The application to the secretary of the navy, in relation to the supplying of the navy station at the port of New-York, and his prohibition by R.C. Wetmore from continuing such supplies, with the correspondence thereinreferred to and consequent thereon.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Battle of 1900 : an official hand-book for every American citizen. Republican issues by L. White Busbey, Prohibition issues by Oliver W. Stewart, Democratic issues by Willis J. Abbot, Populist issues by Dr. Howard S. Taylor. Endorsed by the parties.

Mode of access: Internet.

Prohibition victorious: then--what?

Mode of access: Internet.

Prohibition enforcement in the District of Columbia. Hearing[s] before the Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Senate, Seventy-first Congress, second session, on S. 3344, a bill supplementing the National prohibition act for the District of Columbia. April 8 [25 and May 1] 1930.

Arthur Capper, chairman.

Sewage disposal and wildlife health in Antarctica

Sewage and its microbiology, treatment and disposal are important to the topic of Antarctic wildlife health because disposal of untreated sewage effluent into the Antarctic marine environment is both allowed and commonplace. Human sewage contains enteric bacteria as normal flora, and has the potential to contain parasites, bacteria and viruses which may prove pathogenic to Antarctic wildlife. Treatment can reduce levels of micro-organisms in sewage effluent, but is not a requirement of the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol). In contrast, the deliberate release of non-native organisms for any other reason is prohibited. Hence, disposal of sewage effluent to the marine environment is the only activity routinely undertaken in Antarctica knowing that it will likely result in the release of large numbers of potentially non-native species. When the Madrid Protocol was negotiated, the decision to allow release of untreated sewage effluent was considered the only pragmatic option, as a prohibition would have been costly, and may not have been achievable by many Antarctic operators. In addition, at that time the potential for transmission of pathogens to wildlife from sewage was not emphasised as a significant potential risk. Since then, the transmission of disease-causing agents between species is more widely recognised and it is now timely to consider the risks of continued discharge of sewage effluent in Antarctica and whether there are practical alternatives.

Female genital mutilation : Australian law, policy and practical challenges for doctors

As long ago as 1994, the Family Law Council accepted it was likely that female genital mutilation (FGM) was being conducted in Australia. In 2010, doctors and hospitals reported that it is being conducted and that they are seeing female patients who have experienced FGM. It is impossible to obtain precise data about the extent to which it is performed in Australia, but data indicates that FGM is a relevant issue for Australian medical practitioners. The medical profession has an interest in this topic because its members may be asked to conduct FGM, advise those considering it, or treat female patients with effects from the practice. This article provides a background on the practice of FGM, explains the relevant Australian law, considers whether the current legal prohibition on FGM is justified, and discusses the practical challenges facing individual practitioners and the profession. To inform further discussions about methods of responding to demand for FGM, reference is made to strategies being promoted in African nations to abolish this cultural practice.

Israel's airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar facility : a test case for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence?

This article analyses the legality of Israel’s 2007 airstrike on an alleged Syrian nuclear facility at Al-Kibar—an incident that has been largely overlooked by international lawyers to date. The absence of a threat of imminent attack from Syria means Israel’s military action was not a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defence. Yet, despite Israel’s clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force there was remarkably little condemnation from other states, suggesting the possibility of growing international support for the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This article argues that the muted international reaction to Israel’s pre-emptive action was the result of political factors, and should not be seen as endorsement of the legality of the airstrike. As such, a lack of opinio juris means the Al-Kibar episode cannot be viewed as extending the scope of the customary international law right of self-defence so as to permit the use of force against non-imminent threats. However, two features of this incident—namely, Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the international community’s apparent lack of concern over legality—are also evident in other recent uses of force in the ‘war on terror’ context. These developments may indicate a shift in state practice involving a downgrading of the role of international law in discussions of the use of force. This may signal a declining perception of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum, at least in cases involving minor uses of force.

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.

Charity law, advocacy and the aid/watch decision : compatibility of charitable purposes and political objects — the view from Australia

Introduction In 1952 the Nathan report stated that: Some of the most valuable activities of voluntary societies consist, however, in the fact that they may be able to stand aside from and criticize State action or inaction, in the interests of the inarticulate man in the street. Some 60 years later it remained the case that if a voluntary society wanted to gain or retain charitable status then, contrary to the Nathan report, the one thing it could not do was set itself up with the purpose of criticizing State action or inaction. This legal position was adopted by the authorities in Australia with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) noting in Taxation Ruling TR2005/21: 102. An institution or fund is not charitable if its purpose is advocating a political party or cause, attempting to change the law or government policy, or propagating or promoting a particular point of view. So, why, if it is such a valuable activity, have governments steadfastly refused to allow charities to have as their purpose the freedom to advocate in this way and how has this situation been affected by the recent High Court of Australia decision in Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation? This article proposes to address such questions. Beginning with some background history, it explains that, initially, the current constraints did not apply. Then it looks at the nature of these constraints: how does the law define what constitutes the type of political activity that a charity must not undertake? What is the rationale for prohibition? How has the judiciary contributed to the development of the law in this area in recent years? This will lead into a consideration of the Aid/Watch case and the implications arising from the recent final decision. The article concludes by reflecting on what has changed and why the view on this contentious matter now looks different from Australia.

