Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination : The Approach of the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo

[EN] On 17 February 2008 Kosovo approved its declaration of independence from Serbia. The declaration was raised as a unilateral secession, a category which to date is widely debated by the international community, but supported in that case by a respectable number of the United Nation member states. A great many legal issues have been raised by the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. This opinion was eagerly awaited by legal scholars due to both its possible effects and the scope of its principles outside the context of decolonization in what it could constitute of new approach to the international scenario for the twenty-first century. The ICJ stated that the declaration of independence was in accordance with international law if it was not prohibited. The answer turned on whether or not international law prohibited the declaration of independence, without ever examining whether an entity seeking secession is entitled with a positive right to secede and if so, under which circumstances. The basic issue can be summarised as whether or not we are facing a new course in the interpretation of certain classical categories of international law: the principle of territorial integrity, statehood, sovereignty, recognition, the right to external self-determination, etc. In this study we shall analyse some of the aspects arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo focusing on the territorial issue. Firstly we shall analyse the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and how it operates ; secondly, we shall focus on the scope of that principle in relation to the interior of the State, and ask ourselves how international law operates in relation to declarations of independence. Lastly, we shall deal with the principle of respect for territorial integrity in the specific case of Serbia with respect to Kosovo, and then end with a series of general conclusions. This study aims, definitely, to contribute to the theoretical debate on the challenges to the traditional certainties of international law in this area.

Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes

The International Court of Justice has issued its long-awaited decision in the suit filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro with respect to the 1992–1995 war. The decision confirms the factual and legal determinations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ruling that genocide was committed during the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 but that the conflict as a whole was not genocidal in nature. The Court held that Serbia had failed in its duty to prevent genocide in Srebrenica, although—because, the Court said, there was no certainty that it could have succeeded in preventing the genocide—no damages were awarded. The judgment provides a strong and authoritative statement of the general duty upon states to prevent genocide that dovetails well with the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.

Crime, justice and the legitimacy of military power in the international sphere

This article examines how a discourse of crime and justice is beginning to play a significant role in justifying international military operations. It suggests that although the coupling of war with crime and justice is not a new phenomenon, its present manifestations invite careful consideration of the connection between crime and political theory. It starts by reviewing the notion of sovereignty to look then at the history of the criminalisation of war and the emergence of new norms to constrain sovereign states. In this context, it examines the three ways in which military force has recently been authorised: in Iraq, in Libya and through drones in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. It argues the contemporary coupling of military technology with notions of crime and justice allows the reiteration of the perpetration of crimes by the powerful and the representation of violence as pertaining to specific dangerous populations in the space of the international. It further suggests that this authorises new architectures of authority, fundamentally based on military power as a source of social power.

Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court

Many prosecutors and commentators have praised the victim provisions at the International Criminal Court (ICC) as 'justice for victims', which for the first time include participation, protection and reparations. This book critically examines the role of victims in international criminal justice, drawing from human rights, victimology, and best practices in transitional justice.

Drawing on field research in Northern Uganda, Luke Moffet explores the nature of international crimes and assesses the role of victims in the proceedings of the ICC, paying particular attention to their recognition, participation, reparations and protection. The book argues that because of the criminal nature and structural limitations of the ICC, justice for victims is symbolic, requiring State Parties to complement the work of the Court to address victims' needs.

In advancing an innovative theory of justice for victims, and in offering solutions to current challenges, the book will be of great interest and use to academics, practitioners and students engaged in victimology, the ICC, transitional justice, or reparations.

Realising Justice for victims before the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been celebrated for its innovative victim provisions, which enable victims to participate in proceedings, avail of protection measures and assistance, and to claim reparations. The impetus for incorporating victim provisions within the ICC, came from victims’ dissatisfaction with the ad hoc tribunals in providing them with more meaningful and tangible justice.1 The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R) only included victim protection measures, with no provisions for victims to participate in proceedings nor to claim reparations at them. Developments in domestic and international law, in particular human rights such as the 1985 UN Declaration on Justice for Victims and the UN Guidelines on Remedy and Reparations, and transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth commissions and reparations bodies, have helped to expand the notion of justice for international crimes to be more attuned to victims as key stakeholders in dealing with such crimes.

