The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.

Brazil’s 2014 presidential elections: the interconnection between election news and stock market behavior

This study researches whether there has been abnormal stock market behaviour in Brazil as a consequence of election news (observed via opinion polls), regarding the last Brazilian presidential election, held in October 2014. Via applying event study methodology, the research on the Ibovespa and Petrobras suggests that events in which Rousseff was gaining in share have been subject to negative abnormal returns, and events where Rousseff was loosing in share have led to positive abnormal returns. Moreover, volatility has been significantly elevated during the election period and volume has been found to have slightly increased.

Cabinet composition and assessment of a multiparty presidential system

This doctoral dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the Brazilian cabinet according to the concepts of a multiparty presidential system. Appointing politicians as ministers is one of the most important coalition-building tools and has been widely used by minority presidents. This dissertation will therefore analyze the high-level Brazilian national bureaucracy between 1995 and 2014. It argues that the ministries – or departments – are not equal, and that allied parties therefore take into account the different characteristics of a ministry when demanding positions as a patronage strategy or for use as other kinds of political assets. After reviewing the literature on the theme, followed by a comparative analysis of the Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, and Guatemalan cabinets, all the Brazilian ministries will be weighed and ranked on a scale that is able to measure their political importance and attractiveness. This rank takes into account variables such as the budgetary power, the ability to spend money according the ministers’ will, the ability to hire new employees, the ministries’ influence over other governmental agents such as companies, agencies, and so on, the ministers’ tenure in office. Finally, a proxy is provided that seeks to identify the normative power a department may hold. All of these characteristics will then be taken into account in considering the representatives’ opinion, thus helping to ascertain whether the cabinet appointment has been coalescent among the several parties that belong to the president’s coalition.

Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status

Discusses the termination of desegregation decrees and the elusive meaning of unitary status, first introducing the topic and then covering Jenkins III and providing an overview of desegregation scholarship including discretion, capacity, and legitima. Also discusses the evolution of equity, including English equity, American equity, and equity and desegregation. Explores the concepts of relevant rights and interests, focusing on Hohfeld, the interest theory of rights, and the application of the rights theory. The conclusion posits that what remains is a complicated and confused desegregation jurisprudence, and that the lines that separate desegregation from integration from diversity, if there ever were such lines, are blurring. A discussion of the theoretical premises underlying desegregation appears to continue to be necessary.

Congressional Endorsements in the Presidential Nomination Process: Democratic Superdelegates in the 2008 Election

Examining congressional superdelegate endorsements in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, the authors show that changes in the political context affected the balance of factors in members’ decisions to endorse Clinton or Obama. Specifically, the national standing of the candidates became increasingly important—and local opinion less important—to Obama endorsements even as constituency views became a stronger influence over Clinton endorsements. The findings reveal how constituency considerations affect the elite endorsement choices that shape the presidential nominating process. In addition, the analysis highlights the ways in which members of Congress balance conflicting considerations in a changing political context when an issue plays out over an extended period.

Congressional Endorsements in the Presidential Nomination Process: Democratic Superdelegates in the 2008 Election

Examining congressional superdelegate endorsements in the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, the authors show that changes in the political context affected the balance of factors in members' decisions to endorse Clinton or Obama. Specifically, the national standing of the candidates became increasingly important-and local opinion less important-to Obama endorsements even as constituency views became a stronger influence over Clinton endorsements. The findings reveal how constituency considerations affect the elite endorsement choices that shape the presidential nominating process. In addition, the analysis highlights the ways in which members of Congress balance conflicting considerations in a changing political context when an issue plays out over an extended period.

The Presidential Institution in Bulgaria, Albania and Romani: An Attempt at Comparison"

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania are all parliamentary republics with a president as head of state. Although the Albanian president is elected by Parliament, he is arguably the strongest of the three, both in terms of the powers allowed by the provisional constitution and of Mr. Berisha's political practice. The constitutional reform underway in the country will however change the status quo. In Bulgaria and Romania the presidents are elected directly by popular vote, but their powers are relatively small as compared to the democratic legitimisation implied by direct elections. Actual presidential powers should however be assessed with caution as some of them are set by law or interpretations of constitutional texts, rather than by the constitutions themselves. There is also variation in the degree to which the presidents in office have exploited their constitutional powers or taken their role as non-aligned political brokers seriously. Mr. Berisha, in particular, was in control of party politics throughout his presidency and was one of the most polarising influences on public opinion. The excessive political polarisation in all three countries has however its own logic and power. Thus Mr. Zhelev invariably supported the emergence of a political centre in Bulgaria, but this did not succeed and the policy was as damaging to his political career as the fight with would-be centrists was to Berisha's. Political practice in all three countries seems to need a presidential figure. This adds flexibility to a situation governed by hostile and mutually suspicious parties, stuck parliaments and weak or inexperienced governments. The presidents also command considerable influence on public opinion. Public opinion in Bulgaria, for example, largely supports the idea of greater power for the president, in contrast with the opinions of constitutionalists and other law-makers in the country. Under the legacy of the past, the people have a love-hate relationship with such paternalist figures. Presidents personalise politics in the public mind, but they can also become scapegoats for political failures.

Interaction of powers in the Philippine presidential system

The executive - legislative relations in the Philippines have been described in two contrasting stories, namely the "strong president" story, and the "strong congress" story. This paper tries to consolidate the existing arguments and propose a new perspective focusing on the "compromise exchange" between the president and the congress across the different policy areas. It considers that the policy outcome is not brought by unilateral power of the president or the congress, but formed as the product of such an exchange. Interaction of powers and their complementary function are addressed. Furthermore, aside from the constitutional power, the weak party discipline is pointed out as a key factor in making the exchange possible.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.