Compulsory Voting, Encouraged Tweeting? Australian Elections and Social Media

This chapter examines patterns in social media activity around Australian elections, focusing primarily on the 2013 federal election and supplemented by extended research into social media and Australian politics between 2007 and 2015. The coverage of Australian elections on social media is analysed from three perspectives: the evolution of the use of online platforms during elections; politician and party social media strategies during the 2013 election, focusing on Twitter; and citizen engagement with elections as demonstrated through election day tweeting practices. The specific context of Australian politics, where voting is compulsory, and the popularity of social media platforms like Twitter makes this case notably different from other Western democracies. It also demonstrates the extended mediation of politics through social media, for politicians and citizens alike.

Valence and spatial explanations for voting in the 2013 Australian election

This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere.

Documenting the inevitable: Voting behaviour at the 2013 Australian election

This chapter uses data from the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES), conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Gibson (Bean et al. 2014) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in the election. The study was funded by the Australian Research Council and involved a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-completion questionnaire mailed to respondents on the day before the 7 September election. The sample was a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. Respondents were given the option of returning the completed questionnaire by reply-paid mail or completing the survey online. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings and the final sample size was 3955, representing a response rate of 34 per cent. The data were weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote.

Voting Paths

We consider a variant of the popular matching problem here. The input instance is a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$, where vertices in $\mathcal{A}$ are called applicants and vertices in $\mathcal{P}$ are called posts. Each applicant ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching $M$ is popular if there is no other matching $M'$ such that the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M'$ to $M$ exceeds the number of applicants who prefer their partners in $M$ to $M'$. However, the “more popular than” relation is not transitive; hence this relation is not a partial order, and thus there need not be a maximal element here. Indeed, there are simple instances that do not admit popular matchings. The questions of whether an input instance $G$ admits a popular matching and how to compute one if it exists were studied earlier by Abraham et al. Here we study reachability questions among matchings in $G$, assuming that $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ admits a popular matching. A matching $M_k$ is reachable from $M_0$ if there is a sequence of matchings $\langle M_0,M_1,\dots,M_k\rangle$ such that each matching is more popular than its predecessor. Such a sequence is called a length-$k$ voting path from $M_0$ to $M_k$. We show an interesting property of reachability among matchings in $G$: there is always a voting path of length at most 2 from any matching to some popular matching. Given a bipartite graph $G=(\mathcal{A}\cup\mathcal{P},E)$ with $n$ vertices and $m$ edges and any matching $M_0$ in $G$, we give an $O(m\sqrt{n})$ algorithm to compute a shortest-length voting path from $M_0$ to a popular matching; when preference lists are strictly ordered, we have an $O(m+n)$ algorithm. This problem has applications in dynamic matching markets, where applicants and posts can enter and leave the market, and applicants can also change their preferences arbitrarily. After any change, the current matching may no longer be popular, in which case we are required to update it. However, our model demands that we switch from one matching to another only if there is consensus among the applicants to agree to the switch. Hence we need to update via a voting path that ends in a popular matching. Thus our algorithm has applications here.

Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting

In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the POSSIBLE WINNER problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge 10]. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common voting rules. We show that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule does not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candidates as the parameter. We show however that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem which is an important special case of the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the POSSIBLE WINNER problem is harder than the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem since the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the POSSIBLE WINNER problem does not admit a polynomial kernel. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Financial equilibrium, voting procedures, and coalition structures in allocational mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which is concerned with properties of allocational mechanisms which include voting procedures as part of their operation. The theme of interaction between economic and political forces recurs in the three chapters, as described below.

Chapter One demonstrates existence of a non-controlling interest shareholders' equilibrium for a stylized one-period stock market economy with fewer securities than states of the world. The economy has two decision mechanisms: Owners vote to change firms' production plans across states, fixing shareholdings; and individuals trade shares and the current production / consumption good, fixing production plans. A shareholders' equilibrium is a production plan profile, and a shares / current good allocation stable for both mechanisms. In equilibrium, no (Kramer direction-restricted) plan revision is supported by a share-weighted majority, and there exists no Pareto superior reallocation.