With the first convictions secured at the ICC and the victim participation and reparation regime taking form, it is worth evaluating the extent to which these innovative provisions have translated into justice for victims. The first part of this paper outlines what justice for victims of international crimes entails, drawing from victimology and human rights. The second section surveys the extent to which the ICC has incorporated justice for victims, in procedural and substantive terms, before concluding in looking beyond the Court to how state parties can complement the ICC in achieving justice for victims. This paper argues that while much progress has been made to institutionalise justice for victims within the Court, there is much more progress needed to evolve and develop justice for victims within the ICC to avoid dissatisfaction of past tribunals.

Elaborating Justice for Victims at the International Criminal Court: Beyond Rhetoric and the Hague

Justice for victims has often been invoked as the raison d’être of international criminal justice, by punishing perpetrators of international crimes. This article attempts to provide a more holistic account of justice for victims by examining victims’ needs, interests, and rights. The International Criminal Court itself includes participation, protection and reparation for victims, indicating they are important stakeholders. This article also suggests that victims are integral to the purpose of the ICC in ending impunity by ensuring transparency of proceedings. However, there are limits to the resources and capacity of the ICC, which can only investigate and prosecute selected crimes. To overcome this justice gap, this article directs the debate towards a victim-orientated agenda to complementarity, where state parties and the Assembly of State Parties should play a greater role in implementing justice for victims domestically. This victim-orientated complementarity approach can be achieved through new ASP guidelines on complementarity, expanding universal jurisdiction, or seeking enforcement and cooperation through regional and international bodies and courts, such asUniversal Periodic Review or the African Court’s International Criminal Law Section. In the end, ifwe are serious about delivering justice for victims we need to move beyond the rhetoric, with realistic expectations of what the ICC can achieve, and concentrate our attention to what states should bedoing to end impunity.

Complementarity’s monopoly on justice in Uganda: the International Criminal Court, victims and Thomas Kwoyelo

Complementarity has been extolled as the pioneering way for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to navigate the difficulties of state sovereignty when investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Victims have often been held up to justify and legitimise the work of the ICC and states complementing the Court through domestic processes. This article examines how Uganda has developed its laws, legal procedure, and accountability for international crimes over the past decade. This has culminated in the trial of Thomas Kwoyelo, which after five years of proceedings, has yet to move to the trial phase, due to the issue of an amnesty. While there has been a profusion of provisions to allow victims to participate, avail of protection measures and reparations, in practice very little has changed for them. This article highlights the dangers of complementarity being the sole solution to protracted conflicts, in particular the realisation of victims’ rights.

Digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice

This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.

Quelle justice pour quelle réconciliation ? Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda et le jugement du génocide

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

L'émergence d'un principe de justice distributive en droit international économique : analyse de l'évolution du traitement spécial et différencié du GATT à l'OMC

La libéralisation des échanges a fait augmenter les richesses, mais en réalité, elles se sont concentrées dans les pays développés. La question de la distribution plus équitable des richesses s'est rapidement posée. Le système GATT/OMC a joué un rôle décisif dans la libéralisation des échanges et dans l'articulation des rapports entre les pays développés et les pays en développement (PED). L'émergence et l'incarnation juridique dans le système GATT/OMC d'un principe de justice distributive passe par l'évolution du traitement spécial et différencié (TSD). Sous le GATT, le TSD s'est d'abord manifesté par l'article XVIII et la Partie IV du GATT de 1947, la Clause d'habilitation et le Système de préférences de 1971. Le TSD ainsi proposé appartenait essentiellement à la sof law et a échoué dans sa tentative d'intégrer les PED au système SCM. Sous l'OMC, le TSD a changé de paradigme et de mandat. Le TSD est passé d'un outil voué à mettre au développement des PED à un mécanisme employé à aider les PED à mettre en œuvre les nouvelles politiques de libéralisation découlant des accords de l'OMC. Les dispositions TSD seront alors dispersées dans l'ensemble des accords de l'OMC, mais sans jamais transcender la forme «soft law» qui les caractérisait sous le GATT. L'échec de la Conférence de Seattle, en 1999, engendrera le «Programme de Doha pour le développement», en 2001. La Déclaration de Doha était alors perçue comme l'incarnation de la transformation de l'OMC en organisation qui se préoccupe désormais de justice distributive. En observant de près le texte de la Déclaration de Doha et en analysant sa valeur juridique, on ne constate pas de progrès significatifs. Encore une fois, les mesures proposées le sont sous forme de déclarations d'intention et de promesses, voire d'engagement à négocier. Actuellement, le Cycle de Doha tarde à aboutir et tout nous porte à croire que l'avènement de l'OMC n'a pas concrétisé la volonté des PED d'une répartition plus équitable des richesses.