Seniority-based pay: is it used as a motivation device?

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

It's what you say not what you pay

We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Flying High and Laying Low in the Public and Private Sectors: A Comparison of Pay Differentials for Full-Time Male Employees in Britain

Using new linked employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, full-time male public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector counterparts. Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated with public sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working in higher paid occupations. Further focussing analysis on the highly skilled and unskilled occupations in both sectors, reveals evidence of workplace segregation positively impacting on earnings in the private sector for the highly skilled, and in the public sector for the unskilled. Substantial earnings gaps between the highly skilled and unskilled are found, and the unexplained components in these gaps are very similar regardless of sector.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Effects of Experience, Knowledge and Signals on Willingness to Pay for a Public Good

This paper compares how increases in experience versus increases in knowledge about a public good affect willingness to pay (WTP) for its provision. This is challenging because while consumers are often certain about their previous experiences with a good, they may be uncertain about the accuracy of their knowledge. We therefore design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their WTP for it. Using data for two different public goods, we show qualitative equivalence of the effect of knowledge and experience on valuation for a public good. Surprisingly, though, we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject’s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it: treatment causes an increase of $150-$200 in WTP for well-informed individuals. We find no such effect for less informed subjects. Our results imply that WTP estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

General Practitioners' willingness to pay for continuing medical education in a fee-for-service universal coverage health care system

Background: Sponsoring of physicians meetings by life science companies has led to reduced participation fees but might influence physician's prescription practices. A ban on such sponsoring may increase participation fees. We aimed to evaluate factors associated with physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their position on the sponsoring of medical meetings and their opinion on alternative financing options. Methods: An anonymous web-based questionnaire was sent to 447 general practitioners in one state in Switzerland, identified through their affiliation to a medical association. The questionnaire evaluated physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their perception of a bias in prescription practices induced by commercial support, their opinion on the introduction of a binding legislation and alternative financing options, their frequency of exchange with sales representatives and other relevant socioeconomic factors. We built a multivariate predictor logistic regression model to identify determinants of willingness to pay. Results: Of the 115 physicians who responded (response rate 26%), 48% were willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses, 79% disagreed that commercial support introduced a bias in their prescription practices and 61% disagreed that it introduced a bias in their colleagues' prescription practices. Based on the multivariate logistic regression, perception of a bias in peers prescription practices (OR=7.47, 95% CI 1.65-38.18) and group practice structure (OR=4.62, 95% CI 1.34-22.29) were significantly associated with an increase in willingness to pay. Two thirds (76%) of physicians did not support the introduction of a binding legislation and 53% were in favour of creating a general fund administered by an independent body. Conclusion: Our results suggest that almost half of physicians surveyed are willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses. Predictors of an increase in physicians' willingness to pay were perception of the influence of bias in peers prescription practices and group practice structure. Most responders did not agree that sponsoring introduced prescribing bias nor did they support the 2 introduction of a binding legislation prohibiting sponsoring but a majority did agree to an independent body that would centrally administer a general fund.

Ad-Pay: Programa de control de bons d'hores

Sistema de fidelització de clients mitjançant bons d’hores que el client anirà recarregant i del que se li descomptaran les feines que se li vagin fent. També ha d’ajudar a assegurar-se el cobrament de les feines realitzades. L’aplicació és capaç de mantenir una cartera de clients amb el seu saldo de bons, fer les imposicions de diners i introduir els albarans de les feines produïdes. També mostra dades interessants perquè el gerent de l’empresa client pugui treure les estadístiques necessàries per explotar al màxim la capacitat de la seva empresa.

The Part-time pay penalty in a segmented labor market

This paper is the first to examine the implications of switching to PT work for women's subsequent earnings trajectories, distinguishing by their type of contract: permanent or fixedterm. Using a rich longitudinal Spanish data set from Social Security records of over 76,000 prime-aged women strongly attached to the Spanish labor market, we find that PT work aggravates the segmentation of the labor market insofar there is a PT pay penalty and this penalty is larger and more persistent in the case of women with fixed-term contracts. The paper discusses problems arising in empirical estimation (including a problem not discussed in the literature up to now: the differential measurement error of the LHS variable by PT status), and how to address them. It concludes with policy implications relevant for Continental Europe and its dual structure of employment protection.

An investigation on the pay-off to generic competences for core employees in Catalan manufacturing firms

The aim of this paper is to measure the returns to human capital. We use a unique data set consisting of matched employer-employee information. Data on individuals' human capital include a set of 26 competences that capture the utilization of workers' skills in a very detailed way. Thus, we can expand the concept of human capital and discuss the type of skills that are more productive in the workplace and, hence, generate a higher payoff for the workers. The rich information on firm's and workplace characteristics allows us to introduce a broad range of controls and to improve previous research in this field. This paper gives evidence that the returns to generic competences differ depending on the position of the worker in the firm. Only numeracy skills are reward independent of the occupational status of the worker. The level of technology used by the firm in the production process does not directly increase workers’ pay, but it influences the pay-off to some of the competences. JEL Classification: J24, J31

Does VAA popularity pay off ? : Smartvote users preferred candidates and their results in the 2007 Swiss federal elections

Voting is fundamental for democracy, however, this decisive democratic act requires quite an effort. Decision making at elections depends largely on the interest to gather information about candidates and parties, the effort to process the information at hand and the motivation to reach a vote choice. Especially in electoral systems with highly fragmented party systems and hundreds of candidates running for office, the process of decision making in the pre‐election sphere is highly demanding. In the age of information and communication technologies, new possibilities for gathering and processing such information are available. Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) provide guidance to voters prior to the act of voting and assist voters in choosing between different candidates and parties on the basis of issue congruence. Meanwhile widely used all over the world, scientific inquiry into the effect of such tools on electoral behavior is ongoing. This paper adds to the current debate by focusing on whether the popularity of candidates on the Swiss VAA smartvote eventually paid off at the 2007 Swiss federal elections and whether there is a direct link between the performance of a candidate on the tool and his or her electoral performance.