Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

Sacrifice and efficiency of the income tax schedule

We investigate the efficiency of equal sacrifice tax schedules in an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971): a continuum of individuals with identical preferences defined over consumption and leisure who differ with respect to their labor market productivity. Using a separable specification for preferences we derive the minimum equal sacrifice allocation and recover the tax schedule that implements it. The separable specification allows us to use the methodology developed by Werning (2007b) to check whether the schedule is efficient, that is, whether there is no alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. We find that inefficiency does not arise for most parametrizations we use to approximate the US economy. For the few cases for which inefficiency does arise, it does so only for very high levels of income and marginal tax rates.

On the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules

In an economy which primitives are exactly those in Mirrlees (1971), we investigate the efficiency of labor income tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle. Starting from a given government revenue level, we use Werning’s (2007b) approach to assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule to the one derived under the equal sacrifice principle that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one. For our preferred parametrizations of the problem we find that inefficiency only arises at very high levels of income. We also show how the multipliers of the Pareto problem may be extracted from the data and used to find the implicit marginal social weights associated with each level of income.

Cash-cum-in-kind transfers and income tax function

This paper investigates income tax revenues response to tax rate changes taking into consideration that cash-cum-in-kind transfers are used as a redistributive package to the community. First, we show that when cash and in-kind transfers are not tied to be substitute instruments, a marginal income tax increase may unambiguously decrease the quantity supplied of labor (and tax revenues therein). Next, we show that whenever the government chooses the optimum provision for the publicly provided good the tax revenue function has a negatively-sloped part with respect to tax rates except for one case. Last, we consider Brazilian data - PNAD - from 1976 to 2008 to test our theoretical implications. Our estimations suggest a weak evidence in favor of the existence of a La er-type curve for Brazilian income tax revenues data. Moreover, wend that the actual average income tax rate seems to be below the estimated optimum level. In a shorter sample from 1996-1999, we nd evidence that labor supply decreases with tax rate when cash and in-kind transfers are in play. Using a pseudo-panel from the same shorter sample, we try to estimate the elasticity of taxable income, following Creedy and Gemmell (2012) and Saez et al. (2009). We explore a small tax reform between 1997 and 1998 that a ected only the higher income tax bracket, and evidence that Brazil is on the revenue reducing side of the La er Curve, at least for individuals in the higher income tax bracket.

Strengthening a fiscal pillar: the Uruguayan dual income tax

Includes bibliography

The paradox of progressivity in low-tax countries: income tax in Guatemala

Includes bibliography

The Determinants of Personal Income Tax Progressivity Around the Globe

This paper utilizes a novel database collected by the authors to document features of the progressivity of personal income tax systems across 209 countries for the years 1980-2009. We measure progressivity in several ways. First, we associate it with the increase in effective average (marginal) tax rates between a wage of zero and ten times the average wage in a country. Second, we consider the curvature of the tax schedule expressed as the difference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from a wage of zero to ten times the average wage and a linear average tax schedule and, alternatively, the diference between the effective average (marginal) tax schedule from the minimum positive taxable income, to ten times the average wage as opposed to a linear average tax schedule. Moreover, the paper assesses patterns regarding the conditional correlation of country-specifc tax progressivity measures with a host of economic and political country-specific characteristics and find the labor supply elasticity and the income replacement rates for the unemployed to be key determinants of progressivity around the globe, in line with economic theory.

Regulations 111 relating to the income tax under the Internal revenue code, with amendments to July 31, 1951, including T. D. 5841.

Mode of access: Internet.

Federal income tax treatment of capital gains and losses; a Treasury tax study.

Mode of access: Internet.

Regulations 111 relating to the income tax under the Internal revenue code (applicable only to years beginning after December 31, 1941). Supplement.

At head of title: U.S. Treasury Dept. Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Treasury decisions nos. 5680 to 5815, issued after December 1, 1948 and before December 1, 1950 : amending Income tax regulations 111 issued under the Internal revenue code for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941 : to be used in conjunction with preceding pamphlets and Supplement to Regulations 111.

Mode of access: Internet.

Revenue act of 1932--Supplement no. 3. Income tax exemption of mutual insurance companies. : Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, seventy-second Congress, first session on H.R. 10236 an act to provide revenue, equalize taxation and for other purposes, May 20, 1932.

Mode of access: Internet.

Income tax treaties. The income tax conventions of the United States with Great Britain, Canada, and other countries,

Bibliography: p. xxiii-xxxviii.