Pareto-improving optimal capital and labor taxes

We show a standard model where the optimal tax reform is to cut labor taxes and leave capital taxes very high in the short and medium run. Only in the very long run would capital taxes be zero. Our model is a version of Chamley??s, with heterogeneous agents, without lump sum transfers, an upper bound on capital taxes, and a focus on Pareto improving plans. For our calibration labor taxes should be low for the first ten to twenty years, while capital taxes should be at their maximum. This policy ensures that all agents benefit from the tax reform and that capital grows quickly after when the reform begins. Therefore, the long run optimal tax mix is the opposite from the short and medium run tax mix. The initial labor tax cut is financed by deficits that lead to a positive long run level of government debt, reversing the standard prediction that government accumulates savings in models with optimal capital taxes. If labor supply is somewhat elastic benefits from tax reform are high and they can be shifted entirely to capitalists or workers by varying the length of the transition. With inelastic labor supply there is an increasing part of the equilibrium frontier, this means that the scope for benefitting the workers is limited and the total benefits from reforming taxes are much lower.

Pareto or log-normal? A recursive-truncation approach to the distribution of (all) cities

Traditionally, it is assumed that the population size of cities in a country follows a Pareto distribution. This assumption is typically supported by nding evidence of Zipf's Law. Recent studies question this nding, highlighting that, while the Pareto distribution may t reasonably well when the data is truncated at the upper tail, i.e. for the largest cities of a country, the log-normal distribution may apply when all cities are considered. Moreover, conclusions may be sensitive to the choice of a particular truncation threshold, a yet overlooked issue in the literature. In this paper, then, we reassess the city size distribution in relation to its sensitivity to the choice of truncation point. In particular, we look at US Census data and apply a recursive-truncation approach to estimate Zipf's Law and a non-parametric alternative test where we consider each possible truncation point of the distribution of all cities. Results con rm the sensitivity of results to the truncation point. Moreover, repeating the analysis over simulated data con rms the di culty of distinguishing a Pareto tail from the tail of a log-normal and, in turn, identifying the city size distribution as a false or a weak Pareto law.

The Liberal Ethics of Non-Interference and the Pareto Principle

We analyse the liberal ethics of non-interference applied to social choice. A liberal principle capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill s conception of liberty, is examined. The principle captures the idea that society should not penalise agents after changes in their situation that do not a¤ect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satis es unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy.

Dominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria.

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.

Testing for poverty dominance: an application to Canada

The paper proposes and applies statistical tests for poverty dominance that check for whether poverty comparisons can be made robustly over ranges of poverty lines and classes of poverty indices. This helps provide both normative and statistical confidence in establishing poverty rankings across distributions. The tests, which can take into account the complex sampling procedures that are typically used by statistical agencies to generate household-level surveys, are implemented using the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1996, 1999 and 2002. Although the yearly cumulative distribution functions cross at the lower tails of the distributions, the more recent years tend to dominate earlier years for a relatively wide range of poverty lines. Failing to take into account SLID's sampling variability (as is sometimes done) can inflate significantly one's confidence in ranking poverty. Taking into account SLID's complex sampling design (as has not been done before) can also decrease substantially the range of poverty lines over which a poverty ranking can be inferred.

Male dominance linked to size and age, but not to 'good genes' in brown trout (Salmo trutta).

BACKGROUND: Males that are successful in intra-sexual competition are often assumed to be of superior quality. In the mating system of most salmonid species, intensive dominance fights are common and the winners monopolise most mates and sire most offspring. We drew a random sample of mature male brown trout (Salmo trutta) from two wild populations and determined their dominance hierarchy or traits linked to dominance. The fish were then stripped and their sperm was used for in vitro fertilisations in two full-factorial breeding designs. We recorded embryo viability until hatching in both experiments, and juvenile survival during 20 months after release into a natural streamlet in the second experiment. Since offspring of brown trout get only genes from their fathers, we used offspring survival as a quality measure to test (i) whether males differ in their genetic quality, and if so, (ii) whether dominance or traits linked to dominance reveal 'good genes'. RESULTS: We found significant additive genetic variance on embryo survival, i.e. males differed in their genetic quality. Older, heavier and larger males were more successful in intra-sexual selection. However, neither dominance nor dominance indicators like body length, weight or age were significantly linked to genetic quality measured as embryo or juvenile survival. CONCLUSION: We found no evidence that females can improve their offspring's genetic viability by mating with large and dominant males. If there still were advantages of mating with dominant males, they may be linked to non-genetic benefits or to genetic advantages that are context dependent and therefore possibly not revealed under our experimental conditions - even if we found significant additive genetic variation for embryo viability under such conditions.

