The impact of taxes on optimal portfolio choice : an Australian study

Taxes are an important component of investing that is commonly overlooked in both the literature and in practice. For example, many understand that taxes will reduce an investment’s return, but less understood is the risk-sharing nature of taxes that also reduces the investment’s risk. This thesis examines how taxes affect the optimal asset allocation and asset location decision in an Australian environment. It advances the model of Horan & Al Zaman (2008), improving the method by which the present value of tax liabilities are calculated, by using an after-tax risk-free discount rate, and incorporating any new or reduced tax liabilities generated into its expected risk and return estimates. The asset allocation problem is examined for a range of different scenarios using Australian parameters, including different risk aversion levels, personal marginal tax rates, investment horizons, borrowing premiums, high or low inflation environments, and different starting cost bases. The findings support the Horan & Al Zaman (2008) conclusion that equities should be held in the taxable account. In fact, these findings are strengthened with most of the efficient frontier maximising equity holdings in the taxable account instead of only half. Furthermore, these findings transfer to the Australian case, where it is found that taxed Australian investors should always invest into equities first through the taxable account before investing in super. However, untaxed Australian investors should invest their equity first through superannuation. With borrowings allowed in the taxable account (no borrowing premium), Australian taxed investors should hold 100% of the superannuation account in the risk-free asset, while undertaking leverage in the taxable account to achieve the desired risk-return. Introducing a borrowing premium decreases the likelihood of holding 100% of super in the risk-free asset for taxable investors. The findings also suggest that the higher the marginal tax rate, the higher the borrowing premium in order to overcome this effect. Finally, as the investor’s marginal tax rate increases, the overall allocation to equities should increase due to the increased risk and return sharing caused by taxation, and in order to achieve the same risk/return level as the lower taxation level, the investor must take on more equity exposure. The investment horizon has a minimal impact on the optimal allocation decision in the absence of factors such as mean reversion and human capital.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 1)

Formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. The conclusion that the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm's-length model that applies to multinational banks, despite significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues, is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks. The formulary apportionment model looks to the economic substance of the multinational entity and, in this sense, adopts a substance-over- form approach. Formulary apportionment further recognizes the impossibility of using arm's-length pricing for economically interdependent multinational entities. A final advantage to formulary apportionment, which is also a consequence of this model achieving greater inter-nation equity, is the elimination of double taxation.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 2)

As stated in Part 1 of this article, formulary appointment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity; rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on economically justifiable formula. This article argues that the unitary taxation model is superior to the current arms-lenght model for the taxation of multinational banks despite significant implementation, complicance and enforcement issues. Part one of the article gave some background on the taxation of multinational banks, followed by a discussion of their uniqueness, and the theoretical benefits of the unitary tax model for multinational banking. Part 2 below covers the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an 'optimal' regime for taxing multinational banks.

Encouragement and discouragement : Essays on taxation and government expenditure

This thesis consists of an introduction to a topic of optimal use of taxes and government expenditure and three chapters analysing these themes more in depth. Chapter 2 analyses to what extent a given amount of subsidies affects the labour supply of parents. Municipal supplement to the Finnish home care allowance provides exogenous variation to labour supply decision of a parent. This kind of subsidy that is tied to staying at home instead of working is found to have fairly large effect on labour supply decisions of parents. Chapter 3 studies theoretically when it is optimal to provide publicly private goods. In the set up of the model government sets income taxes optimally and provides a private good, if it is beneficial to do so. The analysis results in an optimal provision rule according to which the good should be provided when it lowers the participation threshold into labour force. Chapter 4 investigates what happened to prices and demand when hairdressers value added tax was cut in Finland from 22 per cent to 8 per cent. The pass-through to prices was about half of the full pass-through and no clear indication of increased demand for the services or better employment situation in the sector is found.

