Ocularcentrism and its others: A framework for metatheoretical analysis

There is a contemporary scepticism towards vision-based metaphors in management and organization studies that reflects a more general pattern across the social sciences. In short, there has been a shift away from ocularcentrism. This shift provides a useful basis for metatheoretical analysis of the philosophical discourse that informs organizational analysis. The article begins by briefly discussing the vision-generated, vision-centred interpretation of knowledge, truth, and reality that has characterized the western philosophical tradition. Taking late 18th-century rationalism as the high-point of ocularcentrism, the article then presents a metatheoretical framework based on three trajectories that critiques of ocularcentrism have subsequently taken. The first exposes the limits of the metaphor by, paradoxically, taking it to its limits. The second trajectory seeks to displace the primordial position of the ocular metaphor and replace it with an alternative lexicon based on other human senses. Last, the third trajectory describes how the Enlightenment ocular characterization of the visual and mental worlds has effectively been inverted in the postmodern moment.

Materialismo, ideología y juegos de lenguaje

La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo social. Se intenta extraer de esta aproximación una distinción entre la filosofía como práctica teórica ideológica y como práctica teórica crítica

Materialismo, ideología y juegos de lenguaje

La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo social. Se intenta extraer de esta aproximación una distinción entre la filosofía como práctica teórica ideológica y como práctica teórica crítica

Materialismo, ideología y juegos de lenguaje

La discusión sobre las consecuencias políticas del pensamiento de L. Wittgenstein ha girado sobre la posibilidad de construir miradas críticas sobre lo social, su legitimidad, amplitud, fuerza, etc. Sin embargo, aproximar a Wittgenstein a una posición materialista, como la entendía L. Althusser, conduce a una comprensión diferente de la crítica, vinculada a la tarea de deconstruir el discurso filosófico que intenta unificar y organizar jerárquicamente las evidencias (certezas) constitutivas de los diferentes juegos de lenguaje en los que se despliega lo social. Se intenta extraer de esta aproximación una distinción entre la filosofía como práctica teórica ideológica y como práctica teórica crítica

The Plutarch’s Motive of "Descensus Animae" in "Nag Hammadi and the Corpus Hermeticum"

Al evaluar los contactos de Plutarco con otras culturas contemporáneas, los investigadores todavía no han llegado a un consenso acerca de la relación entre el queronense y la literatura cristiano-primitiva. Un buen ejemplo de esto aparece al atender al motivo de la creación del alma humana. La intención de las próximas páginas es, tras un análisis de los textos plutarqueos, atender a estos posibles contactos con NHC, los heresiólogos y el Corpus Hermeticum a fin de dilucidar sus similitudes y diferencias.

A Philosophical inquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful : with an introductory discourse concerning taste, and several other additions.

BLC 101, 178.

A philosophical enquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful : with an introductory discourse concerning taste and several other additions /

Mode of access: Internet.

A discourse delivered before the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio : at the annual meeting of said Society in Columbus, December 22, 1832 /

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual discourse, delivered before the Ohio historical and philosophical society, at Columbus, on the 23d of December, 1837.

On cover: Walker's historical discourse.

A discourse on the prospects of letters and taste in Virginia, pronounced before the Literary and philosophical society of Hampden-Sydney college, at their fourth anniversary, in September, 1827.

Mode of access: Internet.

A discourse delivered before the Literary and Philosophical Society of New-Jersey, at its first annual meeting, September 27, 1825.

Mode of access: Internet.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.

Therapeutic Discourse and the American Public Philosophy: On American Liberalism's Troubled Relationship with Psychology

I explore the main currents of postwar American liberalism. One, sociological, emerged in response to the danger of mass movements. Articulated primarily by political sociologists and psychologists and ascendant from the mid-fifties till the mid-seventies, it heralded the "end of ideology." It emphasized stability, elitism, positive science and pluralism; it recast normatively sound politics as logrolling and hard bargaining. I argue that these normative features, attractive when considered in isolation, taken together led to a vicious ad hominem style in accounting for views outside the postwar consensus. It used pseudo-scientific literature in labeling populists, Progressives, Taft conservatives, Goldwaterites, the New Left and others "pathological," viz. mentally ill. Hence, "therapeutic discourse." I argue that philosophical liberalism, which reasserts the role of political theory in working out norms and adjudicating disagreement, is a more profitable way of thinking about and defending from critics liberalism. I take the philosopher John Rawls as the tradition's modern representative. This inquiry is important because the themes of sociological liberalism are making a comeback in American public discourse, and with them perhaps the baggage of therapeutic discourse. I present a cautionary tale.

An historical critique of philosophical universalism through Foucault and Rorty

This thesis examines the critiques of modern philosophy by Foucault and Rorty, which use genealogical and philosophical arguments against the notion of universal truths being fundamental to knowledge. They promote the idea of the autonomy of the self, and the use of discourse to generate pragmatic action within society.

Being philosophical regarding the evidence of 'what works'.

In this paper I am arguing that the debate regarding ‘what works’ in education practice should become more philosophical. By becoming more philosophical professional educators will be enabled to further recognise how unscientific and undemocratic the research which claims to represent ‘what works’ currently is by understanding more clearly the nature of its ‘evidence-base’ and its relation to education. This paper is structured into three parts. The first will address the philosophical aspect which is intrinsic to the discourse of education itself. The second section will offer a differentiation between empiricism and science which is important if we are to recognise the limitations of empirical ‘evidence’ regarding ‘what works’. The third and final section will draw upon Biesta’s notion of the ‘democratic deficit’ to make the case that if the evidence regarding ‘what works’ is only empirical rather than scientific then it is not the sort of evidence appropriate to the discourse of education.