The ghost of social environments past: dominance relationships include current interactions and experience carried over from previous groups.

Dominance hierarchies pervade animal societies. Within a static social environment, in which group size and composition are unchanged, an individual's hierarchy rank results from intrinsic (e.g. body size) and extrinsic (e.g. previous experiences) factors. Little is known, however, about how dominance relationships are formed and maintained when group size and composition are dynamic. Using a fusion-fission protocol, we fused groups of previously isolated shore crabs (Carcinus maenas) into larger groups, and then restored groups to their original size and composition. Pre-fusion hierarchies formed independently of individuals' sizes, and were maintained within a static group via winner/loser effects. Post-fusion hierarchies differed from pre-fusion ones; losing fights during fusion led to a decline in an individual's rank between pre- and post-fusion conditions, while spending time being aggressive during fusion led to an improvement in rank. In post-fusion tanks, larger individuals achieved better ranks than smaller individuals. In conclusion, dominance hierarchies in crabs represent a complex combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, in which experiences from previous groups can carry over to affect current competitive interactions.

The combination of social and personal contexts affects dominance hierarchy development in shore crabs, Carcinus maenas

Many animals that live in groups maintain competitive relationships, yet avoid continual fighting, by forming dominance hierarchies. We compare predictions of stochastic, individual-based models with empirical experimental evidence using shore crabs to test competing hypotheses regarding hierarchy development. The models test (1) what information individuals use when deciding to fight or retreat, (2) how past experience affects current resource-holding potential, and (3) how individuals deal with changes to the social environment. First, we conclude that crabs assess only their own state and not their opponent's when deciding to fight or retreat. Second, willingness to enter, and performance in, aggressive contests are influenced by previous contest outcomes. Winning increases the likelihood of both fighting and winning future interactions, while losing has the opposite effect. Third, when groups with established dominance hierarchies dissolve and new groups form, individuals reassess their ranks, showing no memory of previous rank or group affiliation. With every change in group composition, individuals fight for their new ranks. This iterative process carries over as groups dissolve and form, which has important implications for the relationship between ability and hierarchy rank. We conclude that dominance hierarchies emerge through an interaction of individual and social factors, and discuss these findings in terms of an underlying mechanism. Overall, our results are consistent with crabs using a cumulative assessment strategy iterated across changes in group composition, in which aggression is constrained by an absolute threshold in energy spent and damage received while fighting.

Mate choice evolution, dominance effects, and the maintenance of genetic variation.

Female mate choice influences the maintenance of genetic variation by altering the mating success of males with different genotypes. The evolution of preferences themselves, on the other hand, depends on genetic variation present in the population. Few models have tracked this feedback between a choice gene and its effects on genetic variation, in particular when genes that determine offspring viability and attractiveness have dominance effects. Here we build a population genetic model that allows comparing the evolution of various choice rules in a single framework. We first consider preferences for good genes and show that focused preferences for homozygotes evolve more easily than broad preferences, which allow heterozygous males high mating success too. This occurs despite better maintenance of genetic diversity in the latter scenario, and we discuss why empirical findings of superior mating success of heterozygous males consequently do not immediately lead to a better understanding of the lek paradox. Our results thus suggest that the mechanisms that help maintain genetic diversity also have a flipside of making female choice an inaccurate means of producing the desired kind of offspring. We then consider preferences for heterozygosity per se, and show that these evolve only under very special conditions. Choice for compatible genotypes can evolve but its selective advantage diminishes quickly due to frequency-dependent selection. Finally, we show that our model reproduces earlier results on selfing, when the female choice strategy produces assortative mating. Overall, our model indicates that various forms of heterozygote-favouring (or variable) female choice pose a problem for the theory of sexual ornamentation based on indirect benefits, rather than a solution.

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we proose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absoluterisk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function.We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, thereexists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasingconcave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion wouldrank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this thresholdlevel is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global riskaversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding oppositepreference relations for the two distributions.