996 resultados para Montana. Livestock Commission


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In the spring of 1953 a program of field reconnaissance for radioactivity in south-central Montana and northwestern Wyoming was authorized by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Field procedures consisted of testing outcrops along roads, in cliffs, and around rim rocks, and testing mines, prospects and the dumps thereof with the appropriate instruments in an attempt to locate exposures of areas showing anomalous radioactivity and to ascertain the geological conditions under which such radioactivity occurred.

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"Division of Raw Materials, Exploration Branch."--Cover.

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"December 1954."

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Salt Lake City, Utah, Salt Lake Area Office, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

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"March 1957."

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Radiometric logging of the drill holes was accomplished by means of a Geiger counter-type probe. Samples for chemical assay were selected after checking the core with a Geiger counter and correlation with the radiometric logging record. The exploration project did not disclose significant amounts of ore-grade material although encouraging indications were found at two different properties.

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Title varies slightly: <1873>, Report of the Auditor and Treasurer of Montana Territory for the ... fiscal year ... made to the ... session of the Legislative Assembly of Montana Territory.

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The need to “reduce red tape” and regulatory inconsistencies is a desirable outcome (OECD 1997) for developed countries. The costs normally associated with regulatory regimes are compliance costs and direct charges. Geiger and Hoffman (1998) have noted that the extent of regulation in an industry tends to be negatively associated with firm performance. Typically, approaches to estimation of the cost of regulations examine direct costs, such as fees and charges, together with indirect costs, such as compliance costs. However, in a fragmented system, such as Australia, costs can also be incurred due to procedural delays, either by government, or by industry having to adapt documentation for different spheres of government; lack of predictable outcomes, with variations occurring between spheres of government and sometimes within the same government agency; and lost business opportunities, with delays and red tape preventing realisation of business opportunities (OECD 1997). In this submission these costs are termed adaptation costs. The adaptation costs of complying with variations in regulations between the states has been estimated by the Building Product Innovation Council (2003) as being up to $600 million per annum for building product manufacturers alone. Productivity gains from increased harmonisation of the regulatory system have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (ABCB 2003). This argument is supported by international research which found that increasing the harmonisation of legislation in a federal system of government reduces what we have termed adaptation costs (OECD 2001). Research reports into the construction industry in Australia have likewise argued that improved consistency in the regulatory environment could lead to improvements in innovation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2002), and that research into this area should be given high priority (Hampson & Brandon 2004). The opinion of industry in Australia has consistently held that the current regulatory environment inhibits innovation (Manley 2004). As a first step in advancing improvements to the current situation, a summary of the current costs experienced by industry needs to be articulated. This executive summary seeks to outline these costs in the hope that the Productivity Commission would be able to identify the best tools to quantify the actual costs to industry.

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Bob Baxt, the third Chairman of the Trade Practices Commission, served for a single three year term from 1988 to 1991. He followed Bob McComas, who had deliberately adopted a non-litigious approach to preserving the competitive process, believing that he understood business as an insider and that much of what it did was not anti-competitive, when correctly viewed. Baxt was far more pro-active in his approach, and more closely aligned with that of the first Chairman, Ron Bannerman. Baxt sought to push the frontiers of investigation and precedent, and perhaps, more significantly, sought to influence his Ministers, the government, public servants and public opinion about the need to expand the coverage of the Trade Practices Act, increase penalties and properly resource the Commission so that it could perform its assigned roles. This article examines Baxt’s early and on-going role in teaching Australian students and professionals through his interdisciplinary Trade Practices Workshops, the political context of Baxt’s tenure, including his relations with the Attorney-General ,Michael Duffy, and his skilful handling of the Queensland Wire case.