Love and rationality: on some possible rational effects of love

In this paper I defend the idea that rather than disrupting rationality, as the common-sense conception has done it, love may actually help us to develop rational ways of thinking and acting. I make the case for romantic or erotic love, since this is the kind of love that is more frequently associated with irrationality in acting and thinking. I argue that this kind of love may make us develop epistemic and practical forms of rationality. Based on an analysis of its characteristic action tendencies, I argue that love may help us to develop an instrumental form of rationality in determining the best means to achieve the object of love. It may also narrow down the number of practical considerations that may help us to achieve our goals. Finally, love may generate rational ways of belief-formation by framing the parameters taken into account in perception and attention, and by bringing into light only a small portion of the epistemic information available. Love may make us perceive reality more acutely.

Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows

Abstract In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

The importance of package design to Japanese consumers: The role of visual and informational elements of package design in decision making

The importance of package design as a marketing tool is growing as the competition in retail environment increases. However, there is a lack of studies on how each element of package design affects consumer decisions in different countries. The objective of this thesis is to study the role of package design to Japanese consumers. The research was conducted through an experiment with a sample of 37 Japanese female participants. They were divided into two groups and were given different tasks: one group had to choose a chocolate for themselves, and the other for a group of friends. The participants were presented with 15 different Finnish chocolate boxes to choose from. The qualitative data was gathered through observation and semi-structured interviews. In addition, data from questionnaires was quantified and all the data was triangulated. The empirical results suggest that visual elements strongly affect the decision making of Japanese consumers. Image was the most important element which acted as both, a visual and an informational aspect in the experiment. Informational elements on the other hand have little effect, especially when the context is written in a foreign language. However, informational elements affected participants who were choosing chocolates for a group of friends. A unique finding was the importance of kawaii (cuteness) to Japanese consumers.

Valuation models and Simon's bounded rationality

This paper aims at reconciling the evidence that sophisticated valuation models are increasingly used by companies in their investment appraisal with the literature of bounded rationality, according to which objective optimization is impracticable in the real world because it would demand an immense level of sophistication of the analytical and computational processes of human beings. We show how normative valuation models should rather be viewed as forms of reality representation, frameworks according to which the real world is perceived, fragmented for a better understanding, and recomposed, providing an orderly method for undertaking a task as complex as the investment decision.

Herbert A. Simon and the concept of rationality: boundaries and procedures

This paper discusses Herbert A. Simon's conception of rationality in two of its principal general definitions: bounded rationality and procedural rationality. It argues that the latter is the one that better synthesizes the author's view about rational behavior and that the former fills mainly a critical function. They are complementarily used by Simon in this sense. In spite of that, it is argued that it is the low degree of specificity of the concept of bounded rationality one of the reasons for its relatively greater success.

Freedom of choice and bounded rationality: a brief appraisal of behavioral economists' plea for light paternalism

Behavioral economics has addressed interesting positive and normative questions underlying the standard rational choice theory. More recently, it suggests that, in a real world of boundedly rational agents, economists could help people to improve the quality of their choices without any harm to autonomy and freedom of choice. This paper aims to scrutinize available arguments for and against current proposals of light paternalistic interventions mainly in the domain of intertemporal choice. It argues that incorporating the notion of bounded rationality in economic analysis and empirical findings of cognitive biases and self-control problems cannot make an indisputable case for paternalism.

Rationality in children: the first steps

Not all categorization is conceptual. Many of the experimental findings concerning infant and animal categorization invite the hypothesis that the subjects form abstract perceptual representations, mental models or cognitive maps that are not composed of concepts. The paper is a reflection upon the idea that conceptual categorization involves the ability to make categorical judgements under the guidance of norms of rationality. These include a norm of truth-seeking and a norm of good evidence. Acceptance of these norms implies willingness to defer to cognitive authorities, unwillingness to commit oneself to contradictions, and knowledge of how to reorganize one's representational system upon discovering that one has made a mistake. It is proposed that the cognitive architecture required for basic rationality is similar to that which underlies pretend-play. The representational system must be able to make room for separate 'mental spaces' in which alternatives to the actual world are entertained. The same feature underlies the ability to understand modalities, time, the appearance-reality distinction, other minds, and ethics. Each area of understanding admits of degrees, and mastery (up to normal adult level) takes years. But rational concept-management, at least in its most rudimentary form, does not require a capacity to form second-order representations. It requires knowledge of how to operate upon, and compare, the contents of different mental spaces.

