Identity management : strengthening one-time password authentication through usability

Usability in HCI (Human-Computer Interaction) is normally understood as the simplicity and clarity with which the interaction with a computer program or a web site is designed. Identity management systems need to provide adequate usability and should have a simple and intuitive interface. The system should not only be designed to satisfy service provider requirements but it has to consider user requirements, otherwise it will lead to inconvenience and poor usability for users when managing their identities. With poor usability and a poor user interface with regard to security, it is highly likely that the system will have poor security. The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to an increasing number of different digital identities each user needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded with credentials, which in turn negatively impacts their ability to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the most common type of credential used today. To avoid the tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often behave less securely by using low entropy and weak passwords. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent security threats to online services. Some solutions have been developed to eliminate the need for users to create and manage passwords. A typical solution is based on generating one-time passwords, i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Unfortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure. In this thesis, the security and usability aspects of contemporary methods for authentication based on one-time passwords (OTP) are examined and analyzed. In addition, more scalable solutions that provide a good user experience while at the same time preserving strong security are proposed.

RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited

The RSA-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed to realize both mutual authentication and generation of secure session keys where a client is sharing his/her password only with a server and the latter should generate its RSA public/private key pair (e, n), (d, n) every time due to the lack of PKI (Public-Key Infrastructures). One of the ways to avoid a special kind of off-line (so called e-residue) attacks in the RSA-based PAKE protocols is to deploy a challenge/response method by which a client verifies the relative primality of e and φ(n) interactively with a server. However, this kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols did not give any proof of the underlying challenge/response method and therefore could not specify the exact complexity of their protocols since there exists another security parameter, needed in the challenge/response method. In this paper, we first present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol that can deploy two different challenge/response methods (denoted by Challenge/Response Method1 and Challenge/Response Method2). The main contributions of this work include: (1) Based on the number theory, we prove that the Challenge/Response Method1 and the Challenge/Response Method2 are secure against e-residue attacks for any odd prime e; (2) With the security parameter for the on-line attacks, we show that the RSA-PAKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where all of the off-line attacks are not more efficient than on-line dictionary attacks; and (3) By considering the Hamming weight of e and its complexity in the RSA-PAKE protocol, we search for primes to be recommended for a practical use. We also compare the RSA-PAKE protocol with the previous ones mainly in terms of computation and communication complexities.

Verifying and fixing password authentication protocol

Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) is widely used in the Wireless Fidelity Point-to-Point Protocol to authenticate an identity and password for a peer. This paper uses a new knowledge-based framework to verify the PAP protocol and a fixed version. Flaws are found in both the original and the fixed versions. A new enhanced protocol is provided and the security of it is proved The whole process is implemented in a mechanical reasoning platform, Isabelle. It only takes a few seconds to find flaws in the original and the fixed protocol and to verify that the enhanced version of the PAP protocol is secure.

Further observations on smart-card-based password-authenticated key agreement in distributed systems

This paper initiates the study of two specific security threats on smart-card-based password authentication in distributed systems. Smart-card-based password authentication is one of the most commonly used security mechanisms to determine the identity of a remote client, who must hold a valid smart card and the corresponding password to carry out a successful authentication with the server. The authentication is usually integrated with a key establishment protocol and yields smart-card-based password-authenticated key agreement. Using two recently proposed protocols as case studies, we demonstrate two new types of adversaries with smart card: 1) adversaries with pre-computed data stored in the smart card, and 2) adversaries with different data (with respect to different time slots) stored in the smart card. These threats, though realistic in distributed systems, have never been studied in the literature. In addition to point out the vulnerabilities, we propose the countermeasures to thwart the security threats and secure the protocols. © 2013 IEEE.

A two-step mutual authentication protocol based on randomized hash-lock for small RFID networks

RFID has been widely used in today's commercial and supply chain industry, due to the significant advantages it offers and the relatively low production cost. However, this ubiquitous technology has inherent problems in security and privacy. This calls for the development of simple, efficient and cost effective mechanisms against a variety of security threats. This paper proposes a two-step authentication protocol based on the randomized hash-lock scheme proposed by S. Weis in 2003. By introducing additional measures during the authentication process, this new protocol proves to enhance the security of RFID significantly, and protects the passive tags from almost all major attacks, including tag cloning, replay, full-disclosure, tracking, and eavesdropping. Furthermore, no significant changes to the tags is required to implement this protocol, and the low complexity level of the randomized hash-lock algorithm is retained.

