Soft Power del Vaticano en el reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado

Desde 1945, el inicio de la cuestión palestina, el país ha sufrido una serie de transformaciones e intervenciones en su soberanía y en legitimidad, las cuales siguen en discusión actualmente; y han dado como resultado el estudio del reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado. Es pertinente hacer un acercamiento a este tema desde la variable religiosa (Vaticano), teniendo en cuenta el gran número de lugares sagrados que hay en la región de Palestina y la variable religiosa del conflicto Palestino-israelí. Desde la mirada del Soft Power, concepto que ha venido tomando fuerza en la academia desde 1980, podemos acercarnos al objeto de estudio y dilucidar las injerencias de este actor. Mediante una aproximación cualitativa, que conlleva análisis del discurso, análisis histórico y análisis de política exterior, se logrará obtener el resultado esperado, que es entender de qué manera el Vaticano ejerce influencia (ideológica y cultural) en el Sistema Internacional, en el asunto del reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado.

Análisis de la política exterior rusa frente a Abjasia en el período 2000-2008

El objetivo de la presente monografía de grado es analizar la relación entre la identidad dentro de Rusia y la política exterior de dicho Estado hacia la región de Abjasia. Se analiza y explica la manera en que los referentes identitarios dentro de Rusia en el periodo 2000-2008 influyen en las decisiones de política exterior que Rusia tomó hacia Abjasia en el campo militar y político. Se efectúa una revisión de textos (transcripciones de intervenciones y textos escritos) del Presidente y Primer Ministro de la Federación Rusa entre 2000 y 2008 para encontrar los referentes identitarios que determinan el comportamiento de Rusia hacia otros Estados y la forma en que influenciaron sus acciones con respecto a Abjasia.

Uso del gas como recurso estratégico en la política exterior rusa. Análisis de caso Ucrania periodo 2000-2010

Estudio de caso que busca evaluar el uso del gas natural dentro de la política exterior rusa como recurso estratégico en las relaciones con Ucrania. Se describe y analiza cómo la importancia geoestratégica de Ucrania genera una percepción de seguridad y relevancia económica en Rusia, por esta razón la Federación utiliza el gas natural como mecanismo de presión frente al Estado ucraniano para satisfacer sus intereses nacionales en función de los elementos mencionados anteriormente.Todo lo anterior a través de la Teoría del Heartland desarrollada por Halford Mackinder y El Concepto de Área Pivote de Zbigniew Brzezinski para determinar cómo se genera la importancia del Estado ucraniano frente a Rusia

Towards a fresh deal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies: 15 steps. CEPS Commentary, 29 May 2014

Following the convincing election of Petro Poroshenko as Ukraine’s new President, Michael Emerson puts forward 15 steps with a view to creating a fresh start for Ukraine, the EU and Russia and their neighbourhood policies.

Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making. CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, 25 July 2014

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, Steven Blockmans asks what it will take before the EU is able to confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy. With numerous competing national interests and some member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the author makes a number of recommendations for policy-makers.

How should the EU respond to Russia's war in Ukraine? CEPS Commentary, 3 September 2014

President Putin has chosen to escalate the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine, thereby ignoring both the sanctions and the diplomatic advances of the EU and its partners in response to Russia’s belligerence towards its neighbour over the last six months. Ahead of the NATO Summit in Wales on September 4-5, calls are growing for EU member states to provide arms and more intelligence to Ukraine’s beleaguered army. But it is far from certain that the EU will summon up the collective courage to do so. Beyond sanctions, what other options does the EU have to alter the Kremlin’s calculus?

