Sri Lanka and the responsibility to protect : politics, ethnicity and genocide

This book provides a study of the war by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to create a separate state in Sri Lanka. It examines the ways in which this war should, in principle, have invoked ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principles, as well as the political, legal and practical problems involved and, ultimately, why the international community failed to act.

Over the years there have been several events, including those in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Darfur, and Kosovo, that have led the international community to accept a responsibility to protect. However, despite its overwhelming preliminary endorsement, the principles of this concept are still not universally sanctioned and there are some strong international opponents, including some countries that were initial signatories of the convention.

By considering the example of Sri Lanka, the text focuses on what conditions could satisfy or demand the application of responsibility to protect. It further presents a case as to why this conflict was, and may still be, the normative responsibility of the international community.

Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect will be of great interest to students of South-East Asian politics, human rights, international law, ethnic conflict, security studies and IR in general.

Responsibility to protect or Trojan Horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.

The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur

Governments that have endorsed the 'sovereignty as responsibility' approach have shown little inclination to protect civilians suffering at the hands of their own government in the Sudanese province of Darfur. After providing an overview of Darfur's crisis and international society's feeble response, we explore why the strongest advocates of 'sovereignty as responsibility', the NATO and EU states, failed to seriously contemplate military intervention. We suggest that three main factors help explain the West's unwillingness to intervene in Darfur: increased scepticism about the West's humanitarian interventionism, especially after the invasion of Iraq; Western strategic interests in Sudan; and the relationship between the crisis in Darfur and Sudan's other civil wars. We conclude that the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention remains weak and strongly contested, and that advocates of the 'responsibility to protect' approach have yet to persuade their governments to help save populations in danger.

Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit

At the 2005 World Summit, the world's leaders committed themselves to the "responsibility to protect", recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world's most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world's states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN's High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

Points of convergence and divergence : normative, institutional and operational relationships between R2P and POC

As an international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has gained substantial influence and institutional presence—and created no small controversy—in the ten years since its first conceptualisation. Conversely, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC) has a longer pedigree and enjoys a less contested reputation. Yet UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 has thrown into sharp relief the relationship between the two. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 follow exactly the process envisaged by R2P in response to imminent atrocity crimes, yet the operative paragraphs of the resolutions themselves invoke only PoC. This article argues that, while the agendas of PoC and R2P converge with respect to Security Council action in cases like Libya, outside this narrow context it is important to keep the two norms distinct. Peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, international lawyers, individual states and regional organisations are required to act differently with respect to the separate agendas and contexts covered by R2P and PoC. While overlap between the two does occur in highly visible cases like Libya, neither R2P nor PoC collapses normatively, institutionally or operationally into the other.

The BRICS and R2P : contestation, re-interpretation and norm entrepreneurship

The intra-state humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria have led to renewed debate over the content and implementation of pillar three of the responsibility to protect (R2P). This paper examines the BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) current perspectives on R2P and their recent efforts to shape the concept’s evolution. While Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) proposal has been widely discussed, the central focus here is on the lesser-known, semi-official Chinese idea of “Responsible Protection” (RP). Like RwP, RP proposes decision-making criteria and accountability mechanisms for UN-authorised military intervention under R2P’s third pillar. This paper argues that although RP draws heavily on previous R2P proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s RwP, by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the Chinese initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, as it currently stands, some aspects of RP appear to be framed too strictly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of R2P military intervention, and would, therefore, benefit from clarification and refinement. Of broader significance, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives point to the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to articulate and promote their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance. This development has potential implications both for R2P’s evolution and for the structure of the international system.

R2P ten years after the World Summit: Explaining ongoing contestation over Pillar III

This article examines how and why contrasting interpretations of the international community’s role in preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes continue to exist a decade after the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was unanimously endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Building on recent critical constructivist insights into the fluid, dynamic nature of norms, it advances two main arguments. The first is that continuing contestation over R2P’s third pillar is a product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm dynamism. R2P’s inherently complex normative structure, coupled with several external factors, including the broader normative environment, norm implementation experiences and a shift in global power towards the BRICS, have contributed to a period of renewed contestation and triggered attempts to re-formulate R2P thorough Brazil’s ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) proposal and China’s semi-official ‘Responsible Protection’ concept. The second central argument is that such contestation is affecting R2P’s distinct normative prescriptions in different ways. While resistance to the implementation of coercive pillar III measures is currently impeding the normative progress of that component of the norm, this contestation has not prevented consensual pillar II assistance from becoming more deeply embedded in international practice and discourse.

