Analysis of the restructuring of the Russian defence industry (by the example of aviation industry and knaapo) and the creation of United Aviation Construction Corporation

The present study is focused on the analysis of the three main governmental measures occurred in 2000-2006 in Russian defense industry: the creation of the holding structures, the establishing of the state monopoly in arms export, and creation of the United Aviation Construction Corporation (Ob¿edinennaya Aviastroitel¿naya Corporatziya), which was initiated by the President and Government of Russian Federation in 2006. The last project assumes the consolidation and joining of all producers of civil and military aviation into one united corporation in order to save the technological and productive potential of the sector after serious crisis in 1990-s. On the other hand, this project can be considered as one of the measures to establish state control and hierarchy in the defense industry. The current project tries to analyze the necessity and the possible impacts of restructuring processes. In order to perform such analysis, I need to observe the evolution of the sector, which involves the description of the restructuring and reforming of the industry since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current situation in aviation sector was shaped by number of reforms performed by Government of Russian Federation, which I describe in phases: conversion, privatization, decentralization, followed by evident desire of the state to establish control over some companies. Later on, I am trying to understand the reasons lying behind all reforms of 2000-2006 and the integration of the industry. I also try to predict which impacts on the companies it will have. The last part presents the main conclusions of the paper.

Birth, Development and Progressive Institutionalization of the Ombudsman in the Russian Legal and Political System

One of the current trends in governance and legal development in Russia is aimed at establishing a modern, efficient and internationally harmonised system of safeguards of human rights and civil liberties. A fairly recent addition to this system has been the institution of ombudsman as a public authority specialised in promoting and protecting human rights and civil liberties. The introduction of this institution as well as its formalisation at the constitutional and legislative levels has been increasingly relevant and important, as it raises the dealings between the state and the individual to a new level. As an independent public institution resolving conflicts between citizens and government authorities, the ombudsman makes steps, within the scope of his jurisdiction, to restitute individual rights, and helps to enhance the reputation of government. The present work describes and assesses the birth, development and institutionalization process of the Ombudsman Office in the Russian Federation, at federal and regional levels, with a particular emphasis on the role of international references and cooperation for institution building. Ombudsmen have done a magnificent job in demonstrating value with the resolution of individual and systemic complaints; subsequent improvements to government; and economic savings by mitigating litigation costs.

Figures and related data of a review of the "Global and Russian energy outlook up to 2040"

The Global and Russian Energy Outlook up to 2040, prepared by the Energy Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation, analyses the long-term changes in the main energy markets and thereby identifies the threats to the Russian economy and energy sector. Research has shown that shifts in the global energy sector, especially in hydrocarbon markets (primarily the development of technologies for shale oil and gas extraction), will result in a slowdown of Russia's economy by one percentage point each year on average due to a decrease in energy exports comparison with the official projections. Owing to the lack of development of an institutional framework, an outdated tax system, low competition and low investment efficiency, Russia will be the most sensitive to fluctuations in global hydrocarbon markets among all major energy market players within the forecast period.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

How far do the borders of the west extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010. OSW Report, 2010-03-18

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination. This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.

Federation without federalism. Relations between Moscow and the regions. OSW Study 49/2014

The regions of the Russian Federation are immensely diverse economically and geographically as well as when it comes to their national identity, civic awareness and political activity. We are in fact dealing with a ‘multi-speed Russia’: along with the post-industrial regions with their higher living standards and a need for pluralism in politics, there are poverty-stricken, inertial regions, dependent on subsidies from the centre. As a result of the policy of centralisation pursued by the Kremlin since 2000, the autonomy of the regions has been reduced fundamentally. This has affected the performance of the regional elites and made it difficult for the regions to use their natural advantages (such as resources or location) to their benefit. One of the effects of this policy has been the constantly decreasing number of the donor regions. The current model promotes the role of the region as a passive supplicant, for whom it is easier to seek support from the central government, offering loyalty in exchange, than to implement complex systemic reforms that would contribute to long-term development. Moscow’s control (political, economic and administrative) over the regions is currently so thorough that it contradicts the formally existing federal form of government in Russia.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

North Caucasus: the Russian Gordian knot. The key problems and conflicts in the region and the effect thereof on the future of Russia; Putin after re-election: The Kremlin's policy in Vladimir Putin's second term. OSW Study 16/2004