Unfair terms in residential land contracts : will the Australian consumer law improve a buyer’s bargaining position?

The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts has the potential to significantly impact on the terms of contracts for the sale of land. The definition of ‘consumer contract’ includes contracts for the sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual wholly or predominantly for personal or domestic use. Therefore, a contract for the purchase of a residence for personal occupation by the buyer, as opposed to a purchase for investment purposes, will be a consumer contract potentially attracting the application of the unfair terms provisions. Significant consumer protection mechanisms already exist in most state jurisdictions requiring disclosure of relevant matters to the buyer and providing remedies for the provision of misleading conduct. Minimal evidence of unfair terms in land contract was presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Australian Consumer Policy Framework raising the question as to whether there is an identified problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, whether the same economic and ethical rationales justify regulatory intervention. This article examines what effect if any the introduction of the unfair contract provisions will have on the enforcement of residential land contracts and the viability of previously accepted conditions if challenged as being “unfair terms”. The article concludes that despite the existence of several potentially unfair terms in some land contracts, the intervention of the rules of equity to overcome perceived hardship or unfairness to buyers from strict enforcement of terms means the unfair terms provisions are only likely to operate on terms untouched by those principles. In the authors’ view the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions will be limited to terms untouched by the principles of equity and consumer protection legislation making it unlikely that there will be any significant realignment of the contractual obligations and rights of buyers and sellers of land.

How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?

The purpose of this paper is to provide a basis from which to start an informed and rational dialogue in Australia about voluntary euthanasia (VE) and assisted suicide (AS). It does this by seeking to chart the broad landscape of issues that can be raised as relevant to how this conduct should be regulated by the law. It is not our purpose to persuade. Rather, we have attempted to address the issues as neutrally as possible and to canvass both sides of the argument in an even-handed manner. We hope that this exercise places the reader in a position to consider the question posed by this paper: How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide? In line with the approach taken in the paper, this question does not take sides in the debate. It simply asks how VE and AS should be regulated, acknowledging that both prohibition and legalisation of such conduct involve regulation. We begin by considering the wider legal framework that governs end of life decision-making. Decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that result in a person’s death can be lawful. This could be because, for example, a competent adult refuses such treatment. Alternatively, stopping or not providing treatment can be lawful when it is no longer in a person’s best interests to receive it. The law also recognises that appropriate palliative care should not attract criminal responsibility. By contrast, VE and AS are unlawful in Australia and could lead to prosecution for crimes such as murder, manslaughter or aiding and abetting suicide. But this is not to say that such conduct does not occur in practice. Indeed, there is a body of evidence that VE and AS occur in Australia, despite them being unlawful. There have been repeated efforts to change the law in this country, mainly by the minor political parties. However, apart from a brief period when VE and AS was lawful in the Northern Territory, these attempts to reform the law have been unsuccessful. The position is different in a small but increasing number of jurisdictions overseas where such conduct is lawful. The most well known is the Netherlands but there are also statutory regimes that regulate VE and/or AS in Belgium and Luxembourg in Europe, and Oregon and Washington in the United States. A feature of these legislative models is that they incorporate review or oversight processes that enable the collection of data about how the law is being used. As a result, there is a significant body of evidence that is available for consideration to assess the operation of the law in these jurisdictions and some of this is considered briefly here. Assisting a suicide, if done for selfless motives, is also legal in Switzerland, and this has resulted in what has been referred to as ‘euthanasia tourism’. This model is also considered. The paper also identifies the major arguments in favour of, and against, legalisation of VE and AS. Arguments often advanced in favour of law reform include respect for autonomy, that public opinion favours reform, and that the current law is incoherent and discriminatory. Key arguments against legalising VE and AS point to the sanctity of life, concerns about the adequacy and effectiveness of safeguards, and a ‘slippery slope’ that will allow euthanasia to occur for minors or for adults where it is not voluntary. We have also attempted to step beyond these well trodden and often rehearsed cases ‘for and against’. To this end, we have identified some ethical values that might span both sides of the debate and perhaps be the subject of wider consensus. We then outline a framework for considering the issue of how Australia should regulate VE and AS. We begin by asking whether such conduct should be criminal acts (as they presently are). If VE and AS should continue to attract criminal responsibility, the next step is to enquire whether the law should punish such conduct more or less than is presently the case, or whether the law should stay the same. If a change is favoured as to how the criminal law punishes VE and AS, options considered include sentencing reform, creating context-specific offences or developing prosecutorial guidelines for how the criminal justice system deals with these issues. If VE and AS should not be criminal acts, then questions arise as to how and when they should be permitted and regulated. Possible elements of any reform model include: ensuring decision-making is competent and voluntary; ascertaining a person’s eligibility to utilise the regime, for example, whether it depends on him or her having a terminal illness or experiencing pain and suffering; and setting out processes for how any decision must be made and evidenced. Options to bring about decriminalisation include challenging the validity of laws that make VE and AS unlawful, recognising a defence to criminal prosecution, or creating a statutory framework to regulate the practice. We conclude the paper where we started: with a call for rational and informed consideration of a difficult and sensitive issue. How should Australia regulate voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?