Performance-based contracting in the construction sector

Construction procurement is complex and there is a very wide range of options available to procurers. Inappropriate choices about how to procure may limit practical opportunities for innovation. In particular, traditional approaches to construction procurement set up many obstacles for technology suppliers to provide innovative solutions. This is because they are often employed as sub-contractors simply to provide and install equipment to specifications developed before the point at which they become involved in a project. A research team at the University of Reading has developed a procurement framework that comprehensively defines the various options open to procurers in a more fine-grained way than has been known in the past. This enables informed decisions that can establish tailor-made procurement approaches that take into account the needs of specific clients. It enables risk and reward structures to be aligned so that contracts and payment mechanisms are aligned precisely with what a client seeks to achieve. This is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach. Rather, it is an approach that enables informed decisions about how to organize individual procurements that are appropriate to particular circumstances, acknowledging that they differ for each client and for each procurement exercise. Within this context, performance-based contracting (PBC) is explored in terms of the different ways in which technology suppliers within constructed facilities might be encouraged and rewarded for the kinds of innovation sought by the ultimate clients. Examples from various industry sectors are presented, from public sector and from private sector, with a commentary about what they sought to achieve and the extent to which they were successful. The lessons from these examples are presented in terms of feasibility in relation to financial issues, governance, economics, strategic issues, contractual issues and cash flow issues for clients and for contractors. Further background documents and more detailed readings are provided in an appendix for those who wish to find out more.

Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.

Public Procurement Law and Health care: From Theory to Practice. Research Paper in Law, 2/2010

From the Introduction. This contribution will focus on the core question if, how and to what extent the EU procurement rules and principles (may) affect the national health care systems. We start our analysis by summarizing the applicable EU public procurement legislation, principles and soft law and its exact scope in relation to health care. (section 2). Subsequently, we turn to the parties in a contract, subject to procurement rules in the field of health care, addressing both the definition of contracting authorities and relevant case law (section 3). This will then lead to an analysis of possible justifications for not holding a tender procedure in the field of health care (section 4). Finally, we illustrate the impact of EU public procurement rules on health care by analysing a Dutch case study, in which the question whether public hospitals in the Netherlands qualify as contracting authorities in terms of the Public Sector Directive stood central (section 5). Our conclusions will follow in section 6.

Business contracting-out practices.

"Summary 87-8."

Section 3 : job training, employment, and contracting opportunities for low-income persons.

Includes index.

A guide for providers of mental health and addictive disorder services in managed care contracting /

Shipping list no.: 99-0117-P.

Contracting problems at the Resolution Trust Corporation (Operation Western Storm) : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, March 3, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0522-P.

Reforming postal procurement and contracting : Eagle Air hub example : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, September 24, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0298-P.

Contracting problems at EPA : hearing before Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, March 2, 1992.

Shipping list no.: 93-0404-P.

Avoiding conflict of interest in defense contracting and employment : thirteenth report by the Committee on Government Operations.

"Union calendar no. 389."

Computer program for incentives (a description of a computer program that generates incentive contracting visibility tools), May 1970.

Mode of access: Internet.