What Transaction Costs are Acceptable in Life Insurance Products from the Policyholders' Viewpoint?

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analyze what transaction costs are acceptable for customers in different investments. In this study, two life insurance contracts, a mutual fund and a risk-free investment, as alternative investment forms are considered. The first two products under scrutiny are a life insurance investment with a point-to-point capital guarantee and a participating contract with an annual interest rate guarantee and participation in the insurer's surplus. The policyholder assesses the various investment opportunities using different utility measures. For selected types of risk profiles, the utility position and the investor's preference for the various investments are assessed. Based on this analysis, the authors study which cost levels can make all of the products equally rewarding for the investor. Design/methodology/approach - The paper notes the risk-neutral valuation calibration using empirical data utility and performance measurement dynamics underlying: geometric Brownian motion numerical examples via Monte Carlo simulation. Findings - In the first step, the financial performance of the various saving opportunities under different assumptions of the investor's utility measurement is studied. In the second step, the authors calculate the level of transaction costs that are allowed in the various products to make all of the investment opportunities equally rewarding from the investor's point of view. A comparison of these results with transaction costs that are common in the market shows that insurance companies must be careful with respect to the level of transaction costs that they pass on to their customers to provide attractive payoff distributions. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, their research question - i.e. which transaction costs for life insurance products would be acceptable from the customer's point of view - has not been studied in the above described context so far.

The extent of the insured’s duty of disclosure : a comparative analysis of the disclosure obligations of insured in Australia, Singapore and China

Pre-contractual material disclosure and representation from an insurance policy proposer is the most important element for insurers to make a decision on whether a proposer is insurable and what are the terms and conditions if the proposal by the proposer is able to be insured. The issue this thesis researches and investigates focus on the issues related to the pre-contractual non-disclosures and misrepresentations of an insured under the principle of utmost good faith, by operation of laws, can achieve with different results in different jurisdiction. A similar disputed claim involving material non-disclosed personal information or misrepresentation at the pre-contractual stage from an insured with respect to both general and life insurance policies settled by an insurer in Australia could be that the policy is set aside ab initio by the insurers in Singapore or China. The jurisdictions this thesis examines are • Australia; • Singapore; and • China including Hong Kong.

Policy and Practice Brief: Representative Payment

This brief provides an overview of the Representative Payee program administered by Social Security. Discussed are the many provisions of the programs as well as practice tips and implications for BPA&O and PABSS personnel.

Universal Access-NY User’s Guide

What is Universal Access-NY? Universal Access-NY is a complete online planning toolkit, www.UniversalAccessNY.org, where a One-Stop Delivery System can assess its practices, and develop work plans to improve physical and programmatic accessibility for all One-Stop customers. This web site and manual was developed by Cornell University’s Employment and Disability Institute, through the support and guidance of the New York State Department of Labor, with funding from two U.S. Department of Labor Work Incentive Grants (WIG 1 and 2). This web site was designed for use in a collaborative manner, bringing together One-Stop personnel, agency partners, business leaders and customers with disabilities. Universal Access-NY supports continuous improvement, with features that encourage multiple uses and incremental systems change.

Work Study and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

This Just the Facts Series details Work Study and Supplemental Security Income.

When are SSDI/SSI Benefits Paid Pending Appeal?

This Just the Facts Series details when SSDI/SSI benefits are paid pending appeal.

Promising Practices: Ensuring Choice Under the Ticket to Work Program - The Indiana PABSS Approach

The Ticket to Work program offered disabled and blind social security beneficiaries the promise of greater choice when selecting a vocational rehabilitation provider. With the issuance of Transmittal #17, much of the opportunity to choose a provider was removed. The Protection and Advocacy agency in Indiana took steps to protect the rights of disabled and blind beneficiaries to choose providers in the face of this significant policy change. Learn what was done to protect the rights and ability of beneficiaries to seek and choose vocational rehabilitation providers.

