Enforcing Member State Compliance with EU Environmental Law: A Critical Evaulation of the Use of Financial Penalties

The 1993 Treaty on European Union finally closed a legal vacuum in
EU law, by giving the Court the power to impose financial penalties to
enforce compliance with its judgments. Today, this power is found
within Article 260(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. Drawing upon case law, this article examines the
role that the Court’s enforcement powers have played in relation to
EU environmental law. It argues that EU law has yet to make full use
of their potential. The article commences with the Commission and
questions whether it has sufficient resources to carry out its functions
under Article 260(2). The article also examines the ongoing problem of
Member State delay in complying with Court judgments and the
weight given to environmental considerations in the Court’s decision
making on financial penalties. The article concludes by examining the
implications of the Lisbon Treaty.

Political Posturing or Real Powers: Control of Genetically Modified Crops by the Member States and their Regions

The cultivation of genetically modified (GM) crops in the EU is highly harmonised, involving a central authorisation procedure that aims to ensure a high level of environmental and human health protection. However conflicts over authority persist and the Commission has responded to a combination of internal and external pressures with a more flexible approach to coexistence, a proposed opt-out clause and recently a promise by the head of the Commission to review the existing EU GM legislative regime, providing an opportunity to consider and suggest paths of development. In light of the significance of multilevel governance and subsidiarity for GM cultivation, this paper considers the policy-making powers of the Member States and subnational regions in this regime, focussing upon post-authorisation options in particular. A number of core mechanisms exist, including voluntary measures, safeguard clauses, coexistence measures, a proposed express opt-out and Article 4(2) TEU on ‘national identity. These mechanisms are examined in light of the goals and challenges of multilevel governance, in order to consider whether the relevant powers are located at the appropriate level. Overall, it is apparent that the developments occurring at the EU level are strengthening multilevel governance, but with significant opportunities to improve it further through focussing on the supporting roles and the regional levels in particular.

On convergence with hiccups: recent amendments to Poland's competition law

Discusses the amendments to the Polish Competition Act 2007 adopted in June 2014 which aim to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, including the introduction of: (1) civil fines for individuals; (2) a "leniency plus" programme based on the US model; (3) a settlement procedure; and (4) extended inspection powers for the Competition Authority. Assesses the likely effectiveness of the reforms.

Tutela processual de direitos humanos fundamentais : inflexões no "due process of law"

Tese de doutoramento, Direito (Ciências Jurídico-Civis), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Direito, 2014

Canadian federalism and treaty powers: existential communities, functional regimes and the Canadian constitution

La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de conclure des traités internationaux - ce pouvoir étant réservé, à l'époque de l'adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir impérial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition prévoyait les modalités de mise en oeuvre des traités impériaux au sein de la fédération canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque l'autonomie du Canada face à l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnée d'une refonte en profondeur du texte de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a été expressément prévu concernant le droit des traités au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traités internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du «constitutionnalisme organique» canadien. Cette thèse examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme à travers le cas particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traités internationaux. Elle examine ce sujet tout en approfondissant les conséquences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du fédéralisme reconnu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217. De manière plus spécifique, cette thèse analyse en détail l’affaire Canada (P.G.) c. Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arrêt des conventions de travail) ou le Conseil prive a conclu que si l'exécutif fédéral peut signer et ratifier des traités au nom de l'État canadien, la mise en oeuvre de ces traités devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification législative est nécessaire à cet effet - par le palier législatif compétent sur la matière visée par l'obligation internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne spécifia toutefois pas dans cet arrêt qui a compétence pour conclure des traités relatifs aux matières de compétence provinciale. Cette thèse s'attaque donc à cette question. Elle défend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou règle de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'exécutif fédéral ait un pouvoir plénier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traités. Elle souligne de plus que de très importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les impératifs d'expertise, de fonctionnalité institutionnelle et de démocratie militent à l’encontre d'un tel pouvoir fédéral plénier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des différentes communautés existentielles présentes au Canada exige une telle décentralisation. Cette thèse démontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules à posséder un pouvoir constitutionnel de conclure des traités portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de compétence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant déléguer l'exercice au gouvernement fédéral. Enfin, cette thèse analyse de manière systématique et approfondie les arguments invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes établis par l'arrêt des conventions de travail en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre législative des traités relatifs à des matières provinciales et elle démontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle démontre par ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des règles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-tendent et complètent le sens de cette décision, renverser l’arrêt des conventions de travail aurait pour effet concret de transformer l'ensemble de la fédération canadienne en état quasi unitaire car le Parlement pourrait alors envahir de manière permanente et exclusive l'ensemble des champs de compétence provinciaux. Cette conséquence est assurément interdite par le principe du fédéralisme constitutionnellement enchâssé.

