Reputation Formation and the Evolution of Cooperation in Anonymous Online Markets

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade.

Integration of cooperation for development in Survey Engineering curricula at the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) framework

Survey Engineering curricula involves the integration of many formal disciplines at a high level of proficiency. The Escuela de Ingenieros en Topografía, Cartografía y Geodesia at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (Survey Engineering) has developed an intense and deep teaching on so-called Applied Land Sciences and Technologies or Land Engineering. However, new approaches are encouraged by the European Higher Education Area (EHEA). This fact requires a review of traditional teaching and methods. Furthermore, the new globalization and international approach gives new ways to this discipline to teach and learn about how to bridge gap between cultures and regions. This work is based in two main needs. On one hand, it is based on integration of basic knowledge and disciplines involved in typical Survey Engineering within Land Management. On the other, there is an urgent need to consider territory on a social and ethical basis, as far as a part of the society, culture, idiosyncrasy or economy. The integration of appropriate knowledge of the Land Management is typically dominated by civil engineers and urban planners. It would be very possible to integrate Survey Engineering and Cooperation for Development in the framework of Land Management disciplines. Cooperation for Development is a concept that has changed since beginning of its use until now. Development projects leave an impact on society in response to their beneficiaries and are directed towards self-sustainability. Furthermore, it is the true bridge to reduce gap between societies when differences are immeasurable. The concept of development has also been changing and nowadays it is not a purely economic concept. Education, science and technology are increasingly taking a larger role in what is meant by development. Moreover, it is commonly accepted that Universities should transfer knowledge to society, and the transfer of knowledge should be open to countries most in need for developing. If the importance of the country development is given by education, science and technology, knowledge transfer would be one of the most clear of ways of Cooperation for Development. Therefore, university cooperation is one of the most powerful tools to achieve it, placing universities as agents of development. In Spain, the role of universities as agents of development and cooperation has been largely strengthened. All about this work deals to how to implement both Cooperation for Development and Land Management within Survey Engineering at the EHEA framework.

Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a population dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high population densities with subsequent crashes and long low density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low densities. The results indicate that ecological dynamics are important for evolutionary shifts between adaptive peaks.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.