The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

Ukraine: sovereign decentralisation or federalism without sovereignty? OSW Commentary No. 133, 18.04.2014

A key element of Russia’s policy towards the new government of Ukraine concerns demands for a constitutional reform that would transform the country from a unitary into a federal state in a way that would considerably privilege the eastern and southern regions. Such a change to Ukraine’s administrative system would enable Moscow to put pressure on Ukraine’s central government via the regions. In order to achieve its objectives, Russia has been pressuring Kyiv to establish a constitutional assembly in a form that would guarantee the endorsement of solutions dictated by Russia. In other words, Russia has been demanding, in what is practically an ultimatum, that Ukraine give up one of the fundamental sovereign rights of a state, the right to freely determine its system of government. Transforming Ukraine into a federal state is an unacceptable idea, primarily because the intention behind Russia’s demands is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, both through the content of the proposed changes and the way in which they are to be implemented. However, keeping in place the current, centralist model of state governance is not a feasible alternative. Ukraine will have to grant its regions broad self-governance powers, including the power to hold local referendums, and to transfer a considerable portion of the prerogatives currently held by the state to the local self-governments, along with adequate financial resources. That is because decentralisation along these lines is the only way forward towards a modern democracy in Ukraine. Russia’s policy has forced Kyiv to undertake legislative work on constitutional reform as a matter of urgency, rather than waiting until a new parliament is elected in which the new, post-Maidan balance of political power will be reflected, as political logic would require. The first draft of the constitutional amendments (of which no details are known at this stage) is to be presented in mid-May, and is expected to come into force in early autumn. However, whether these plans can be put into practice depends on further developments in the eastern part of Ukraine, because (among other reasons) if a state of emergency is introduced, the constitutional amendment process will have to be suspended.

Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement. OSW Commentary No. 44, 2010-12-15

The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.

Russia's development assistance. OSW Commentary No. 62, 2011-10-10

In its attempts to catch up with the global trend, Russia began granting development assistance in 2004. From the onset of Russia’s commitment, the aid delivered has increased fivefold and reached approximately US$ 500 million in 2010. Russian aid, albeit distributed nearly exclusively via international organisations, has been granted above all to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In recent months work on the establishment of the Russian development assistance system has been accelerated (a national strategy is being prepared and a specialised agency is to be established). This move proves that the Kremlin attaches weight to activity in this area which is an element of soft power politics, the foundations of which Moscow is currently attempting to lay. In its commitment to development co-operation Russia has sought on the one hand to increase its prestige on the international stage and on the other hand to gain another instrument of exerting its ascendancy in the CIS. The scale of aid and the way of delivering it have not made Russia an important global actor. Over the last five years Russia increased the funding allocated to development assistance several times, however, compared to other donors its aid does not appear impressive. The resources dedicated to this end stand at a mere 0.035% of Russian GDP. Unlike other non-Western superpowers such as China or India, Russia is not a competitor for Western countries in this area on the global scale. Nevertheless, within the CIS, Russia’s aid is building the country’s position as a donor. The long-term results of this aid are however being counteracted by the fact that Russia is expecting measurable and direct political and economic benefits in return. Although this policy helps Moscow achieve its objectives in the CIS, it does not develop Russian potential in the sphere of soft power or create a positive image of the country.

Ukraine and Russia: mutual relations and the conditions that determine them; The Republic of Belarus or the Belarussian Republic? OSW Study 3/2001

Ukraine and Russia: Among all of the countries that border Ukraine, the Russian Federation is its most important partner. Ukraine's relations with Moscow are the key issue of its foreign policy to such an extent that each option of the Ukrainian foreign policy is first and foremost a choice as to the shape of its relations with Russia. This is mainly a consequence of Ukraine's geographic and geopolitical situation, the legacy of many centuries of political, economic and cultural bonds between these two countries, as well as Russia's inevitably dominant position in their mutual relations. Belarus: Belarus has not broken off its bonds with Moscow after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Throughout the whole period of the Belarussian independence we can observe the country's strong political, economic and military dependence on Russia. This dependence allows Russia to control, and even shape, the processes that take place in Belarus in all the areas mentioned.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

Russia's strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change? OSW Commentary No. 74, 2012-04-19

