Annual report : Intergovernmental Law Enforcement Officers In-Service Training Act fiscal year ... /

Provides a summary of Mobile Team Unit appropriations and activities, and serves to meet the requirements of Public Act 82-674, which directs submission of an annual report to the Governor and the legislature.

Evaluation of nine FY 96 Traffic Law Enforcement Program (TLEP) projects in Illinois /

"February 1998."

Evaluation of eight Traffic Law Enforcement Program (TLEP) projects in Illinois /

"June 1999."

Evaluation of the Traffic Law Enforcement Program (TLEP) and the Local Alcohol Program (LAP) projects in Illinois /

"May 2001."

Riverboat gambling and crime in Illinois : preliminary report on riverboat gambling in Joliet, impact on criminal activity and law enforcement workloads.

Cover title.

Right of way in traffic law enforcement.

Kept up to date by supplements.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Assessing an automated, information -sharing technology in the post "9 -11" era: Do local law enforcement officers think it meets their needs?

In the wake of the “9-11” terrorists' attacks, the U.S. Government has turned to information technology (IT) to address a lack of information sharing among law enforcement agencies. This research determined if and how information-sharing technology helps law enforcement by examining the differences in perception of the value of IT between law enforcement officers who have access to automated regional information sharing and those who do not. It also examined the effect of potential intervening variables such as user characteristics, training, and experience, on the officers' evaluation of IT. The sample was limited to 588 officers from two sheriff's offices; one of them (the study group) uses information sharing technology, the other (the comparison group) does not. Triangulated methodologies included surveys, interviews, direct observation, and a review of agency records. Data analysis involved the following statistical methods: descriptive statistics, Chi-Square, factor analysis, principal component analysis, Cronbach's Alpha, Mann-Whitney tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Scheffe' post hoc analysis. ^ Results indicated a significant difference between groups: the study group perceived information sharing technology as being a greater factor in solving crime and in increasing officer productivity. The study group was more satisfied with the data available to it. As to the number of arrests made, information sharing technology did not make a difference. Analysis of the potential intervening variables revealed several remarkable results. The presence of a strong performance management imperative (in the comparison sheriff's office) appeared to be a factor in case clearances and arrests, technology notwithstanding. As to the influence of user characteristics, level of education did not influence a user's satisfaction with technology, but user-satisfaction scores differed significantly among years of experience as a law enforcement officer and the amount of computer training, suggesting a significant but weak relationship. ^ Therefore, this study finds that information sharing technology assists law enforcement officers in doing their jobs. It also suggests that other variables such as computer training, experience, and management climate should be accounted for when assessing the impact of information technology. ^

Black and Blue: Exploring Racial Bias and Law Enforcement in the Killings of Unarmed Black Male Civilians

In late 2014, a series of highly publicized police killings of unarmed Black male civilians in the United States prompted large-scale social turmoil. In the current review, we dissect the psychological antecedents of these killings and explain how the nature of police work may attract officers with distinct characteristics that may make them especially well-primed for negative interactions with Black male civilians. We use media reports to contextualize the precipitating events of the social unrest as we ground our explanations in theory and empirical research from social psychology and industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology. To isolate some of the key mechanisms at play, we disentangle racial bias (e.g., stereotyping processes) from common characteristics of law enforcement agents (e.g., social dominance orientation), while also addressing the interaction between racial bias and policing. By separating the moving parts of the phenomenon, we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the factors that may have contributed to the killings. In doing so, we endeavor to more effectively identify and develop solutions to eradicate excessive use of force during interactions between “Black” (unarmed Black male civilians) and “Blue” (law enforcement).

EU-North Africa relations in cross-border law enforcement: new legal challenges for the EU in the post-Lisbon and post-Stockholm era

The Stockholm Programme, allied to the Lisbon Treaty, heralds a new era of development of the EU provisions on cross-border law enforcement. The focus is shifting from the ongoing internal EU developments to the external relations of the EU. Many North African countries have had long legal relationships with the EU through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships. A number of these partnership agreements make express references, at the political level, to the development of cross-border law enforcement provision, as is the case of Morocco and Algeria with regard to drug trafficking and manufacture, or the lengthy references by Egypt to many of the crimes of interest to the EU’s own law enforcement legal framework. Algeria is currently focusing on modernising their own police forces, with both Algeria and Tunisia, reforming their criminal judicial frameworks. Another key player, Libya, currently has no legal agreements with the EU, and at least until the recent conflict, maintained an observer status in the Euro-Mediterranean process. At a practitioner level, the European Police College (CEPOL) is currently involved in the Euromed Police II programme. Clearly momentum is developing, both within the EU and from a number of Euro-Med North African countries to develop closer law enforcement co-operation. This may well develop further with the recent changes in governments of a number of North African countries. The EU approach in the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) policy area is to develop a legal framework upon which EU cross-border law enforcement will be based. The current EU cross-border law enforcement framework is the product of many years of multi-level negotiations. Challenges will arise as new countries from different legal and policing traditions will attempt to engage with already highly detailed legal and practice frameworks. The shared European legal traditions will not necessarily be reflected in the North African countries. This chapter critically analyses, from an EU legal perspective the problems and issues that will be encountered as the EU’s North African partner countries attempt to articulate into the existing, and still developing EU cross-border law enforcement framework.