Interjurisdictional allocation of multinational banking income : aligning taxation principles with economic activity

This thesis argues that one type of multinational entity – the multinational bank – poses particularly significant challenges to the international tax regime in terms of its current profit allocation rules. Multinational banks are a unique subset of multinational entities, and as a consequence of their unique traits, the traditional international tax regime foes not yield an optimal interjurisdictional allocation of taxing rights. The opportunity for tax minimisation, achievable because of the unique traits, and realised through exploitation of the traditional source and transfer pricing regime, results in a jurisdictional distribution of taxing rights which does not reflect economic reality. There are two distinct ways in which the traditional international tax regime fails to reflect economic activity. The first way that economic activity may not be reflected in the distribution of the taxing rights to income from multinational banking is through the application of traditional source rules. The traditional sources rules allocate income where transactions are completed rather than where the intermediation services are arranged. As a result of their unique commercial role as financial intermediaries, by separating intermediary economic activity from legal transactions with third parties, multinational banks may distort the true location of the activity giving rise to income. The second way in which the traditional tax regime may fail to reflect economic activity is through the traditional transfer pricing regime requiring related or internal transaction to be undertaken at an arm’s length price. The arm’s length pricing requirement is theoretically deficient in its failure to recognise the highly integrated nature of multinational banking. In practice, the arm’s length pricing requirement is also difficult, if not impossible, to apply to multinational banks because of the requirement of comparability. The difficulties associated with the current model have resulted in a subtle move by multinational banks towards global formulary apportionment. This thesis concludes that, for the international taxation of multinational banks, the current source regime should be replaced with a system that allocates profits for tax purposes on the basis of income source, with source determined using a unitary taxation or global formulary apportionment system. It is argued that global formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior model that provides both jurisdiction to tax and allocated profits on the basis of the economic activity that generates the income.

Optimal redistribution when educational background matters

Higher education plays an important role in determining individuals lifetime
earnings. In turn, the decision to become educated depends to a large extent on innate ability and on family characteristics, including both family
wealth and educational background. In this paper, we abstract from family
income differences to concentrate on the effects of fiscal policies on the
decision to undertake higher education when the educational background
matters. In a dynamic framework, where successive generations are linked by educational background, we consider a government that uses both linear income taxation and a lump-sum subsidy to education. Conditions for
optimality of each policy are derived. The factors that determine the sign
and magnitude of the tax rate and the subsidy are identified and include
concerns for redistribution, efficiency and the educational externality on
future generations

The holy grail : the search for the optimal gaar

The sustainability of a taxation system relies in part in reducing effective tax avoidance as far as is possible. Tax avoidance impacts on the economy both because it results in revenue loss and because it diverts people into devising, marketing and implementing avoidance arrangements, rather than engaging in economically productive activities. Revenue losses in turn weaken the government's ability to formulate and implement fiscal policies. Moreover, the very integrity of a tax system, necessary for its long-term sustainability, is attacked by tax avoidance. The goal of equity is undermined by tax avoidance as typically these schemes are accessed by the wealthy. Thus, tax avoidance results in an unfair shift in the tax burden to the less wealthy in society. As one commentator recently noted, combating 'tax avoidance ... will serve to lessen the overall burden on all taxpayers'. Further, legislative responses to tax avoidance increase the complexity of a taxation scheme. Tax avoidance schemes also undermine the neutrality of a taxation system by distorting trade and investment decisions. Thus, tax avoidance attacks every aspect of a fair, and hence, sustainable, taxation system.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms

Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: "Tax Filing Choices for the Household", "Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches" e "Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms".

Tax-Optimal Step-Up and Imperfect Loss Offset

In the field of mergers and acquisitions, German and international tax law allow for several opportunities to step up a firm's assets, i.e., to revaluate the assets at fair market values. When a step-up is performed the taxpayer recognizes a taxable gain, but also obtains tax benefits in the form of higher future depreciation allowances associated with stepping up the tax base of the assets. This tax-planning problem is well known in taxation literature and can also be applied to firm valuation in the presence of taxation. However, the known models usually assume a perfect loss offset. If this assumption is abandoned, the depreciation allowances may lose value as they become tax effective at a later point in time, or even never if there are not enough cash flows to be offset against. This aspect is especiallyrelevant if future cash flows are assumed to be uncertain. This paper shows that a step-up may be disadvantageous or a firm overvalued if these aspects are not integrated into the basic calculus. Compared to the standard approach, assets should be stepped up only in a few cases and - under specific conditions - at a later point in time. Firm values may be considerably lower under imperfect loss offset.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.