A Systematic Mapping on the Role-Permission Relationship in Role Based Access Control Models

Access control is a key component of security in any computer system. In the last two decades, the research on Role Basead Access Control Models was intense. One of the most important components of a Role Based Model is the Role-Permission Relationship. In this paper, the technique of systematic mapping is used to identify, extract and analyze many approaches applied to establish the Role-Permission Relationship. The main goal of this mapping is pointing directions of significant research in the area of Role Based Access Control Models.

A FIREWALL MODEL OF FILE SYSTEM SECURITY

File system security is fundamental to the security of UNIX and Linux systems since in these systems almost everything is in the form of a file. To protect the system files and other sensitive user files from unauthorized accesses, certain security schemes are chosen and used by different organizations in their computer systems. A file system security model provides a formal description of a protection system. Each security model is associated with specified security policies which focus on one or more of the security principles: confidentiality, integrity and availability. The security policy is not only about “who” can access an object, but also about “how” a subject can access an object. To enforce the security policies, each access request is checked against the specified policies to decide whether it is allowed or rejected. The current protection schemes in UNIX/Linux systems focus on the access control. Besides the basic access control scheme of the system itself, which includes permission bits, setuid and seteuid mechanism and the root, there are other protection models, such as Capabilities, Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), supported and used in certain organizations. These models protect the confidentiality of the data directly. The integrity of the data is protected indirectly by only allowing trusted users to operate on the objects. The access control decisions of these models depend on either the identity of the user or the attributes of the process the user can execute, and the attributes of the objects. Adoption of these sophisticated models has been slow; this is likely due to the enormous complexity of specifying controls over a large file system and the need for system administrators to learn a new paradigm for file protection. We propose a new security model: file system firewall. It is an adoption of the familiar network firewall protection model, used to control the data that flows between networked computers, toward file system protection. This model can support decisions of access control based on any system generated attributes about the access requests, e.g., time of day. The access control decisions are not on one entity, such as the account in traditional discretionary access control or the domain name in DTE. In file system firewall, the access decisions are made upon situations on multiple entities. A situation is programmable with predicates on the attributes of subject, object and the system. File system firewall specifies the appropriate actions on these situations. We implemented the prototype of file system firewall on SUSE Linux. Preliminary results of performance tests on the prototype indicate that the runtime overhead is acceptable. We compared file system firewall with TE in SELinux to show that firewall model can accommodate many other access control models. Finally, we show the ease of use of firewall model. When firewall system is restricted to specified part of the system, all the other resources are not affected. This enables a relatively smooth adoption. This fact and that it is a familiar model to system administrators will facilitate adoption and correct use. The user study we conducted on traditional UNIX access control, SELinux and file system firewall confirmed that. The beginner users found it easier to use and faster to learn then traditional UNIX access control scheme and SELinux.

Secure access control by means of human stress detection

This paper proposes a stress detection system based on fuzzy logic and the physiological signals heart rate and galvanic skin response. The main contribution of this method relies on the creation of a stress template, collecting the behaviour of previous signals under situations with a different level of stress in each individual. The creation of this template provides an accuracy of 99.5% in stress detection, improving the results obtained by current pattern recognition techniques like GMM, k-NN, SVM or Fisher Linear Discriminant. In addition, this system can be embedded in security systems to detect critical situations in accesses as cross-border control. Furthermore, its applications can be extended to other fields as vehicle driver state-of-mind management, medicine or sport training.

An Access Control Model for Protecting Provenance Graphs

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TRAAC: Trust and Risk Aware Access Control

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Engineering access control for distributed enterprise applications

Access control (AC) is a necessary defense against a large variety of security attacks on the resources of distributed enterprise applications. However, to be effective, AC in some application domains has to be fine-grain, support the use of application-specific factors in authorization decisions, as well as consistently and reliably enforce organization-wide authorization policies across enterprise applications. Because the existing middleware technologies do not provide a complete solution, application developers resort to embedding AC functionality in application systems. This coupling of AC functionality with application logic causes significant problems including tremendously difficult, costly and error prone development, integration, and overall ownership of application software. The way AC for application systems is engineered needs to be changed. ^ In this dissertation, we propose an architectural approach for engineering AC mechanisms to address the above problems. First, we develop a framework for implementing the role-based access control (RBAC) model using AC mechanisms provided by CORBA Security. For those application domains where the granularity of CORBA controls and the expressiveness of RBAC model suffice, our framework addresses the stated problem. ^ In the second and main part of our approach, we propose an architecture for an authorization service, RAD, to address the problem of controlling access to distributed application resources, when the granularity and support for complex policies by middleware AC mechanisms are inadequate. Applying this architecture, we developed a CORBA-based application authorization service (CAAS). Using CAAS, we studied the main properties of the architecture and showed how they can be substantiated by employing CORBA and Java technologies. Our approach enables a wide-ranging solution for controlling the resources of distributed enterprise applications. ^