Chapter Two addresses efficient management of stationary-site, fixed-budget, partisan voter registration drives. Sufficient conditions obtain for unique optimal registrar deployment within contested districts. Each census tract is assigned an expected net plurality return to registration investment index, computed from estimates of registration, partisanship, and turnout. Optimum registration intensity is a logarithmic transformation of a tract's index. These conditions are tested using a merged data set including both census variables and Los Angeles County Registrar data from several 1984 Assembly registration drives. Marginal registration spending benefits, registrar compensation, and the general campaign problem are also discussed.

The last chapter considers social decision procedures at a higher level of abstraction. Chapter Three analyzes the structure of decisive coalition families, given a quasitransitive-valued social decision procedure satisfying the universal domain and ITA axioms. By identifying those alternatives X* ⊆ X on which the Pareto principle fails, imposition in the social ranking is characterized. Every coaliton is weakly decisive for X* over X~X*, and weakly antidecisive for X~X* over X*; therefore, alternatives in X~X* are never socially ranked above X*. Repeated filtering of alternatives causing Pareto failure shows states in X^n*~X^((n+1))* are never socially ranked above X^((n+1))*. Limiting results of iterated application of the *-operator are also discussed.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

The Voting Rights Act, Shelby County, and Redistricting: Improving Estimates of Racially Polarized Voting in a Multiple-Election Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County has severely limited the power of the Voting Rights Act. I argue that Congressional attempts to pass a new coverage formula are unlikely to gain the necessary Republican support. Instead, I propose a new strategy that takes a “carrot and stick” approach. As the stick, I suggest amending Section 3 to eliminate the need to prove that discrimination was intentional. For the carrot, I envision a competitive grant program similar to the highly successful Race to the Top education grants. I argue that this plan could pass the currently divided Congress.

Without Congressional action, Section 2 is more important than ever before. A successful Section 2 suit requires evidence that voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized. Accurately and objectively assessing the level of polarization has been and continues to be a challenge for experts. Existing ecological inference methods require estimating polarization levels in individual elections. This is a problem because the Courts want to see a history of polarization across elections.

I propose a new 2-step method to estimate racially polarized voting in a multi-election context. The procedure builds upon the Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) multinomial-Dirichlet model. After obtaining election-specific estimates, I suggest regressing those results on election-specific variables, namely candidate quality, incumbency, and ethnicity of the minority candidate of choice. This allows researchers to estimate the baseline level of support for candidates of choice and test whether the ethnicity of the candidates affected how voters cast their ballots.

At Your Convenience: Facilitating Voting and Registration

This work proposes answers to methodological and substantive questions related to convenience voting. The first analytical chapter surveys the various research designs that have been proposed within this literature, and concludes that the field benefits from using all in conjunction. The next chapter uses matching to identify the relationship between disability status and political participation, and considers whether any forms of convenience voting mediate in the relationship. The final two analytical chapters examine how online voter registration, one of the most recent policy innovations, affects participation and vote share in American elections. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings presented herein, and briefly discusses the natural extensions of this work.

Testing of Depth-Encoded Hough Voting for Infrastructure Object Detection

The lack of viable methods to map and label existing infrastructure is one of the engineering grand challenges for the 21st century. For instance, over two thirds of the effort needed to geometrically model even simple infrastructure is spent on manually converting a cloud of points to a 3D model. The result is that few facilities today have a complete record of as-built information and that as-built models are not produced for the vast majority of new construction and retrofit projects. This leads to rework and design changes that can cost up to 10% of the installed costs. Automatically detecting building components could address this challenge. However, existing methods for detecting building components are not view and scale-invariant, or have only been validated in restricted scenarios that require a priori knowledge without considering occlusions. This leads to their constrained applicability in complex civil infrastructure scenes. In this paper, we test a pose-invariant method of labeling existing infrastructure. This method simultaneously detects objects and estimates their poses. It takes advantage of a recent novel formulation for object detection and customizes it to generic civil infrastructure scenes. Our preliminary experiments demonstrate that this method achieves convincing recognition results.