Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

When to carry eccentric products? Optimal retail assortment under consumer returns

To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study howthe optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects itsassortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase andkeep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortmenthas a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the mostpopular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed asa form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, orwhen returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a commonfinding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results:more eccentric products have higher probability of return conditional on purchase. In light of our analyticalfindings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into accountwhen merchandising.

Implicit collusion on wide spreads

Recent empirical findings suggest that spreads quoted in dealershipmarkets might be uncompetitive. This paper analyzes theoretically if pricecompetition between risk--averse market--makers leaves room for implicitcollusive behavior. We compare the spread and risk--sharing efficiencyarising in several market structures differing in terms of i) the priorityrule followed in case of ties, and ii) the type of schedules market makersmay use, namely: general schedules, linear schedules, or limit orders. Ingeneral, competitive pricing does not arise in equilibrium, and there isa conflict between risk sharing efficiency and the tightness of the spread.This conflict can be mitigated by an appropriate market structure design.The limit order market is the only market structure in which the competitiveequilibrium is the unique equilibrium.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Government consumption and private consumption correlations

This paper examines whether the introduction of government consumptionexpenditure in a standard one good model of the international real businesscycle is sufficient to reconcile the theory with the existing pattern ofinternational consumption and output correlations. I calibrate the model totwo different pairs of countries and generate the simulated distribution ofconsumption and output correlations implied by several specifications of themodel. It is shown that the model can account for existing internationalconsumption correlations only under very specific assumptions about the sizeof effect of government expenditure on agents' utility or the variabilityof government expenditure shocks. Crucial parameters are identified and thesensitivity of the results discussed.

Credit derivatives in emerging markets

Credit Derivatives are securities that offer protection against credit or default risk ofbonds or loans. The credit derivatives emerging market has grown rapidly and creditderivatives are widely used. This paper describes the emerging credit derivativesmarket structure. The current market activity is analyzed through elementary pricingdynamics and the study of the term structure of default risk. Focusing on theperformance of credit derivatives in stress situation, including legal and market risks,we discuss the potential consequences of a debt restructuring in a large emergingmarket borrower. The contribution of credit derivatives to the risk sharing in emergingmarkets is also examined.

Insurance with frequent trading: A dynamic analysis of efficient insurance markets

This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency toa dynamic setting. It introduces continuosly open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It alsoeliminates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying riskprocess. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catstrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Insurance with frequent trading

This paper looks at the dynamic management of risk in an economy with discrete time consumption and endowments and continuous trading. I study how agents in such an economy deal with all the risk in the economy and attain their Pareto optimal allocations by trading in a few natural securities: private insurance contracts and a common set of derivatives on the aggregate endowment. The parsimonious nature ofthe implied securities needed for Pareto optimality suggests that insuch contexts complete markets is a very reasonable assumption.

The concept of solution: Industry’s insights compared to theoretical views

Many manufacturing companies have started to offer complete solutions to their customers’ unique needs due to toughening competition and customer demand. Discourse on this kind of solution business is still developing, hence, there is not an established definition for the concept of solution. The aim of the study is to profoundly identify the concept of solution and to understand how the industry’s current views differ from the theoretical concepts. The describing dimensions are identified from selected 13 theoretical notions, and from responses, that the employees of five different companies have given. The 32 interview transcripts are analyzed with thematic analysis and qualitative content analysis. According to the findings, the concept of solution is characterized by integration, customization, risk-sharing, value co-creation, long-term orientation, and desired outcomes. The industry’s insights differ in terms of them all. The results illustrate, that a solution is a bundle, and the whole solution is customized on some level for a client. A solution supplier needs to be customer-focused, in which value co-creation is only a part. The solution solves the customer’s problem, and improves both the customer’s, and the supplier’s business. Neither long-term focus nor risks-sharing were directly employed to characterize the concept of solution. Differences are mainly due to the different approaches to the definitions and inexperience of the companies.