North Caucasus: North Caucasus is the most instable part of the Russian Federation: since the early 90's, there has been going on the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over into the other republics of the region, terrorism seems to have occupied its regular position in the political life of Caucasus, organized crime is flourishing, the tension persists there and military incidents and attacks are breaking out every now and again. During the recent year, the destabilization of the region, which affects many fields of Russian political and social life, has grown to an alarming size. Putin after re-election: Vladimir Putin's first term as President was a period of submitting political, regional and economic lobbies to the Kremlin. The actions Putin has taken since being re-elected are aimed at consolidating the Kremlin's control over the political, economic and social spheres. Further liquidation of political and informational pluralism, an increase of the ruling group's control over state and private property, and an intensification of state propaganda aimed at generating social support for the Kremlin's initiatives have all proceeded apace. These processes reinforce authoritarian tendencies and strengthen the emerging monocentric political system, with the President's strong domination over political, economic and social life.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Crimea one year after Russian annexation. EPC Policy Brief, 24 March 2015

On 18 March 2014, the Lower House of the Russian Parliament approved a Treaty to annex the Ukrainian Black Sea Peninsula of Crimea by 443 to 1 votes. This act violated Ukraine's sovereignty, representing a fundamental breach of international law; the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the terms of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, whereby the nuclear arsenal stationed on Ukraine's territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union was relinquished in exchange for security assurances of its sovereign territorial integrity. Russia, the US, France and the UK all signed. The annexation also violated a number of bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia. Russia's actions were immediately condemned by the international community. A 13 March European Parliament Resolution "firmly condemns Russia's act of aggression in invading Crimea, which is an inseparable part of Ukraine and recognised as such by the Russian Federation".

An examination of the management of Russian civil society

This thesis begins by examining the concepts of civil society and social capital. Specifically, it outlines the role of health and education third sector organisations (TSOs) in building civil society and generating social capital which is conducive to democratisation. Following this, the thesis presents literature on civil society development in the context of the Russian Federation, highlighting a void in our understanding of health and education TSOs in this context. The literature review examines cultural-historic antecedents and their impact on civil society development. These antecedents result in three constraints which limit TSOs ability to establish civil society as an autonomous space. In light of these constraints, the thesis explores the present day realities faced by Russian TSOs and proposes that the all-dominant nature of the Russian state leads to managed civil society arrangements. Consequently the thesis addresses the question of how a managed civil society manifests itself in the context of the Russian Federation. Using a qualitative research design, the thesis investigates the control mechanisms created by legislative framework, the ability of third sector organisations to substitute for the state, and the organisational characteristics of TSOs within a managed civil society space. Based on interview data from 82 TSOs across three geographical regions, the empirical chapters explore these three aspects in-depth. Firstly, the thesis demonstrates how a specific legislative framework is used as a legally mandated method to manage civil society. Secondly, the thesis explores more subtle attempts by the state to manage civil society. And thirdly, the thesis highlights ways in which the state controls TSOs and coerces them to mimic marionette organisations. Overall, the evidence presented throughout the thesis highlights the idiosyncratic nature of managed civil society arrangements in Russia in which the state is able to control and direct civil society

Cross Section and Parity-Violating Spin Asymmetries of W(+/-) Boson Production in Polarized p plus p Collisions at root s=500 Gev

Large parity-violating longitudinal single-spin asymmetries A(L)(e+) = 0.86(-0.14)(+0.30) and Ae(L)(e-) = 0.88(-0.71)(+0.12) are observed for inclusive high transverse momentum electrons and positrons in polarized p + p collisions at a center-of-mass energy of root s = 500 GeV with the PHENIX detector at RHIC. These e(+/-) come mainly from the decay of W(+/-) and Z(0) bosons, and their asymmetries directly demonstrate parity violation in the couplings of the W(+/-) to the light quarks. The observed electron and positron yields were used to estimate W(+/-) boson production cross sections for the e(+/-) channels of sigma(pp -> W(+)X) X BR(W(+) -> e(+) nu(e)) = 144.1 +/- 21.2(stat)(-10.3)(+3.4)(syst) +/- 21.6(norm) pb, and sigma(pp -> W(-)X) X BR(W(-) -> e(-) (nu) over bar (e)) = 3.17 +/- 12.1(stat)(-8.2)(+10.1)(syst) +/- 4.8(norm) pb.