Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.

Durable Goods, Inter-Sectoral Linkages and Monetary Policy

Barsky, House and Kimball (2007) show that introducing durable goods into a sticky-price model leads to negative sectoral comovement of production following a monetary policy shock and, under certain conditions, to aggregate neutrality. These results appear to undermine sticky-price models. In this paper, we show that these results are not robust to two prominent and realistic features of the data, namely input-output interactions and limited mobility of productive inputs. When extended to allow for both features, the sticky-price model with durable goods delivers implications in line with VAR evidence on the effects of monetary policy shocks.

Monetary Policy When Wages Are Downwardly Rigid: Friedman Meets Tobin

In a monetary economy with downwardly rigid wages, the central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, inflation rate.

Dissent in monetary policy decisions

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The effect of insti- tutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.

Impact of Monetary Policy on Indian Economy in the Post-Reform Period

The present study was an attempt to analyze systematically the techniques of monetary control measures with its relevance and changing importance and to find out their effectiveness in the Indian context especially to achieve the thriving objectives of price stability and economic growth.There is definite and remarkable economic impact of monetary policy on Indian economy in the post-reform period. The importance of monetary policy has been increasing year after year. Its role is very relevant in attaining monetary objectives, especially in managing price stability and achieving economic growth. Along that, the use and importance of monetary weapons like Bank rate, CRR, SLR, Repo rate and Reverse Rate have increased over the years. Repo and Reverse Repo rates are the most frequently used monetary techniques in recent years. The rates are varied mainly for curtailing inflation and absorb the excess liquidity and hence to maintain price stability in the economy. Thus, this short-time objective of price stability is more successful on Indian economy rather than other long-term objectives of development.Monetary policy rules can be active or passive. The passive rule is to keep the money supply constant, which is reminiscent of Milton Friedman’s money growth rule. The second, called a price stabilization rule, is to change the money supply in response to changes in aggregate supply or demand to keep the price level constant. The idea of an active rule is to keep the price level and hence inflation in check. In India, this rule dominates our monetary policy. A stable growth is healthy growth.

Modeling the monetary policy reaction function of the colombian central bank

This paper proposes a simple Ordered Probit model to analyse the monetary policy reaction function of the Colombian Central Bank. There is evidence that the reaction function is asymmetric, in the sense that the Bank increases the Bank rate when the gap between observed inflation and the inflation target (lagged once) is positive, but it does not reduce the Bank rate when the gap is negative. This behaviour suggests that the Bank is more interested in fulfilling the announced inflation target rather than in reducing inflation excessively. The forecasting performance of the model, both within and beyond the estimation period, appears to be particularly good.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.