Commentaires politiques et historiques sur le traité du prince de Machiavel, et sur L'anti-Machiavel de Fréderic II /

Mode of access: Internet.

Human nature in politics /

Mode of access: Internet.

Oeuvres complètes de N. Machiavelli /

Translated from the Italian of his Opere.

The elements of morality, including polity.

Mode of access: Internet.

The prince /

"The life of Sir Thomas More [by William Roper]": p. 93-141.

Report to Thomas E. Dewey, Governor,

Mode of access: Internet.

Teikoku kensei to dōgi /

Mode of access: Internet.

Éthocratie ou le Gouvernement fondé sur la morale.

500 copies. No. 153.

Politik und moral,

Mode of access: Internet.

Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale.

Mode of access: Internet.

The elements of morality, including polity.

Mode of access: Internet.

The prince,

At head of title: The five-foot shelf of books.

Klugheit zu Leben und zu Herrschen : mit grossem Fleiss zweyer wahrhafftig hochgelahrten Männer in zwey Theilen verfasset.

Includes index.

¿Cuál es el problema con el cálculo de utilidad?

Un problema de la ética del bien común, planteado por Franz Hinkelammert es el que representa el “calculo de utilidad”. En el articulo se valora positivamente el carácter consecuencialista de este planteamiento, a la vez que se señalan las virtudes de ciertas versiones del utilitarismo, así como las dificultades con expresiones como “utilidad” o “bienestar para todos”. También se propone recurrir a las ideas de Hinkelammert en el orden del reconocimiento de los limites de factibilidad, lo cual permitiría realizar una crítica original y constructiva a las corrientes utilitaristas y consecuencialistas predominantes. Abstract One problem of the common good ethics posed by Franz J. Hinkelammert is the “calculation of utility”. In this article the consequentialist character of this exposition is positively valued and at the same time it is pointed out the virtues of certain versions of utilitarism as well as, the difficulties posed by expressions as “utility” and “well-being”. It is proposed also to resort to Hinkelammert’s ideas in the orden of recognition of the feasibility limits which would allow us to make a original and constructive critic to the prevailing utilitarian and consequentialist currents.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.