Promoting Corporate Responsibility in Private Banking: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Joining the Wolfsberg Initiative Against Money Laundering

In recent years, the fight against money laundering has emerged as a key issue of financial regulation. The Wolfsberg Group is an important multistakeholder agreement establishing corporate responsibility (CR) principles against money laundering in a domain where international coordination remains otherwise difficult. The fact that 10 out of the 25 top private banking institutions joined this initiative opens up an interesting puzzle concerning the conditions for the participation of key industry players in the Wolfsberg Group. The article presents a fuzzy-set analysis of seven hypotheses based on firm-level organizational factors, the macro-institutional context, and the regulatory framework. Results from the analysis of these 25 financial institutions show that public ownership of the bank and the existence of a code of conduct are necessary conditions for participation in the Wolfsberg Group, whereas factors related to the type of financial institution, combined with the existence of a black list, are sufficient for explaining participation.

Desenvolupament d'aplicacions per a dispositius mòbils amb plataforma Android : Where is my money?

L'objectiu d'aquest treball es centra sobre dos eixos bàsics. Per unabanda, es pretén fer un apropament a l'estudi de l'entorn de desenvolupament d'Android. Per altra banda, es realitza una aplicació que aprofitarà algunes de les seves característiques fonamentals. Mitjançant aquest desenvolupament, juntament amb una documentació detallada, el lector ha de poder comprendre el funcionament de les aplicacions per Android i conèixer els passos per crear les seves pròpies.

Clustering algorithms for anti-money laundering using graph theory and social network analysis

HEMOLIA (a project under European community’s 7th framework programme) is a new generation Anti-Money Laundering (AML) intelligent multi-agent alert and investigation system which in addition to the traditional financial data makes extensive use of modern society’s huge telecom data source, thereby opening up a new dimension of capabilities to all Money Laundering fighters (FIUs, LEAs) and Financial Institutes (Banks, Insurance Companies, etc.). This Master-Thesis project is done at AIA, one of the partners for the HEMOLIA project in Barcelona. The objective of this thesis is to find the clusters in a network drawn by using the financial data. An extensive literature survey has been carried out and several standard algorithms related to networks have been studied and implemented. The clustering problem is a NP-hard problem and several algorithms like K-Means and Hierarchical clustering are being implemented for studying several problems relating to sociology, evolution, anthropology etc. However, these algorithms have certain drawbacks which make them very difficult to implement. The thesis suggests (a) a possible improvement to the K-Means algorithm, (b) a novel approach to the clustering problem using the Genetic Algorithms and (c) a new algorithm for finding the cluster of a node using the Genetic Algorithm.

State of Iowa Money Laundering Threat Assessment, September 2002

Report of Iowa Money Laundering threat.

State of Iowa Money Laundering Threat Assessment, January 2004

Report of Iowa Money Laundering threat.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.

Fiat Money, Intrinsic Properties, and Government Transaction Policy

Why do people coordinate on the use of valueless pieces of paper as generally accepted money? A possible answer is that these objects have intrinsic properties that make them better candidates to be used as media of exchange. Another answer stresses the fact that unconvertible fiat money will not easily appear unless there is a centralized institution that favors its use. The main objective of the paper is to analyze these questions. In order to do this, we take a model of commodity money in which fiat money does not play any significant role and modify it to examine under which circumstances fiat money might come to circulate as medium of exchange. Some of the results obtained from the model differ in a rather substantial way from previous related literature.

Are Chileans equally supportive? Analysis of the individual differences in money donations

In the public discourse it is commonly assumed that Chile is a solidary country, an assumption that is mixed with the idea of homogeneity in the country as far as helping behavior and solidarity values is concerned. The present paper is aimed at challenging this homogeneity assumption by proposing that helping behavior is associated to personal resources, which at the same time are linked to the position in the stratification structure. Using data from the Solidarity Survey implemented by the assessment center MIDE UC of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in 2009, the paper focuses on a specific type of helping behavior: money donations. The analysis centers on the influence of personal resources such as income, education and networks on this kind of donations. Results indicate that individuals with greater resources are more given to donate, whereby the educational level plays a key role.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

On money as a medium of exchange when goods vary by supply and demand

Models of the exchange process based on search theory can be usedto analyze the features of objects that make them more or less likely toemerge as ``money'' in equilibrium. These models illustrate the trade--offbetween endogenous acceptability (an equilibrium property) and intrinsiccharacteristics of goods, such as storability, recognizability, etc. Inthis paper, we look at how the relative supply and demand for various goodsaffect their likelihood of becoming money. Intuitively, goods in highdemand and/or low supply are more likely to appear as commodity money,subject to the qualification that which object ends up circulating as amedium of exchange depends at least partly on convention. Welfare propertiesare discussed.