias fases dos processos do mercado eletrónico. A implementação e experimentação do modelo proposto demonstra como a colaboração entre os diferentes agentes pode ser vantajosa na melhoria do desempenho do sistema e como a inclusão e combinação de serviços de ontologias e redes sociais se reflete na eficiência da negociação de transações e na dinâmica do mercado como um todo.

Geospatial data harmonization from regional level to european level: a usa case in forest fire data

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

stochastic method for automated matching of horizons across a fault in 3D seismic data

Seismic analysis, horizon matching, fault tracking, marked point process,stochastic annealing

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

NAVA enhances tidal volume and diaphragmatic electro-myographic activity matching: a Range90 analysis of supply and demand.

Neurally adjusted ventilatory assist (NAVA) is a ventilation assist mode that delivers pressure in proportionality to electrical activity of the diaphragm (Eadi). Compared to pressure support ventilation (PS), it improves patient-ventilator synchrony and should allow a better expression of patient's intrinsic respiratory variability. We hypothesize that NAVA provides better matching in ventilator tidal volume (Vt) to patients inspiratory demand. 22 patients with acute respiratory failure, ventilated with PS were included in the study. A comparative study was carried out between PS and NAVA, with NAVA gain ensuring the same peak airway pressure as PS. Robust coefficients of variation (CVR) for Eadi and Vt were compared for each mode. The integral of Eadi (ʃEadi) was used to represent patient's inspiratory demand. To evaluate tidal volume and patient's demand matching, Range90 = 5-95 % range of the Vt/ʃEadi ratio was calculated, to normalize and compare differences in demand within and between patients and modes. In this study, peak Eadi and ʃEadi are correlated with median correlation of coefficients, R > 0.95. Median ʃEadi, Vt, neural inspiratory time (Ti_ ( Neural )), inspiratory time (Ti) and peak inspiratory pressure (PIP) were similar in PS and NAVA. However, it was found that individual patients have higher or smaller ʃEadi, Vt, Ti_ ( Neural ), Ti and PIP. CVR analysis showed greater Vt variability for NAVA (p < 0.005). Range90 was lower for NAVA than PS for 21 of 22 patients. NAVA provided better matching of Vt to ʃEadi for 21 of 22 patients, and provided greater variability Vt. These results were achieved regardless of differences in ventilatory demand (Eadi) between patients and modes.

Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.

Matching and Sorting in a Global Economy

We develop a neoclassical trade model with heterogeneous factors of production. We consider a world with two factors, labor and .managers., each with a distribution of ability levels. Production combines a manager of some type with a group of workers. The output of a unit depends on the types of the two factors, with complementarity between them, while exhibiting diminishing returns to the number of workers. We examine the sorting of factors to sectors and the matching of factors within sectors, and we use the model to study the determinants of the trade pattern and the effects of trade on the wage and salary distributions. Finally, we extend the model to include search frictions and consider the distribution of employment rates.

Local adaptation and matching habitat choice in female barn owls with respect to melanic coloration.

Local adaptation is a major mechanism underlying the maintenance of phenotypic variation in spatially heterogeneous environments. In the barn owl (Tyto alba), dark and pale reddish-pheomelanic individuals are adapted to conditions prevailing in northern and southern Europe, respectively. Using a long-term dataset from Central Europe, we report results consistent with the hypothesis that the different pheomelanic phenotypes are adapted to specific local conditions in females, but not in males. Compared to whitish females, reddish females bred in sites surrounded by more arable fields and less forests. Colour-dependent habitat choice was apparently beneficial. First, whitish females produced more fledglings when breeding in wooded areas, whereas reddish females when breeding in sites with more arable fields. Second, cross-fostering experiments showed that female nestlings grew wings more rapidly when both their foster and biological mothers were of similar colour. The latter result suggests that mothers should particularly produce daughters in environments that best match their own coloration. Accordingly, whiter females produced fewer daughters in territories with more arable fields. In conclusion, females displaying alternative melanic phenotypes bred in habitats providing them with the highest fitness benefits. Although small in magnitude, matching habitat selection and local adaptation may help maintain variation in pheomelanin coloration in the barn owl.