The Application of a Pluralist Approach of Global Administrative Law on the Governance of Doping in Sport

Plusieurs problèmes liés à l'utilisation de substances et méthodes interdites de dopage dans les sports posent de grands défis à la gouvernance antidopage. Afin de lutter contre le dopage, certains pays ont mis en oeuvre des cadres juridiques basés exclusivement sur le droit pénal tandis que d'autres pays ont plutôt misé sur des mécanismes et organismes spécialisés trouvant fondement en droit privé ou sur un régime hybride de droit public et privé. Ces différentes approches réglementaires ont pour conséquence de faire en sorte qu’il est très difficile de lutter efficacement contre le dopage dans les sports, notamment parce que leur exécution requiert un degré de collaboration internationale et une participation concertée des autorités publiques qui est difficile à mettre en place. À l’heure actuelle, on peut par exemple observer que les États n’arrivent pas à contrer efficacement la participation des syndicats et organisations transnationales liés au crime organisé dans le marché du dopage, ni à éliminer des substances et méthodes de dopage interdites par la réglementation. Par ailleurs, la gouvernance antidopage basée sur les règles prescrites par l’Agence mondiale antidopage prévoit des règles et des normes distinctes de dopage distinguant entre deux catégories de personnes, les athlètes et les autres, plaçant ainsi les premiers dans une position désavantageuse. Par exemple, le standard de responsabilité stricte sans faute ou négligence imposé aux athlètes exige moins que la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable et permet l'utilisation de preuves circonstancielles pour établir la violation des règles antidopages. S'appliquant pour prouver le dopage, ce standard mine le principe de la présomption d'innocence et le principe suivant lequel une personne ne devrait pas se voir imposer une peine sans loi. D’ailleurs, le nouveau Code de 2015 de l’Agence attribuera aux organisations nationales antidopage (ONADs) des pouvoirs d'enquête et de collecte de renseignements et ajoutera de nouvelles catégories de dopage non-analytiques, réduisant encore plus les droits des athlètes. Dans cette thèse, nous discutons plus particulièrement du régime réglementaire de l’Agence et fondé sur le droit privé parce qu’il ne parvient pas à répondre aux besoins actuels de gouvernance mondiale antidopage. Nous préconisons donc l’adoption d’une nouvelle approche de gouvernance antidopage où la nature publique et pénale mondiale du dopage est clairement reconnue. Cette reconnaissance combiné avec un modèle de gouvernance adapté basé sur une approche pluraliste du droit administratif global produira une réglementation et une administration antidopage mieux acceptée chez les athlètes et plus efficace sur le plan des résultats. Le nouveau modèle de gouvernance que nous proposons nécessitera toutefois que tous les acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques ajustent leur cadre de gouvernance en tenant compte de cette nouvelle approche, et ce, afin de confronter les défis actuels et de régler de manière plus satisfaisante les problèmes liés à la gouvernance mondiale du dopage dans les sports.

EU free movement law and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships: the case for mutual recognition

This article seeks to examine the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the EU. Although the Member States maintain an exclusive competence in the field of family law and, thus, it is up to them to determine whether they will provide a legal status to same-sex couples within their territory, they need to exercise their powers in that field in a way that does not violate EU law. This, it is suggested, requires that Member States mutually recognize the legal status of same-sex couples and do not treat same-sex couples worse than opposite-sex couples, if the basis of the differentiation is, merely, the (homosexual) sexual orientation of the two spouses/partners. Nonetheless, the current legal framework does not make it clear that Member States are under such an obligation. The main argument of the article, therefore, is that the EU must adopt a more hands-on approach towards this issue.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.

Directors' duty to use their powers for proper or permissable purposes

This article focuses generally on the interaction among several internal company law doctrines such as the supremacy of the articles of association; that other organs cannot interfere with powers exclusively conferred upon a particular organ; that courts will not readily interfere with internal company matters; that directors are under a duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company as a whole and under a duty to use their powers for proper or permissible purposes; and that there are some remedies available to shareholders if directors did not perform their powers for a proper or permissible purpose. The specific aim with the article is to establish when and why the courts will be prepared to set aside decisions by directors if they have taken them for an improper or impermissible purpose. The article concludes that the courts will be prepared to set the decisions of directors aside when they have used a particular power substantially or primarily for an improper or impermissible purpose. When the exercise of directors' powers is challenged under circumstances where there were both permissible and impermissible purposes for exercising a particular power, there is no alternative for the court but to inquire into the complex area of the state of mind of those who acted and the motive on which they acted. This is, in fact, second-guessing the decisions of directors.