The nomination on 21 March of deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin to the newly created post of the Russian president’s special representative for Transnistria and to the post of co-chairman of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental committee demonstrates the Kremlin’s increased interest in Moldova, and may be a sign of a change in Russia’s strategy towards this country. Other developments which may suggest a revival of Russia’s policy towards Moldova include the appointment on 5 April of Farit Mukhametshin as Russia’s new ambassador in Chisinau. Mukhametshin is a high-ranking official who had previously headed the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), which is one of the major instruments of Russia’s ‘soft power’ policy towards the post-Soviet states. The Kremlin’s growing interest in Moldova has further been confirmed by an unprecedented visit by Russia’s defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov to Transnistria on 12 April, and a two-day visit by Dmitri Rogozin to Chisinau and Tiraspol on 16–17 April.

Russian nationalists on the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 156|24.12.2014

On the Day of National Unity, celebrated in Russia every 4 November, members of nationalist movements organise a so-called Russian March in Moscow. In 2014 the nationalists took part in three competing marches, which illustrated the divisions present in these circles. The reason for these divisions is a difference of opinions on the policy pursued by Russia towards Ukraine. The pro-Russian, Russia-inspired protests in south-eastern Ukraine organised under the slogan of ‘defending’ the Russians living there (the ‘Russian Spring’) and the annexation of Crimea were received enthusiastically by the nationalists and contributed to a consolidation of these circles around the Kremlin which lasted for several months. In spite of this, opinions on the Russian government’s current policy towards the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics have been varied. The most radical groups have demanded that military support be offered, and that the ‘confederation’ of these republics, the so-called ‘Novorossiya’, should be officially recognised. They consider the Kremlin’s policy to have been too soft, and see the signing of the peace agreements in Minsk as a betrayal of the interests of the Russians. For the remaining representatives of nationalist circles, who are not so numerous and are less visible in the public sphere, finding a solution for Russia’s domestic problems remains a priority. Some of them oppose the very notion of Russia’s involvement in the conflict. Since the beginning of the ‘Russian Spring’, the Kremlin has fostered active attitudes among the nationalists and solicited their support, hoping to win a valuable ally. This has boosted hopes in these circles that their political position may be strengthened. The involvement in the fighting in Ukraine has led to a radicalisation of attitudes among the nationalists, and demonstrated that this group is ideologically motivated and has considerable potential for mobilisation. Moreover, the ‘Great Russian’ and anti-Western slogans some of them have propagated are reflected in views displayed by average Russians, who have been influenced by the patriotic enthusiasm which followed the annexation of Crimea. Due to all this, from among all the actors active on the opposition side, it is the nationalists – and not the representatives of the liberal and pro-Western opposition – that have the best prospects for access to the political stage in Russia. It cannot be ruled out that a further strengthening of the radical groups might also be boosted by the possible growing social frustration caused by the economic crisis, which additionally increases the risk of political destabilisation.

Western Strategic Poverty: The Ukrainian Crisis and the New World Order. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 Special Issue, March 2014

From Introduction. The Ukrainian crisis, which deepened in February with the invasion of the Crimean peninsula by Russia, has exposed a serious poverty of strategy and leadership from Europe and the US. Such a lack of strategic vision in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, considered by Nicholas Burns among others, as one of the greatest crises in Europe since 1991, diverges between the European Union and the US. It is undeniable that the western leadership is unable to get its act together. In the US, the perpetual fratricide between the republicans and democrats over anything is affecting the development and implementation of sound foreign policies, while in the EU, there is no clear European leadership emerging, neither from the 28 Member States nor the High Representative and Presidents of the Council and Commission. The EU is once again facing its perpetual policy of risk aversion. On the one hand, the US remains conflicted in identifying its identity in this post-liberal world order, while the EU difficulty faces the inevitable limitation of its soft power. With a West in crisis, no decent strategy and/or policy to unravel, or at least contain, the Ukrainian crisis can emerge in this axiomatic moment with the making of the new world order.