Fitness to stand trial : how discourses of rationality, reasonableness and culpability inform the law and psychiatry to create standards of normal

The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of the concepts of rationality, reasonableness, culpability and autonomy that inform and support our conception of both the person and the punishable subject. A critical discourse analysis tracing these concepts through both the law and psychological tools used to evaluate the fitness of a person reveals that these concepts and their implied values are inconsistently applied to the mentally disordered who come into conflict with the law. I argue that the result of this inconsistency compromises a person's autonomy which is a contradiction to this concept as a foundational principle of the law. Ultimately, this thesis does not provide a solution to be employed in policy making, but its analysis leaves open possibilities for further exploration into the ways legal and social justice can be reconciled.

The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings

This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings.

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

L’anthropologie théologique évangélique à la rencontre de la rationalité technoscientifique

Cette thèse analyse les incidences des avancées d’une rationalité technoscientifique sur les définitions classiques de l’humain. Elle discerne, dans sa présentation de ce phénomène, le lien entre la technoscience, la cybernétique et le posthumanisme qui en découle. Elle souligne les mutations et projets de remodèlement de l’humain qui traversent cette rationalité technoscientifique et son paradigme informationnel cybernéticien. Cette rationalité technoscientifique, polémique aux ontologies dites conservatrices, soutenant une vision amorale de la RDTS (Recherche & Développement technoscientifique), accouche d’un posthumanisme – en rapport difficile avec le corps – qui bouscule les définitions classiques de l’humain judéo-chrétien, dont l’anthropologie théologique évangélique. Traitant, dans une première grande section de trois chapitres, de la rationalité technoscientifique et de ses visions de l’humain, la thèse permet la mise en exergue des enjeux principaux se dégageant des nouveaux questionnements des anthropologies classiques soumises aux pressions de la RDTS. Dans la deuxième partie, encore de trois chapitres, qui porte sur l’anthropologie évangélique, la thèse situe les Évangéliques historiquement et doctrinalement, pour mieux relever les éléments identitaires du mouvement et les grandes déterminations théologiques à l’intérieur desquels se déploie cette anthropologie. La présentation de cette dernière se décline à partir des différentes compréhensions du motif anthropologique évangélique par excellence, l’imago Dei et le concept de l’unicité de l’humain dont les fondements semblent de plus en plus fragiles à la lumière des conclusions des recherches en paléontologie et en cognition animale. Si plusieurs défis importants sont posés à l’anthropologie évangélique, la thèse, se limitant à une critique évangélique de la rationalité technoscientifique et des réponses évangéliques à cette dernière, analyse une question essentielle pour la pensée évangélique, celle de l’humain homo ii faber et l’anthropotechnie, versus le remodèlement de l’humain autour des interrogations posthumanistes sur le corps et la question du salut. Cette thèse apporte une contribution 1) sur le plan de la synthèse qu’elle présente de l’anthropologie évangélique, 2) de la compréhension de l’identité évangélique, sa singularité et sa diversité, et 3) des manières dont une théologie évangélique peut entrer en dialogue avec la raison technoscientifique. Elle lève le voile sur l’utilisation tous azimuts du concept de l’imago Dei et de son insuffisance, à lui seul, pour apprécier les véritables enjeux du débat avec la rationalité technoscientique. Elle insinue que ce motif doit être analysé en conjonction avec la christologie dans l’approfondissement du Logos incarné, pour en mieux apprécier l'étendue. Ce n'est que dans ce lien qu’ont pu être trouvés des éléments capables d'articuler ce qui est en germe dans l'imago Dei et suggérer une définition de l’humain capable de prendre en considération les défis d’une rationalité technoscientifique et de son posthumanisme.

The Informational Complexity of Learning from Examples

This thesis attempts to quantify the amount of information needed to learn certain tasks. The tasks chosen vary from learning functions in a Sobolev space using radial basis function networks to learning grammars in the principles and parameters framework of modern linguistic theory. These problems are analyzed from the perspective of computational learning theory and certain unifying perspectives emerge.