The Benefits Planner: New York Implements Medicaid Buy-In Program - Program Allows Individuals With Disabilities to Work and Keep Medicaid

This newsletter will provide valuable information on how work for persons with disabilities effects government benefits, with an emphasis on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) work incentives. Each newsletter will contribute to an ongoing dialogue on topics related to benefits and work.

Developing Strategic Marketing Plan

This publication is first in a series targeted for Coordinators and Managers within Benefits Planning, Assistance and Outreach Programs concerned with developing continuous quality improvement approaches. This early publication focuses on understanding strategies for market position, strategic planning and provides a tool for conducting an organizational self-assessment along with a stakeholder analysis

O agravamento do risco no contrato de seguro

Este trabalho objetivou demonstrar o que é e quais os requisitos adotados pela doutrina e pela jurisprudência para que seja aplicado o instituto do agravamento do risco (previsto nos artigos 768 e 769 do Código Civil) nos contratos de seguro, e quais os seus efeitos jurídicos. Para tanto, examinou-se o contrato de seguro buscando revelar a dimensão coletiva que este tipo negocial possui por excelência, em detrimento de parte da doutrina ainda restrita a uma leitura atomística e individualista deste contrato. Partiu-se, ainda, da premissa de que a boa-fé (seja na sua acepção objetiva ou subjetiva) é qualificada no contrato de seguro, eis que este tipo contratual é todo sob ela estruturado. O princípio da boa-fé é uma via de mão dupla que cria deveres para ambas as partes, cujas declarações e comportamentos serão fundamentais para a delimitação do objeto do seguro e para o alcance da função social desse tipo contratual. A boa-fé estará, ainda, incisivamente presente e modelando a relação obrigacional do seguro em todas as fases contratuais: antes da conclusão do contrato, na apresentação da proposta do contrato; durante a relação obrigacional, nas declarações necessárias sobre eventuais alterações no risco (tais como o seu agravamento), e, ainda, na fase pós-contratual, sempre considerando a natureza comunitária do seguro. Passou-se, também, por algumas questões polêmicas envolvendo a utilização de determinadas cláusulas no seguro, tidas como contrárias à boa-fé, a exemplo da cláusula perfil, cuja validade deve ser avaliada no caso concreto, e possui íntima relação com o agravamento do risco.

Construction Dispute Resolution in Ireland during Recession: Best Practice for Small-to-Medium Enterprises

The purpose of this paper is to identify best practice construction dispute resolution in small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) within Ireland during the recent economic recession. A sequential mixed methodology encompassing a detailed literature review, case studies, and questionnaire survey is adopted, with results analyzed using both exploratory (data reduction) and confirmatory (structural equation modelling) factor analysis. The results show that four core aspects should be adopted by SMEs to achieve best practice construction dispute resolution in recession: third-party intervention, adoption of a streamlined process, proactive party characteristics, and the use of legal professionals. Numerous studies of this subject have been conducted; however, no research has been done to date documenting best practice in construction dispute resolution within SMEs, particularly in light of the economic recession in Ireland. It is clear that dispute resolution in Ireland is currently undergoing fundamental changes, and time is necessary to see if the new Construction Contracts Act 2013 will help this practice. Therefore, it is a fundamental requirement for project management and legal professionals to acknowledge the changing environment attributable to the economic downturn and the resultant SME best practices in dispute resolution. This paper fulfills a gap in knowledge with the emergence of the economic recession and the evolution of best practice in dispute resolution within SMEs in the Irish construction sector.

Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously

Although Insurers Face Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard When They Set Insurance Contracts, These Two Types of Asymmetrical Information Have Been Given Separate Treatments Sofar in the Economic Literature. This Paper Is a First Attempt to Integrate Both Problems Into a Single Model. We Show How It Is Possible to Use Time in Order to Achieve a First-Best Allocation of Risks When Both Problems Are Present Simultaneously.

Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment

Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.

Assurance companies' returns.

Title varies slightly.

Marine policies; a complete statement of the law concerning contracts of marine insurance, with an appendix, containing the Marine insurance act, 1906, and other statutes,

Mode of access: Internet.