The responsibility to record civilian casualties

The responsibility to record civilian casualties in both armed conflict and civil disturbances must be an integral element of the responsibility to protect, particularly in the application of the just cause principles. The first part of this article examines the threshold issue of the possibility of large-scale civilian casualties which triggers the international community’s responsibility to react. The reports recommending the responsibility to protect emphasise the need to establish the actuality or risk of ‘large scale’ loss of life which is not possible in the current context without a civilian casualty recording structure. The second part of the article outlines the international legal obligation to record civilian casualties based on international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Thirdly, the responsibility to protect and the legal obligation to record casualties are brought together within the framework of Ban Ki-moon’s reports on implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The fourth and final part of the article reviews the situations in Sri Lanka and Syria. Both states represent egregious examples of governments hiding the existence of casualties, resulting in paralysis within the international community. These situations establish, beyond doubt, that the national obligation to record civilian casualties must be part and parcel of the responsibility to protect.

Contextualizing the business responsibility to respect: How much is lost in translation?

As the work of the UN Special Representative (UNSR) for business and human rights moves towards its conclusion in mid-2011, the core principles of the UNSR’s ‘responsibility to respect’ framework have received widespread endorsement from businesses, NGOs and governments. The translation of these general principles into specific obligations governing business activity will need to differ according to context. The reasons why overarching regulatory principles can get ‘lost in translation’ when applied in practice have important implications for understanding how the UNSR’s responsibility to respect framework can be meaningfully implemented across widely varying regulatory contexts. The central goal of this chapter is to understand why and under what conditions this loss is likely to arise, and how regulatory standards for business and human rights might be designed to enable the responsibility to respect principle to be applied in context-sensitive ways, without losing regulatory force.

"Everything was designed to make sure that this thing endured" : Processus de légitimation et la Responsabilité de protéger

L’objet de cette thèse est la « Responsabilité de protéger » (RdP), son émergence et les processus de légitimation qui ont contribué à son acceptation dans les arènes de la politique globale. Le principe d’une intervention militaire à des fins humanitaires gagne en légitimité dans les années 1990, bien qu’il soit marqué par d’intenses polémiques dans la pratique. Les situations de conflits où les civils sont brutalement persécutés et les interventions demandées et organisées pour y répondre sont maintenant largement justifiées dans les termes de la RdP. Est donc apparu d’abord un changement normatif. Ce changement s’est cristallisé dans le rapport de la Commission internationale sur l’intervention et la souveraineté des États (CIISE) qui a forgé l’expression « responsabilité de protéger ». Le point de départ ici est cependant que la RdP marque un changement discursif dans la manière de parler et de justifier ces pratiques. Je montre comment les termes de la RdP en sont venus à être ceux qui dégagent le plus large consensus autour de la question de l’intervention à des fins humanitaires. La thèse centrale de cette recherche est que le relatif succès de la RdP tient au fait que les architectes de la CIISE et les entrepreneurs de la RdP ont déployé un sens pratique aiguisé du champ de la politique globale. Le procédé principal employé est de mettre en lumière les processus de légitimation activement mis en oeuvre pour stimuler ce changement discursif. J’avance que les agents ont su placer la RdP, et par extension le principe de l’intervention à des fins humanitaires, dans le domaine du non problématique en déployant un langage et des pratiques vus comme ne posant pas problème. Concrètement, il s’est agi de choisir les agents à qui serait accordée la reconnaissance de parler, mais qui seraient aussi en mesure de proposer une solution d’une manière considérée comme légitime dans les arènes de la politique globale. Traquer les processus de légitimation est un procédé analytique qui permet de comprendre le succès de la RdP, mais qui révèle également des éléments fondamentaux du fonctionnement formel et informel de la politique globale.

Introduction

"The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a major new international principle, adopted unanimously in 2005 by Heads of State and Government. Whilst it is broadly acknowledged that the principle has an important and intimate relationship with international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights and armed conflict, there has yet to be a volume dedicated to this question. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law fills that gap by bringing together leading scholars from North America, Europe and Australia to examine R2P’s legal content. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law focuses on questions relating to R2P’s legal quality, its relationship with sovereignty, and the question of whether the norm establishes legal obligations. It also aims to introduce readers to different legal perspectives, including feminism, and pressing practical questions such as how the law might be used to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, and punish the perpetrators."--publisher website