The normative and the personal life: individual differences in life scripts and life story events among USA and Danish undergraduates.

Life scripts are culturally shared expectations about the order and timing of life events in a prototypical life course. American and Danish undergraduates produced life story events and life scripts by listing the seven most important events in their own lives and in the lives of hypothetical people living ordinary lives. They also rated their events on several scales and completed measures of depression, PTSD symptoms, and centrality of a negative event to their lives. The Danish life script replicated earlier work; the American life script showed minor differences from the Danish life script, apparently reflecting genuine differences in shared events as well as less homogeneity in the American sample. Both consisted of mostly positive events that came disproportionately from ages 15 to 30. Valence of life story events correlated with life script valence, depression, PTSD symptoms, and identity. In the Danish undergraduates, measures of life story deviation from the life script correlated with measures of depression and PTSD symptoms.

Towards a Normative Defence of Provocation in England and Ireland

This article compares, in the light of the House of Lords’ decision in R v Smith (Morgan James), the English and Irish approaches to the objective test in provocation. Though the law on this point has developed in radically different directions as between England and Ireland, both jurisdictions demonstrate a profound dissatisfaction with the objective test in its traditional formulation combined with a reluctance to dispense with it altogether. It is suggested that Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Morgan Smith, by drawing out the essentially normative function of the objective test, provides a useful way forward for the law on both sides of the Irish Sea.

A normative approach to the criminalisation of cartel activity

Although cartel behaviour is almost universally (and rightly) condemned, it is not clear why cartel participants deserve the full wrath of the criminal law and its associated punishment. To fill this void, I develop a normative (or principled) justification for the criminalisation of conduct characteristic of ‘hard core’ cartels. The paper opens with a brief consideration of the rhetoric commonly used to denounce cartel activity, eg that it ‘steals from’ or ‘robs’ consumers. To put the discussion in context, a brief definition of ‘hard core’ cartel behaviour is provided and the harms associated with this activity are identified. These are: welfare losses in the form of appropriation (from consumer to producer) of consumer surplus, the creation of deadweight loss to the economy, the creation of productive inefficiency (hindering innovation of both products and processes), and the creation of so-called X-inefficiency. As not all activities which cause harm ought to be criminalised, a theory as to why certain harms in a liberal society can be criminalised is developed. It is based on JS Mill's harm to others principle (as refined by Feinberg) and on a choice of social institutions using Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance.’ The theory is centred on the value of individual choice in securing one's own well-being, with the market as an indispensable instrument for this. But as applied to the harm associated with cartel conduct, this theory shows that none of the earlier mentioned problems associated with this activity provide sufficient justification for criminalisation. However, as the harm from hard core cartel activity strikes at an important institution which permits an individual's ability to secure their own well-being in a liberal society, criminalisation of hard core cartel behaviour can have its normative justification on this basis.