Reflections on quasi-loss of nationality in comparative, international and European perspective. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 66/August 2014

This paper focuses on situations in which a person is said never to have had the nationality of a country, even though (s)he assumed (and in many cases the authorities of the country concerned shared that assumption) that (s)he possessed that nationality. Contrary to situations of loss of nationality, where something is taken away that had existed, quasi-loss involves situations in which nationality was never acquired. This contribution seeks to examine whether a person should under certain circumstances be protected against quasi-loss of nationality. In order to do so, the paper first maps out situations of quasi-loss in EU member states, describing typical cases in which a person never acquired the nationality of the country, although (s)he was at some time considered as a national. Drawing on this taxonomy, the paper attempts to uncover whether national, European and international laws offer some protection, and if yes, to which extent, for situations of quasi-loss. It concludes with outlining best practices which Member States should comply with in handling such situations.

Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 28/2013

Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail at that time. While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with unknown destination and full of surprises.

2014-A Centenary and a Discovery. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 59 December 2014

It is almost as if engaging in war is easier than thinking about war. In the year of the commemoration of the First World War, Europe is facing several wars on its borders, and European forces are actively engaged in Iraq and Mali. But is anyone thinking about the strategic objectives?

The European Union and global security: is the EU becoming the indispensable partner? EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 11, April 2014

The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.

An Industrious European Council on Defence? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 53, February 2014

The December 2013 Council meeting set in motion a number of important “roadmaps” for defence-industrial policy in Europe. Now the member states, the European Defence Agency and European Commission need to be aware of the potential roadblocks ahead.

Time to think about a European Union operated airlift capability? Security Policy Brief No. 62, April 2015

The European Council of June 2015 will assess concrete progress regarding its conclusions of December 2013 and provide further guidance in the most promising areas. This could be the right time to propose innovative solutions to long-lasting issues and shortfalls - strategic airlift being one of them – and increased civil/military synergies. Could the A400M become part of the answer?

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): China’s new multilateralism and the erosion of the West. Security Policy Brief No. 63, April 2015

China will launch a new development bank for Asia later this year, called the AIIB. 58 countries worldwide have already applied to become founding members, including numerous Western nations. This policy brief argues that the AIIB constitutes an important international development, as it reflects a new geopolitical reality and marks a new turn in China’s practice of multilateralism. It also looks critically at the European uncoordinated response to the AIIB, and what it tells about Europe’s shrinking role in the world.

Considering DPRK [North Korea] Regime Collapse: Its Probability and Possible Geopolitical and Security Consequences. Security Policy Brief No. 66, August 2015

Both the EU and its member states are in a period of rethinking security strategy to adapt to contemporary challenges both in the European region and beyond, including Northeast Asia. In this Security Policy Brief, Mason Richey discusses what difficulties and risks a North Korean regime collapse would pose, the likelihood that it will occur sooner rather than later, and how Europe will be affected by such a scenario.

From Survival to Revival: The Riga Summit 2015 and the revised ENP. Egmont Security policy Brief No. 65, July 2015

With the European Parliament’s July report on the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calling on the Commission to ‘go back to basics’, this article argues that such a move would be counter-productive and that instead, the ENP needs to move towards the future and break away with the historical elusiveness of this overarching policy. The Riga Summit serves as an illustration of what will not suffice if the EU is to strengthen or even maintain its role in its neighbourhoods. The revision of the ENP is described as 3Dimensional process which needs to yield a concrete and forward-looking new ENP. The recommendations put forth herein map out what a truly revised ENP would entail.

Information Guide: Common Foreign and Security Policy

A guide to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with hyperlinks to sources of information within European Sources Online and on external websites

Convergence to the European Energy Policy in European countries: case studies and comparison

Purpose – Our paper aims at analyzing how different European countries cope with the European Energy Policy, which proposes a set of measures (free energy market, smart meters, energy certificates) to improve energy utilization and management in Europe. Design/methodology/approach – The paper first reports the general vision, regulations and goals set up by Europe to implement the European Energy Policy. Later on, it performs an analysis of how some European countries are coping with the goals, with financial, legal, economical and regulatory measures. Finally, the paper draws a comparison between the countries to present a view on how Europe is responding to the emerging energy emergency of the modern world. Findings – Our analysis on different use cases (countries) showed that European countries are converging to a common energy policy, even though some countries appear to be later than others In particular, Southern European countries were slowed down by the world financial and economical crisis. Still, it appears that contingency plans were put into action, and Europe as a whole is proceeding steadily towards the common vision. Research limitations/implications – European countries are applying yet more cuts to financing green technologies, and it is not possible to predict clearly how each country will evolve its support to the European energy policy. Practical implications – Different countries applied the concepts and measures in different ways. The implementation of the European energy policy has to cope with the resulting plethora of regulations, and a company proposing enhancement regarding energy management still has to possess robust knowledge of the single country, before being able to export experience and know-how between European countries. Originality/Value – Even though a few surveys on energy measures in Europe are already part of the state-of-the-art, organic analysis diagonal to the different topics of the European Energy Policy is missing. Moreover, this paper highlights how European countries are converging on a common view, and provides some details on the differences between the countries, thus facilitating parties interesting into cross-country export of experience and technology for energy management.

Why did London become the main money market? Monetary Policy, Arbitrage and European Money Market Integration in 18th century

How did the leading capital market start to attract international bullion? Why did London become the main money market? Monetary regulations, including the charges for minting money and the restrictions on bullion exchange, have played the key role in defining the direction of the flow of international bullion. Countries that abolished minting charges and permitted the free movement of bullion were able to attract international bullion, and countries that applied minting taxes suffered an outflow of bullion. In these cases monetary authorities tried to limit bullion movement through prohibitions on domestic bullion exchange at a free price, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bullion exports. The paper illustrates the logic of international monetary flow in the 18th century, using empirical evidence for England, France and Spain. The first section defines and measures monetary policy, and the second section introduces minting charges into the arbitrage equation in order to explain the logic of bullion flow between the pairs of nations England-France, England-Spain and France-Spain. The conclusion emphasises the importance of monetary policy in the creation of leading money markets.