996 resultados para Military campaigns


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El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo mostrar y analizar las relaciones fronterizas entre indígenas, cronistas, viajeros y agentes del gobierno de Buenos Aires en el período de 1870 a 1880. Se prestará especial atención a las vinculaciones entre estos "mundos" a partir de los viajes que realizó Moreno a los toldos del cacique Valentín Sayhueque y su comunidad en las regiones aledañas al Lago Nahuel Huapi. No se descarta la influencia de otros cronistas de época (Cox y Musters) como tampoco la impronta de personajes centrales en el contexto (Zeballos y Roca). Los viajeros que recorrieron la Patagonia dejaron testimonios claves para comprender el proceso que se dio entre las sociedades indígenas y el Estado nacional argentino a fines del siglo XIX. Su análisis a través de una mirada crítica da la pauta de cómo las sociedades nativas fueron observadas y estudiadas desde el gobierno de Buenos Aires y países extranjeros. La actual Patagonia fue un punto de atracción (y lo sigue siendo), para muchos individuos que no conocen el lugar. Su naturaleza, paisaje, vegetación eran únicos y muy atractivos. Sus tierras eran habitadas por sujetos que no tenían las mismas formas de vida que el resto de las regiones del momento. Habían desarrollado costumbres, formas de comunicación, comercio e intercambio, relaciones sociales, festividades. Cronistas como Francisco Moreno son nodales para adentrarnos al mundo nativo desde otro ángulo, ya que nos muestra las relaciones en el espacio de frontera y los propósitos del gobierno de Buenos Aires en el momento de las campañas militares. Desde el punto de vista metodológico se ha recurrido a la Etnohistoria para abordar nuestro problema desde una óptica diferente y alimentando la investigación en curso

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En estas páginas, el autor pretende aportar alguna luz al debate de la denominada “Revolución Militar” y señalar cómo la introducción de la artillería de pólvora dentro de los trenes de asedio tuvo lugar ya a fines del siglo XIV y comienzos del XV. Para ello, se buscan los primeros ejemplos del empleo de piezas artilleras en la frontera con Granada, se apuntan algunas de las limitaciones que tenía la neurobalística y se analiza, sobre todo, un caso concreto: las grandes campañas efectuadas por el regente de Castilla don Fernando de Trastámara contra el emirato granadino en 1407 y 1410, examinándose cuestiones tales como la verdadera efectividad táctica de la paleoartillería, el aprendizaje de su empleo por experiencia acumulada o las necesidades logísticas que demandaba el uso de un arma que, en esos momentos, era bastante novedosa.

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This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

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Full Title: Medical sketches of the campaigns of 1812, 13, 14 : to which are added, surgical cases, observations on military hospitals, and flying hospitals attached to a moving army : also, an appendix comprising a dissertation on dysentery which obtained the Boylstonian prize medal for the year 1806 and observations on the winter epidemic of 1815-16, denominated peripneumonia notha, as it appeared at Sharon and Rochester, state of Massachusetts