Minimizing information leakage of tree-based RFID authentication protocols using alternate tree-walking

The privacy of efficient tree-based RFID authentication protocols is heavily dependent on the branching factor on the top layer. Indefinitely increasing the branching factor, however, is not a viable option. This paper proposes the alternate-tree walking scheme as well as two protocols to circumvent this problem. The privacy of the resulting protocols is shown to be comparable to that of linear-time protocols, where there is no leakage of information, whilst reducing the computational load of the database by one-third of what is required of tree-based protocols during authentication. We also identify and address a limitation in quantifying privacy in RFID protocols.

HPAKE : Password authentication secure against cross-site user impersonation

We propose a new kind of asymmetric mutual authentication from passwords with stronger privacy against malicious servers, lest they be tempted to engage in “cross-site user impersonation” to each other. It enables a person to authenticate (with) arbitrarily many independent servers, over adversarial channels, using a memorable and reusable single short password. Beside the usual PAKE security guarantees, our framework goes to lengths to secure the password against brute-force cracking from privileged server information.

Quantum direct secret sharing with efficient eavesdropping-check and authentication based on distributed fountain codes

We propose to use a simple and effective way to achieve secure quantum direct secret sharing. The proposed scheme uses the properties of fountain codes to allow a realization of the physical conditions necessary for the implementation of no-cloning principle for eavesdropping-check and authentication. In our scheme, to achieve a variety of security purposes, nonorthogonal state particles are inserted in the transmitted sequence carrying the secret shares to disorder it. However, the positions of the inserted nonorthogonal state particles are not announced directly, but are obtained by sending degrees and positions of a sequence that are pre-shared between Alice and each Bob. Moreover, they can confirm that whether there exists an eavesdropper without exchanging classical messages. Most importantly, without knowing the positions of the inserted nonorthogonal state particles and the sequence constituted by the first particles from every EPR pair, the proposed scheme is shown to be secure.

Does counting still count? Revisiting the security of counting based user authentication protocols against statistical attacks

At NDSS 2012, Yan et al. analyzed the security of several challenge-response type user authentication protocols against passive observers, and proposed a generic counting based statistical attack to recover the secret of some counting based protocols given a number of observed authentication sessions. Roughly speaking, the attack is based on the fact that secret (pass) objects appear in challenges with a different probability from non-secret (decoy) objects when the responses are taken into account. Although they mentioned that a protocol susceptible to this attack should minimize this difference, they did not give details as to how this can be achieved barring a few suggestions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by generalizing the attack with a much more comprehensive theoretical analysis. Our treatment is more quantitative which enables us to describe a method to theoretically estimate a lower bound on the number of sessions a protocol can be safely used against the attack. Our results include 1) two proposed fixes to make counting protocols practically safe against the attack at the cost of usability, 2) the observation that the attack can be used on non-counting based protocols too as long as challenge generation is contrived, 3) and two main design principles for user authentication protocols which can be considered as extensions of the principles from Yan et al. This detailed theoretical treatment can be used as a guideline during the design of counting based protocols to determine their susceptibility to this attack. The Foxtail protocol, one of the protocols analyzed by Yan et al., is used as a representative to illustrate our theoretical and experimental results.

Efficient Dictionary for Salted Password Analysis

User authentication is essential for accessing computing resources, network resources, email accounts, online portals etc. To authenticate a user, system stores user credentials (user id and password pair) in system. It has been an interested field problem to discover user password from a system and similarly protecting them against any such possible attack. In this work we show that passwords are still vulnerable to hash chain based and efficient dictionary attacks. Human generated passwords use some identifiable patterns. We have analysed a sample of 19 million passwords, of different lengths, available online and studied the distribution of the symbols in the password strings. We show that the distribution of symbols in user passwords is affected by the native language of the user. From symbol distributions we can build smart and efficient dictionaries, which are smaller in size and their coverage of plausible passwords from Key-space is large. These smart dictionaries make dictionary based attacks practical.

Species identification and authentication of some of the most important seafood products in Iranian markets using biotechnological methods based on DNA

This study describes the molecular identification of sixteen fish species present in processed products imported into Iran for human consumption. DNA barcoding using direct sequencing of about 650 bp of the mitochondrial Cytochrome Oxidase subunit I gene revealed incorrect labeling (31.25%). Substitution of fish species constitutes serious economic fraud, and our results increase concern regarding the trading of processed fish products in Iran from both health and conservation points of view.