The Jama legal narrative. Part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, we reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: "The Jama Model. On Legal Narratives and Interpretation Patterns"), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story, is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability was infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for AI researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flouishing among legal scholars. Nowadays both the the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and Bayesioskeptics (e.g. Ron Allen) among those legal scholars whoare involved in the controversy are willing to give AI researchers a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application or probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making (Rosoni 1995). Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Distributed belief revision as applied within a descriptive model of jury deliberations

Belief revision is a well-research topic within AI. We argue that the new model of distributed belief revision as discussed here is suitable for general modelling of judicial decision making, along with extant approach as known from jury research. The new approach to belief revision is of general interest, whenever attitudes to information are to be simulated within a multi-agent environment with agents holding local beliefs yet by interaction with, and influencing, other agents who are deliberating collectively. In the approach proposed, it's the entire group of agents, not an external supervisor, who integrate the different opinions. This is achieved through an election mechanism, The principle of "priority to the incoming information" as known from AI models of belief revision are problematic, when applied to factfinding by a jury. The present approach incorporates a computable model for local belief revision, such that a principle of recoverability is adopted. By this principle, any previously held belief must belong to the current cognitive state if consistent with it. For the purposes of jury simulation such a model calls for refinement. Yet we claim, it constitutes a valid basis for an open system where other AI functionalities (or outer stiumuli) could attempt to handle other aspects of the deliberation which are more specifi to legal narrative, to argumentation in court, and then to the debate among the jurors.

[Book review] Rights of the Accused, Crime Control and Protection of Victims

Review of: Rights of the Accused, Crime Control and Protection of Victims. Edited by Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein. A special volume of the Israel Law Review, Vol. 31, Nos. 1-3, Winter-Summer 1997. Published by the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

[Book review] Psicologia Della Prova [Psychology of Proof]

Review of: Psicologia Della Prova [Psychology of Proof] edited by C. Cabras, Giuffré, Milano. 1996.

[Book review] Complex Cases: Perspectives on the Netherlands Criminal Justice System

Review of: Complex Cases: Perspectives on the Netherlands Criminal Justice System. (Eds.) M. Malsch & J.F. Nijboer. Thela Thesis Publishers (2000)

Kappa calculus and evidential strength: A note on Åqvist's logical theory of legal evidence

Lennart Åqvist (1992) proposed a logical theory of legal evidence, based on the Bolding-Ekelöf of degrees of evidential strength. This paper reformulates Åqvist's model in terms of the probabilistic version of the kappa calculus. Proving its acceptability in the legal context is beyond the present scope, but the epistemological debate about Bayesian Law isclearly relevant. While the present model is a possible link to that lineof inquiry, we offer some considerations about the broader picture of thepotential of AI & Law in the evidentiary context. Whereas probabilisticreasoning is well-researched in AI, calculations about the threshold ofpersuasion in litigation, whatever their value, are just the tip of theiceberg. The bulk of the modeling desiderata is arguably elsewhere, if one isto ideally make the most of AI's distinctive contribution as envisaged forlegal evidence research.

[Book review] Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts

Review of: Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts. Ray Bull and David Carson (eds.) Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.

Acknowledgement [Special Issue - Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence]

This Acknowledgement refers to the special issue "Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence" of the Artificial Intelligence and Law, September 2001, Vol. 9, Issue 2-3, which was guest edited by Ephraim Nissan.

Editorial: context, content and aims [Special Issue - Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence]

This special issue "Formal Approaches to Legal Evidence" of the Artificial Intelligence and Law, September 2001, Vol. 9, Issue 2-3, which was guest edited by Ephraim Nissan.

Editorial

Editorial

The Jama legal narrative part II: A foray into concepts of improbability

In judicial decision making, the doctrine of chances takes explicitly into account the odds. There is more to forensic statistics, as well as various probabilistic approaches, which taken together form the object of an enduring controversy in the scholarship of legal evidence. In this paper, I reconsider the circumstances of the Jama murder and inquiry (dealt with in Part I of this paper: 'The JAMA Model and Narrative Interpretation Patterns'), to illustrate yet another kind of probability or improbability. What is improbable about the Jama story is actually a given, which contributes in terms of dramatic underlining. In literary theory, concepts of narratives being probable or improbable date back from the eighteenth century, when both prescientific and scientific probability were infiltrating several domains, including law. An understanding of such a backdrop throughout the history of ideas is, I claim, necessary for Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers who may be tempted to apply statistical methods to legal evidence. The debate for or against probability (and especially Bayesian probability) in accounts of evidence has been flourishing among legal scholars; nowadays both the Bayesians (e.g. Peter Tillers) and the Bayesio-skeptics (e.g. Ron Allen), among those legal scholars who are involved in the controversy, are willing to give AI research a chance to prove itself and strive towards models of plausibility that would go beyond probability as narrowly meant. This debate within law, in turn, has illustrious precedents: take Voltaire, he was critical of the application of probability even to litigation in civil cases; take Boole, he was a starry-eyed believer in probability applications to judicial decision making. Not unlike Boole, the founding father of computing, nowadays computer scientists approaching the field may happen to do so without full awareness of the pitfalls. Hence, the usefulness of the conceptual landscape I sketch here.

Belief revision as applied within a descriptive model of jury deliberations

Belief revision is a well-researched topic within Artificial Intelligence (AI). We argue that the new model of belief revision as discussed here is suitable for general modelling of judicial decision making, along with the extant approach as known from jury research. The new approach to belief revision is of general interest, whenever attitudes to information are to be simulated within a multi-agent environment with agents holding local beliefs yet by interacting with, and influencing, other agents who are deliberating collectively. The principle of 'priority to the incoming information', as known from AI models of belief revision, is problematic when applied to factfinding by a jury. The present approach incorporates a computable model for local belief revision, such that a principle of recoverability is adopted. By this principle, any previously held belief must belong to the current cognitive state if consistent with it. For the purposes of jury simulation such a model calls for refinement. Yet, we claim, it constitutes a valid basis for an open system where other AI functionalities (or outer stimuli) could attempt to handle other aspects of the deliberation which are more specific to legal narratives, to argumentation in court, and then to the debate among the jurors.

The Daedalus system: A tool for the Italian investigating magistrate

Daedalus is a computer tool, developed by an Italian magistrate - Carmelo Asaro - and integrated in his own daily routine as an investigating magistrate conducting inquiries, then as a prosecutor if and when the case investigated goes to court. This tool has recently been adopted by magistrates in judiciary offices throughout Italy, spawning moreover other related projects. First, this paper describes a sample session with daedalus. Next, an overview of an array of judicial tools leads to positioning daedalus in the context of the spectrum.

Guidance on interviewing child witnesses in Scotland

The guidance was commissioned from Dr Amina Memon and Lynn Hulse at Aberdeen University. Their work was overseen by a steering group with representatives from the Scottish Executive Justice Department, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, NCH Scotland, the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, the Association of Directors of Social Work, the Law Society for Scotland, the Scottish Association of Community Child Health and the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration. A full list of those involved is given in the Appendix C. pt. 1. Guidance on interviewing child witnesses in Scotland -- pt. 2. Guidance on the questioning of children in court -- pt. 3. Lord Justice-General's memorandum on child witnesses: appendix to Guidance on the questioning of children in court -- pt. 4. Guidance on child witness court familiarisation visits -- pt. 5. Information about child, young and vulnerable adult witnesses to inform decision-making in the legal process: good practice guide -- pt. 6. Code of practice to facilitate the provision of therapeutic support to child witnesses in court proceedings -- pt. 7. Guidance on the conduct of identity parades with child witnesses.