Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Relook into the historical progress and philosophy of Indian space exploration

A study of the history and philosophy of the contribution of India towards the exploration of space since antiquity provides interesting insights. The contributions are described during the three periods namely: (1) the ten millenniums from 10,000 BC with a twilight period up to 900 AD; (2) the ten centuries from 900 AD to 1900 AD; and (3) the ten decades from 1900 AD to 2000 AD; called mythological, medieval, and modern respectively. Some important events during the above periods provide a reference view of the progress. The Vedas during the mythological period and the Siddhantas during the medieval periods, which are based on astronomical observations, indicate that the Indian contribution preceded other cultures. But most Western historians ignore this fact time and again in spite of many proofs provided to the contrary. This chapter also shows that Indians had the proper scientific attitude of developing any physical theory through the triplet of mind, model, and measurements. It is this same triplet that forms the basis of the present day well known Kalman filter technique. Up to about 1500 BC the Indian contribution was leading but during foreign invasion and occupation it lagged and has been improving only after independence.

The participatory mind : a new theory of knowledge and of the universe /

"We have taken IQ tests but, strangely, no Compassion Aptitude Tests (CATs). Yet mind and emotions need to be seen as two different parts of the same spectrum, says holistic thinker Henryk Skolimowski, if the human psyche, having taken an unprecedented battering this century, is to be mended. This cannot be accomplished, however, either through the offices of dusty philosophical treatises or popular psychological fixes, only by our arriving at a new way of looking at the world." "In a Grand Theory of participatory mind that builds on the insights of such thinkers as Teilhard de Chardin and Bergson as well as contemporaries Dobzhansky and Bateson, Skolimowski points to a new order, one brought about by a Western mind returning to, then reintegrating, the spiritual. This quest for fresh perspectives, as we approach the twenty-first century, has now become 'the hallmark of our times'."--BOOK JACKET.

From the account manager’s conscience to top-of-mind : account planning in Australia

What began as the “account manager’s conscience” has grown to be top-of-mind in Australian advertising today. Account planning is a hybrid discipline which uses research to bring the consumer voice to the campaign process during strategy generation, creative development and evaluation. In Australia, account planning is subjected to the “Vegemite Factor” where planners are spread too thinly across accounts and much of the market is dominated by freelance researchers and planners. This unique environment has shaped many different perceptions of account planning in Australia. These are compared with an international definition of account planning and the current research. While many basic tenants of the definition are shared by Australian advertising professionals, the difference appears to be in the ongoing nature, team approach and level of commitment. In Australia, account planners seem to be more facilitators of the strategic direction, than directors of it. Instead of exerting a sustained influence across the campaign, most energy appears to be expended at the start of campaign development, rather than extending through to its evaluation.

The ADHD debate and the philosophy of truth

There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders. In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has been the subject of considerable scepticism. With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth. If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature? Do we mean that it fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an idea in a practical sense? This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD. Specifically, the paper will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of social governance. The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.

Insights from ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching

The aim of this paper is to show how principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory can underpin a philosophy of coaching practice in a nonlinear pedagogy. Nonlinear pedagogy is based on a view of the human movement system as a nonlinear dynamical system. We demonstrate how this perspective of the human movement system can aid understanding of skill acquisition processes and underpin practice for sports coaches. We provide a description of nonlinear pedagogy followed by a consideration of some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory that underpin it as a coaching philosophy. We illustrate how each principle impacts on nonlinear pedagogical coaching practice, demonstrating how each principle can substantiate a framework for the coaching process.

The enterprising artist and the arts entrepreneur : Emergent pedagogies for new disciplinary habits of mind

Traditional pedagogies in the arts in higher education focus largely on the studio experience in which a novice artist studies under one or more master teachers (e.g., Don, Garvey, & Sadeghpour, 2009). In more recent times, however, a shift in higher education curriculum and pedagogy in the arts has expanded this traditional conservatory model of training to include, among other components, career self-management and enterprise creation—in a word, entrepreneurship.This chapter examines the developing field of arts enterprise and arts entrepreneurship in higher education in a multinational context. The field is contextualized within the broader landscape of the creative industries and the consequential development of knowledge, skills, and the habits of mind necessary for artistic venture creation, sustainability, and success. Whereas the discourse about learning and teaching for business entrepreneurship is well established (e.g., Fiet, 2001), equivalent conversations about arts enterprise and entrepreneurship have only recently begun (Beckman, 2007, 2011; Essig, 2009). This chapter will address the contested definitions of key terms and concepts and also the question of how arts educators, although mindful of the pedagogic traditions of the arts school, are also drawing on the pedagogies of business entrepreneurship and cognitive theories of entrepreneurship to create innovative new transdisciplinary signature pedagogies for creative enterprise and entrepreneurship education in the arts.

Out of sight, out of mind/out of mind, out of site : Schooling and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is a diagnostic term now indelibly scored on the public psyche. In some quarters, a diagnosis of “ADHD” is regarded with derision. In others it is welcomed with relief. Despite intense multi-disciplinary research, the jury is still out with regards to the “truth” of ADHD. Not surprisingly, the rapid increase in diagnosis over the past fifteen years, coupled with an exponential rise in the prescription of restricted class psychopharmaceuticals has stirred virulent debate. Provoking the most interest, it seems, are questions regarding causality. Typically, these revolve around possible antecedents for “disorderly” behaviour – bad food, bad tv and bad parents. Very seldom is the institution of schooling ever in the line of sight. To investigate this gap, I draw on Foucault to question what might be happening in schools and how this may be contributing to the definition, recognition and classification of particular children as a particular kind of “disorderly”.