Goodman and Putnam on the making of worlds

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called irrealism in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.

A recepção adorniana de Freud no estudo da personalidade autoritária

Em geral, a tradição do pensamento metafísico entende que no desenvolvimento histórico da razão há um progresso. A existência do progresso requer o sacrifício do indivíduo ao longo da história. A filosofia de Theodor W. Adorno realiza um exame crítico do processo de esclarecimento vivido no Ocidente. Os estudos de Adorno mostram que a associação entre o “progresso” e o sacrifício da individualidade resulta na barbárie. Deste modo, Adorno evidencia os momentos do irracional conservados na sociedade racionalizada e que ameaçam o processo civilizatório. Neste trabalho, investigamos a influência de Sigmund Freud no pensamento de Adorno. Defendemos que a leitura adorniana de Freud é essencial para a explicação dos fatores subjetivos da personalidade autoritária. No entanto, a razão subjetiva não explica inteiramente os determinantes do caráter autoritário. Por isso, no primeiro capítulo nós apresentamos os pressupostos marxianos da razão objetiva. Além disso, indicamos a relação entre razão objetiva e razão subjetiva. No segundo capítulo, buscamos compreender a teoria de Freud e assinalamos como suas categorias manifestam as condições objetivas assinaladas por Adorno. No terceiro capítulo, examinamos a interpretação marxista realizada por Adorno sobre os determinantes psicológicos que favorecem a manifestação do caráter autoritário. Ao final, nós debatemos os resultados da recepção adorniana de Freud.

Building the «true evolutionism»: Darwin's impact on Henri Bergson's thought

The paper focuses on the importance of Darwin’s work for the shaping of Henri Bergson’s philosophy, bearing on mind that the two authors first intercepted symbolically in 1859, when On the Origin of Species was published and Bergson was born. Bergson studied the biological sciences of his time, whose results were integrated in a metaphysical thought. He belonged to spiritualistic positivism, a philosophy that goes from the positive data of sciences and finds the ultimate explanation of reality in a spiritual principle. He was interested in the positive evolution of the natural world and in the works of naturalists such as Lamarck, De Vries or Eimer. Darwin was among these authors, being responsible for a vision of evolution that went from the scientific level to other domains. Bergson defends the “insufficiency of pure Darwinism” by pointing out the necessity to compensate scientific evolution with an internal metaphysical reading of the real, which he considered to be “true evolutionism”. This criticism is the most visible aspect of the relations between both works. However, an attentive look verifies that Darwin’s influence overcomes the divergence of positions concerning the extent of “evolution”. The French philosopher knew not only the 1859’s bestseller, but also studies by Darwin about ethology, entomology and botany, which contributed to the fact that the naturalist’s impact gained fundamental importance in Bergson’s philosophical perspective.

Biology Expansively Understood: [Review of] Alexandre Lefebvre's Human Rights as a Way of Life. On Bergson's Political Philosophy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013)

Human Rights as a Way of Life is about the political dimension of Henri Bergson's work, focusing mainly on The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, the last original book by the French philosopher, published in 1932.

On environmental philosophy: an interview with Eugene C. Hargrove

Artigo traduzido para mandarim, publicado em Nature and Human Life E-Academic Magazine, 6 (2015), pp. 19-32. http://www.ziranyurensheng.org/current-2961621002.html.

A teaching-learning sequence of colour informed by history and philosophy of science

In this work, we present a teaching-learning sequence on colour intended to a pre-service elementary teacher programme informed by History and Philosophy of Science. Working in a socio-constructivist framework, we made an excursion on the history of colour. Our excursion through history of colour, as well as the reported misconception on colour helps us to inform the constructions of the teaching-learning sequence. We apply a questionnaire both before and after each of the two cycles of action-research in order to assess students’ knowledge evolution on colour and to evaluate our teaching-learning sequence. Finally, we present a discussion on the persistence of deep-rooted alternative conceptions.

A didactic sequence of elementary geometric optics Informed by history and philosophy of science

The concepts and instruments required for the teaching and learning of geometric optics are introduced in the didactic processwithout a proper didactic transposition. This claim is secured by the ample evidence of both wide- and deep-rooted alternative concepts on the topic. Didactic transposition is a theory that comes from a reflection on the teaching and learning process in mathematics but has been used in other disciplinary fields. It will be used in this work in order to clear up the main obstacles in the teachinglearning process of geometric optics. We proceed to argue that since Newton’s approach to optics, in his Book I of Opticks, is independent of the corpuscular or undulatory nature of light, it is the most suitable for a constructivist learning environment. However, Newton’s theory must be subject to a proper didactic transposition to help overcome the referred alternative concepts. Then is described our didactic transposition in order to create knowledge to be taught using a dialogical process between students’ previous knowledge, history of optics and the desired outcomes on geometrical optics in an elementary pre-service teacher training course. Finally, we use the scheme-facet structure of knowledge both to analyse and discuss our results as well as to illuminate shortcomings that must be addressed in our next stage of the inquiry.

A study in cross-cultural transmission of natural philosophy: the Kenkon Bensetsu

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em História dos Descobrimentos e da Expansão Portuguesa

From Consciousness to Knowledge – The Explanatory Power of Revelation

Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.

Sustentabilidade no Design: uma abordagem aos resíduos limpos das indústrias do calçado

Dissertação de mestrado em Design e Marketing

Hume e o problema moral

Tese de Doutoramento em Filosofia (área de especialização em Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea).

Filososofía y Ciencia Computacional: Aspectos epistemológicos, ontológicos y metodológicos. Philosophy and Computing Sciencs: Epistemological, Ontological and Methodological Aspects.

Uno de los temas centrales del proyecto concierne la naturaleza de la ciencia de la computación. La reciente aparición de esta disciplina sumada a su origen híbrido como ciencia formal y disciplina tecnológica hace que su caracterización aún no esté completa y menos aún acordada entre los científicos del área. En el trabajo Three paradigms of Computer Science de A. Eden, se presentan tres posiciones admitidamente exageradas acerca de como entender tanto el objeto de estudio (ontología) como los métodos de trabajo (metodología) y la estructura de la teoría y las justificaciones del conocimiento informático (epistemología): La llamada racionalista, la cual se basa en la idea de que los programas son fórmulas lógicas y que la forma de trabajo es deductiva, la tecnocrática que presenta a la ciencia computacional como una disciplina ingenieril y la ahi llamada científica, la cual asimilaría a la computación a las ciencias empíricas. Algunos de los problemas de ciencia de la computación están relacionados con cuestiones de filosofía de la matemática, en particular la relación entre las entidades abstractas y el mundo. Sin embargo, el carácter prescriptivo de los axiomas y teoremas de las teorías de la programación puede permitir interpretaciones alternativas y cuestionaría fuertemente la posibilidad de pensar a la ciencia de la computación como una ciencia empírica, al menos en el sentido tradicional. Por otro lado, es posible que el tipo de análisis aplicado a las ciencias de la computación propuesto en este proyecto aporte nuevas ideas para pensar problemas de filosofía de la matemática. Un ejemplo de estos posibles aportes puede verse en el trabajo de Arkoudas Computers, Justi?cation, and Mathematical Knowledge el cual echa nueva luz al problema del significado de las demostraciones matemáticas.Los objetivos del proyecto son: Caracterizar el campo de las ciencias de la computación.Evaluar los fundamentos ontológicos, epistemológicos y metodológicos de la ciencia de la computación actual.Analizar las relaciones entre las diferentes perspectivas heurísticas y epistémicas y las practicas de la programación.