564 resultados para PENALTY KICKING
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Yes, of course I know the expression is “Don’t look,” not kicking, but our collective professional behavior makes “kicking” the more operative and appropriate verbal. More about this in due course. As an expression, “don’t look a gift horse in the mouth” comes to us from the Lain, Noli equi dentes inspicere donate. Some argue Jerome said it first in 400 A.D., in which his words, very nearly our Latin literally translated, ran, “Never inspect the teeth of a gift horse.”
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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A numerical scheme based on the Finite Element Method (FEM) is presented to calculate the full solution of a three-dimensional steady magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) flow with moderately high Hartmann numbers and interaction parameters. An incompressible, viscous and electrically conducting liquid-metal is considered. Assuming a low magnetic Reynolds number, the solution method solves the coupled Navier-Stokes and Maxwell's equations through the use of a penalty function method. Results are presented for Hartmann numbers in the range 10(2)-10(3).
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The optimal reactive dispatch problem is a nonlinear programming problem containing continuous and discrete control variables. Owing to the difficulty caused by discrete variables, this problem is usually solved assuming all variables as continuous variables, therefore the original discrete variables are rounded off to the closest discrete value. This approach may provide solutions far from optimal or even unfeasible solutions. This paper presents an efficient handling of discrete variables by penalty function so that the problem becomes continuous and differentiable. Simulations with the IEEE test systems were performed showing the efficiency of the proposed approach. © 1969-2012 IEEE.
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The aim of this study was to analyse the characteristics of the asymmetries in the dominant and non-dominant limbs when kicking stationary and rolling balls. Ten experienced Brazilian amateur futsal players participated in this study. Each participant performed kicks under two conditions (stationary ball vs. rolling ball) with the dominant and non-dominant limbs (five kicks per condition per limb). We analysed the kicking accuracy, ball and foot velocities, angular joint displacement and velocity. The asymmetry between the dominant and non-dominant limbs was analysed by symmetry index and two-way repeated measures ANOVA. The results did not reveal any interaction between the condition and limb for ball velocity, foot velocity and accuracy. However, kicking with the dominant limb in both kicks showed higher ball velocity (stationary ball: dominant - 24.27 ± 2.21 m · s(-1) and non-dominant - 21.62 ± 2.26 m · s(-1); rolling ball: dominant - 23.88 ± 2.71 m · s(-1) and non-dominant - 21.42 ± 2.25 m · s(-1)), foot velocity (stationary ball: dominant - 17.61 ± 1.87 m · s(-1) and non-dominant - 15.58 ± 2.69 m · s(-1); rolling ball: dominant - 17.25 ± 2.26 m · s(-1) and non-dominant - 14.77 ± 2.35 m · s(-1)) and accuracy (stationary ball: dominant - 1.17 ± 0.84 m and non-dominant - 1.56 ± 1.30 m; rolling ball: dominant - 1.31 ± 0.91 m and non-dominant - 1.97 ± 1.44 m). In addition, the angular joint adjustments were dependent on the limb in both kicks (the kicks with non-dominant limb showed lower hip external rotation than the kicks with the dominant limb), indicating that the hip joint is important in kick performance. In conclusion, the kicks with the non-dominant limb showed different angular adjustments in comparison to kicks with the dominant limb. In addition, kicking a rolling ball with the non-dominant limb showed higher asymmetry for accuracy, indicating that complex kicks are more asymmetric.
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We consider a discrete-time financial model in a general sample space with penalty costs on short positions. We consider a friction market closely related to the standard one except that withdrawals from the portfolio value proportional to short positions are made. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonexistence of arbitrages in this situation and for a self-financing strategy to replicate a contingent claim. For the finite-sample space case, this result leads to an explicit and constructive procedure for obtaining perfect hedging strategies.
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At each outer iteration of standard Augmented Lagrangian methods one tries to solve a box-constrained optimization problem with some prescribed tolerance. In the continuous world, using exact arithmetic, this subproblem is always solvable. Therefore, the possibility of finishing the subproblem resolution without satisfying the theoretical stopping conditions is not contemplated in usual convergence theories. However, in practice, one might not be able to solve the subproblem up to the required precision. This may be due to different reasons. One of them is that the presence of an excessively large penalty parameter could impair the performance of the box-constraint optimization solver. In this paper a practical strategy for decreasing the penalty parameter in situations like the one mentioned above is proposed. More generally, the different decisions that may be taken when, in practice, one is not able to solve the Augmented Lagrangian subproblem will be discussed. As a result, an improved Augmented Lagrangian method is presented, which takes into account numerical difficulties in a satisfactory way, preserving suitable convergence theory. Numerical experiments are presented involving all the CUTEr collection test problems.
The boundedness of penalty parameters in an augmented Lagrangian method with constrained subproblems
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Augmented Lagrangian methods are effective tools for solving large-scale nonlinear programming problems. At each outer iteration, a minimization subproblem with simple constraints, whose objective function depends on updated Lagrange multipliers and penalty parameters, is approximately solved. When the penalty parameter becomes very large, solving the subproblem becomes difficult; therefore, the effectiveness of this approach is associated with the boundedness of the penalty parameters. In this paper, it is proved that under more natural assumptions than the ones employed until now, penalty parameters are bounded. For proving the new boundedness result, the original algorithm has been slightly modified. Numerical consequences of the modifications are discussed and computational experiments are presented.
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Objectives The current study investigated to what extent task-specific practice can help reduce the adverse effects of high-pressure on performance in a simulated penalty kick task. Based on the assumption that practice attenuates the required attentional resources, it was hypothesized that task-specific practice would enhance resilience against high-pressure. Method Participants practiced a simulated penalty kick in which they had to move a lever to the side opposite to the goalkeeper's dive. The goalkeeper moved at different times before ball-contact. Design Before and after task-specific practice, participants were tested on the same task both under low- and high-pressure conditions. Results Before practice, performance of all participants worsened under high-pressure; however, whereas one group of participants merely required more time to correctly respond to the goalkeeper movement and showed a typical logistic relation between the percentage of correct responses and the time available to respond, a second group of participants showed a linear relationship between the percentage of correct responses and the time available to respond. This implies that they tended to make systematic errors for the shortest times available. Practice eliminated the debilitating effects of high-pressure in the former group, whereas in the latter group high-pressure continued to negatively affect performance. Conclusions Task-specific practice increased resilience to high-pressure. However, the effect was a function of how participants responded initially to high-pressure, that is, prior to practice. The results are discussed within the framework of attentional control theory (ACT).
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The issue of bias-motivated crimes has attracted consderable attention in recent years. In this paper, we develop an economic framework to analyze penalty enhancements for bias-motivated crimes. We extend the standard model by introducing two different groups of potential victims of crime, and assume that a potential offender's benefits from a crime depend on the group to which the victim belongs. We begin with the assumption that the harm to an individual victim from a bias-motivated crime is identical to that from an equivalent non-hate crime. Nonetheless, we derive the result that a pattern of crimes disproportionately targeting an identifiable group leads to greater social harm. This conclusion follows both from a model where disparities in groups' victimization probabilities lead to social losses due to fairness concerns, as well as a model where potential victims have the opportunity to undertake socially costly victimization avoidance activities. In particular, penalty enhancements can reduce the incentives for avoidance activity, and thereby protect the networks of profitable interactions that link members of different groups. We also argue that those groups that are covered by hate crime statutes tend to be those whose characteristics make it especially likely that penalty enhancement is socially optimal. Finally, we consider a number of other issues related to hate crimes, including teh choice of sanctions from behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' concerning group identity.