Internationalization of IT company: Case study of a Finnish MOOC platform

The interest to small and media size enterprises’ (SMEs) internationalization process is increasing with a growth of SMEs’ contribution to GDP. Internet gives an opportunity to provide variety of services online and reach market niche worldwide. The overlapping of SMEs’ internationalization and online services is the main issue of the research. The most SMEs internationalize according to intuitive decisions of CEO of the company and lose limited resources to worthless attempts. The purpose of this research is to define effective approaches to online service internationalization and selection of the first international market. The research represents single holistic case study of local massive open online courses (MOOCs) platform going global. It considers internationalization costs and internationalization theories applicable to online services. The research includes preliminary screening of the markets and in-depth analysis based on macro parameters of the market and specific characteristics of the customers and expert evaluation of the results. The specific issues as GILT (Globalization, Internationalization, Localization and Translation) approach and Internet-enabled internationalization are considered. The research results include recommendations on international market selection methodology for online services and for effective internationalization strategy development.

Creación de marca mediante la utilización de mecanismos estratégicos comunitarios y marketing

El presente documento pretende mostrar la manera como se debe ejecutar la creación de marca mediante la utilización de mecanismos estratégicos comunitarios y marketing. El objetivo del estudio se basa en encontrar los mecanismos adecuados para el desarrollo y creación de una marca enfocándose en el análisis de las principales prácticas y modelos desarrollados en el área del marketing, examinando el impacto que la marca pueda generar en la comunidad en la cual la organización está incluida, estableciendo además un conexión directa con el modo de vida de los consumidores. Durante el desarrollo del documento se demuestra que las estrategias de marketing aplicadas por cada compañía, sirven para construir una relación estrecha y fuerte con todos los agentes involucrados en la construcción de una marca, principalmente con los clientes, ya que la forma más efectiva de establecer relaciones a largo plazo, es enfocándose exclusivamente en las necesidades desarrolladas por los consumidores, y a partir de ellas ajustar los valores (misión, visión, cultura organizacional, objetivos) de la organización. Estas estrategias comunitarias son también influenciadas por varios factores internos y externos a la organización, los cuales deben ser tenidos en cuenta al momento de elegir la estrategia adecuada. Los mecanismos estratégicos que desarrollan las empresas pueden cambiar significativamente de un sector comercial a otro, la importancia de las necesidades que se deben suplir y el consumidor final se deben evaluar desde un aspecto comunitario, entendiendo como comunidad como el conjunto de grupos sociales y comerciales que tienen relación directa o indirecta con la empresa. Con la investigación llevada a cabo acerca de las estrategias que deben aplicar las compañías se concluye que las marcas reflejan la imagen que la empresa transmite a sus compradores estableciendo una relación emocional entre los consumidores y la marca desarrollada, además de estimular la oferta y demanda del negocio. Se espera que por medio de la obtención de información teórica y conceptual, se pueda aclarar la manera como se puede desarrollar la creación de una marca por medio de la correcta utilización de mecanismos estratégicos comunitarios y de marketing.

International partner selection Indian technical textile market

Due to a combination of a vast agricultural industry and a tremendously growing technical textile industry, Ludvig Svensson identified India as target market for possible expansion through domestic production and supply. However, Svensson needed additional information about the industry structure and key players. Therefore, this project focused on a detailed analysis of the technical textile market and its players by following the international partner selection process. Thereby, five key players were identified as potential partners, as well as the need for additional research to determine alternative entry modes, as the market does not currently seem to be receptive for Svensson products.

Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

Trade Costs, International Competition and Selection: The Effects of Unionisation on Market Size

Within a two-country model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms face firm-specific unions, we study the effects of different forms of trade liberalisation on market structure and competitive selection in the presence of inter-country asymmetries in size and labour market institutions. For given levels of trade openness, an increase in a country’s relative unions’ strength reduces the average productivity of its domestic producers but increases that of its exporters. Whilst an unfavourable union power differential, by increasing wages, weakens a country’s firms’ competitive position, the higher wages reinforce standard market access mechanisms to give rise to aggregate income effects. When the initial levels of trade openness are sufficiently low, this ‘expansionary’ aggregate effect can attract industry in the country with stronger unions and also result in an increase in the extensive margin of exports. For sufficiently large inter-country differences in the bargaining power of unions, trade liberalization can then result in a pro-variety effect, with an increase in the total availability of varieties to consumers in both countries, regardless of there being inter-country differences in size.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Self-selection and risk selection on the Swiss health insurance market

Abstract This thesis presents three empirical studies in the field of health insurance in Switzerland. First we investigate the link between health insurance coverage and health care expenditures. We use claims data for over 60 000 adult individuals covered by a major Swiss Health Insurance Fund, followed for four years; the data show a strong positive correlation between coverage and expenditures. Two methods are developed and estimated in order to separate selection effects (due to individual choice of coverage) and incentive effects ("ex post moral hazard"). The first method uses the comparison between inpatient and outpatient expenditures to identify both effects and we conclude that both selection and incentive effects are significantly present in our data. The second method is based on a structural model of joint demand of health care and health insurance and makes the most of the change in the marginal cost of health care to identify selection and incentive effects. We conclude that the correlation between insurance coverage and health care expenditures may be decomposed into the two effects: 75% may be attributed to selection, and 25 % to incentive effects. Moreover, we estimate that a decrease in the coinsurance rate from 100% to 10% increases the marginal demand for health care by about 90% and from 100% to 0% by about 150%. Secondly, having shown that selection and incentive effects exist in the Swiss health insurance market, we present the consequence of this result in the context of risk adjustment. We show that if individuals choose their insurance coverage in function of their health status (selection effect), the optimal compensations should be function of the se- lection and incentive effects. Therefore, a risk adjustment mechanism which ignores these effects, as it is the case presently in Switzerland, will miss his main goal to eliminate incentives for sickness funds to select risks. Using a simplified model, we show that the optimal compensations have to take into account the distribution of risks through the insurance plans in case of self-selection in order to avoid incentives to select risks.Then, we apply our propositions to Swiss data and propose a simple econometric procedure to control for self-selection in the estimation of the risk adjustment formula in order to compute the optimal compensations.

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.