The eagle and the starlings: Galileo's argument for the autonomy of science-how pertinent is it today?

After Galileo's argument for the autonomy of science is analysed and adapted to take into account later developments of scientific practices, we conclude that, in the final analysis, it is not compelling. Nevertheless, Galileo's argument still provides a useful point of reference, for aspects of it can be interpreted to anticipate central components of the often acclaimed ideal of science as value free, so that appraising it contributes to the larger purpose of exploring how well that ideal stands up today. Finally, we will argue that residue from Galileo's struggle with the Church remains with us, making it difficult to identify the conditions that would need to be put into place today for any robust sense of the autonomy of science to be defensible. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

An investigation into the nature and consequences of teachers' implicit philosophies of science

The aims of this study were to investigate the beliefs concerning the philosophy of science held by practising science teachers and to relate those beliefs to their pupils' understanding of the philosophy of science. Three philosophies of science, differing in the way they relate experimental work to other parts of the scientific enterprise, are described. By the use of questionnaire techniques, teachers of four extreme types were identified. These are: the H type or hypothetico-deductivist teacher, who sees experiments as potential falsifiers of hypotheses or of logical deductions from them; the I type or inductivist teacher, who regards experiments mainly as a way of increasing the range of observations available for recording before patterns are noted and inductive generalisation is carried out; the V type or verificationist teacher, who expects experiments to provide proof and to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of scientific statements; and the 0 type, who has no discernible philosophical beliefs about the nature of science or its methodology. Following interviews of selected teachers to check their responses to the questionnaire and to determine their normal teaching methods, an experiment was organised in which parallel groups were given H, I and V type teaching in the normal school situation during most of one academic year. Using pre-test and post-test scores on a specially developed test of pupil understanding of the philosophy of science, it was shown that pupils were positively affected by their teacher's implied philosophy of science. There was also some indication that V type teaching improved marks obtained in school science examinations, but appeared to discourage the more able from continuing the study of science. Effects were also noted on vocabulary used by pupils to describe scientists and their activities.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Harminics of evolution : the philosophy of individual life basedupon natural science, as taught by modern masters of the law

UANL

Why Implementing History and Philosophy in School Science Education is a Challenge: An Analysis of Obstacles

Teaching and learning with history and philosophy of science (HPS) has been, and continues to be, supported by science educators. While science education standards documents in many countries also stress the importance of teaching and learning with HPS, the approach still suffers from ineffective implementation in school science teaching. In order to better understand this problem, an analysis of the obstacles of implementing HPS into classrooms was undertaken. The obstacles taken into account were structured in four groups: 1. culture of teaching physics, 2. teachers` skills, epistemological and didactical attitudes and beliefs, 3. institutional framework of science teaching, and 4. textbooks as fundamental didactical support. Implications for more effective implementation of HPS are presented, taking the social nature of educational systems into account.

An introduction to theosophy, or the science of the "Mystery of Christ", that is, of deity, nature, and creature : embracing the philosophy of all the working powers of life, magical and spiritual ... Vol. I. complete in itself

Los vols. proyectados no se publicaron.

The philosophy of arithmetic : (considered as a branch of mathematical science) and the elements of algebra /

Mode of access: Internet.

The Christian philosopher; or, The connection of science and philosophy with religion ... Illustrated with upwards of one hundred and fifty engravings.

Mode of access: Internet.

History of the philosophy of mind embracing the opinions of all writers on mental science from the earliest period to the present time /

Includes bibliographical references.

Studies in the philosophy of history and the new science of sociology.

"Developed from the lectures delivered to the senior class in the university of Mississippi, during the second term of 1884."

Divine penology : the philosophy of retribution and the doctrine of future punishment considered in the light of reason, science, revelation, and redemption /

Mode of access: Internet.

The philosophy of necessity : or, Natural law as applicable to moral, mental, and social science /

Mode of access: Internet.