Engineering access control for distributed enterprise applications

Access control (AC) is a necessary defense against a large variety of security attacks on the resources of distributed enterprise applications. However, to be effective, AC in some application domains has to be fine-grain, support the use of application-specific factors in authorization decisions, as well as consistently and reliably enforce organization-wide authorization policies across enterprise applications. Because the existing middleware technologies do not provide a complete solution, application developers resort to embedding AC functionality in application systems. This coupling of AC functionality with application logic causes significant problems including tremendously difficult, costly and error prone development, integration, and overall ownership of application software. The way AC for application systems is engineered needs to be changed. In this dissertation, we propose an architectural approach for engineering AC mechanisms to address the above problems. First, we develop a framework for implementing the role-based access control (RBAC) model using AC mechanisms provided by CORBA Security. For those application domains where the granularity of CORBA controls and the expressiveness of RBAC model suffice, our framework addresses the stated problem. In the second and main part of our approach, we propose an architecture for an authorization service, RAD, to address the problem of controlling access to distributed application resources, when the granularity and support for complex policies by middleware AC mechanisms are inadequate. Applying this architecture, we developed a CORBA-based application authorization service (CAAS). Using CAAS, we studied the main properties of the architecture and showed how they can be substantiated by employing CORBA and Java technologies. Our approach enables a wide-ranging solution for controlling the resources of distributed enterprise applications.

A PHR system with policy-based fine-grained access control and revocation mechanism

Collaborative sharing of information is becoming much more needed technique to achieve complex goals in today's fast-paced tech-dominant world. Personal Health Record (PHR) system has become a popular research area for sharing patients informa- tion very quickly among health professionals. PHR systems store and process sensitive information, which should have proper security mechanisms to protect patients' private data. Thus, access control mechanisms of the PHR should be well-defined. Secondly, PHRs should be stored in encrypted form. Cryptographic schemes offering a more suitable solution for enforcing access policies based on user attributes are needed for this purpose. Attribute-based encryption can resolve these problems, we propose a patient-centric framework that protects PHRs against untrusted service providers and malicious users. In this framework, we have used Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption scheme as an efficient cryptographic technique, enhancing security and privacy of the system, as well as enabling access revocation. Patients can encrypt their PHRs and store them on untrusted storage servers. They also maintain full control over access to their PHR data by assigning attribute-based access control to selected data users, and revoking unauthorized users instantly. In order to evaluate our system, we implemented CP-ABE library and web services as part of our framework. We also developed an android application based on the framework that allows users to register into the system, encrypt their PHR data and upload to the server, and at the same time authorized users can download PHR data and decrypt it. Finally, we present experimental results and performance analysis. It shows that the deployment of the proposed system would be practical and can be applied into practice.

Secure, dynamic and distributed access control stack for database applications

In database applications, access control security layers are mostly developed from tools provided by vendors of database management systems and deployed in the same servers containing the data to be protected. This solution conveys several drawbacks. Among them we emphasize: 1) if policies are complex, their enforcement can lead to performance decay of database servers; 2) when modifications in the established policies implies modifications in the business logic (usually deployed at the client-side), there is no other possibility than modify the business logic in advance and, finally, 3) malicious users can issue CRUD expressions systematically against the DBMS expecting to identify any security gap. In order to overcome these drawbacks, in this paper we propose an access control stack characterized by: most of the mechanisms are deployed at the client-side; whenever security policies evolve, the security mechanisms are automatically updated at runtime and, finally, client-side applications do not handle CRUD expressions directly. We also present an implementation of the proposed stack to prove its feasibility. This paper presents a new approach to enforce access control in database applications, this way expecting to contribute positively to the state of the art in the field.

Secure, dynamic and distributed access control stack for database applications

In database applications, access control security layers are mostly developed from tools provided by vendors of database management systems and deployed in the same servers containing the data to be protected. This solution conveys several drawbacks. Among them we emphasize: (1) if policies are complex, their enforcement can lead to performance decay of database servers; (2) when modifications in the established policies implies modifications in the business logic (usually deployed at the client-side), there is no other possibility than modify the business logic in advance and, finally, 3) malicious users can issue CRUD expressions systematically against the DBMS expecting to identify any security gap. In order to overcome these drawbacks, in this paper we propose an access control stack characterized by: most of the mechanisms are deployed at the client-side; whenever security policies evolve, the security mechanisms are automatically updated at runtime and, finally, client-side applications do not handle CRUD expressions directly. We also present an implementation of the proposed stack to prove its feasibility. This paper presents a new approach to enforce access control in database applications, this way expecting to contribute positively to the state of the art in the field.