Enforcement in environmental law: an economic analysis of citizen suits

Previous to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement responsibilities over the violation of pollution control standards. However, recognizing that the government had neither the time nor resources to provide full enforcement, Congress created citizen suits. Citizen suits, first amended to the Clean Air Act in 1970, authorize citizens to act as private attorney generals and to sue polluters for violating the terms of their operating permits. Since that time, Congress has included citizen suits in 13 other federal statutes. The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known about it. However, we do know that citizen suits have increased rapidly since the early 1980's. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of citizen suits jumped from 41 to 266. Obviously, they are becoming a widely used method of enforcing the environmental statutes. This paper will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of citizen suits. It will begin with an introduction and will then move on to provide some historic and descriptive background on such issues as how citizen suit powers are delegated, what limitations are placed on the citizens, what parties are on each side of the suit, what citizens can enforce against, and the types of remedies available. The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis of citizen suits. It will begin with a discussion of non-profit organizations, especially non-profit environmental organizations, detailing the economic factors which instigate their creation and activities. Three models will be developed to investigate the evolution and effects of citizen suits. The first model will provide an analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the point of view of a potential litigator showing how varying remedies, limitations and reimbursement procedures can effect both the level and types of activities undertaken. The second model shows how firm behavior could be expected to respond to citizen suits. Finally, a third model will look specifically at the issue of efficiency to determine whether the introduction of citizen enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency in pollution control. The database on which the analysis rests consists of 1205 cases compiled by the author. For the purposes of this project this list of citizen suit cases and their attributes were computerized and used to test a series of hypotheses derived from three original economic models. The database includes information regarding plaintiffs, defendants date notice and/or complaint was filed and statutes involved in the claim. The analysis focuses on six federal environmental statutes (Clean Water Act} Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act) because the majority of citizen suits have occurred under these statutes.

Opting out of shareholder governance rights: a new perspective on contractual freedom in Australian corporate law

One of the classic debates in corporate law relates to whether the rules of corporate law are ar should be 'mandatory', in that companies must comply, or 'enabling' - meaning a set of default rules which companies have the choice of adopting or 'opting out' of through alternative contractual arrangements. The so-called 'mandatory/enabling' debate has been especially prominent in the United States fro numerous reasons, yet has also received some attention in Australia. That said, the extent to which companies can 'opt out' of corporate law has rarely been considered as a practical issue in Australia - particularly whether Australian companies can 'opt out' of provisions under the Corporations Act ("the Act"). However, just recently, two high-profile events in Australia have made 'opting out' of corporate law a relevant issue, especially the question of whether companies are free to 'opt out' of provisions of the Corporations Act  which provide express governance rights to shareholders. These events were Boral's constitutional amendment in 2003 to restrict the ability of shreholders to propose amendments to the company's constitution, and the contemplation and introduction of so-called 'pre-nuptial' agreements- designed to by-pass the right of shreholders to vote on removing directors in public companies. In the light of these two recent events, in this article the authors revisit the mandatory/enabling debate. However, rather than going over old ground as to whether a mandatory or enabling approach to corporate regulation is desirable, the authors approach the issue from a fresh perspective: that Australian Securitiesand Investments Commission's ("ASIC") existing relief powers under the Act should be extended to provide a means for companies to opt out of provisions containing shareholder governance rights.

Prevention of suicide : police powers, parliamentary intent and judicial interpretation

While in most countries suicide is no longer a crime, it is also acknowledged that the state has an interest in the preservation of human life, prevention of suicide, and protection of vulnerable persons from harming themselves. In a civil, secular and democratic society, however, the public law principle of state protective powers has to be balanced against the private law principle of personal autonomy (personal self-determination). Under the doctrine of autonomy, competent adults of sound mind can make legally binding voluntary choices, including the so-called ‘death-choice’ (refusal of life-sustaining or life-prolonging treatment as well as suicide). To add to the complexity, whereas the powers of the state in relation to suicide and its prevention have been codified, the concepts of personal autonomy and personal liberty are grounded in common law. Stuart v Kirkland–Veenstra [2008] VSCA 32, which is at present being considered by the High Court of Australia, exemplifies tensions that arise in the suicide-prevention area of jurisprudence. This article explores powers and duties of police officers in relation to suicide prevention and the notion of mental illness by reference to the Kirkland–Veenstra case, the relevant statutory framework and the common law.

The status of using drug detection dogs under Australian law

In recent years it has become increasingly common for drug detection dogs to be active in and around public transport, busy nightclub precincts, music festivals and dance parties. However, the legal status of police using drug detection dogs is anything but clear in many parts of Australia. The aim of this article is to outline the nature and scope of the powers available to police at common law and under statute that allow their use.